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JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 AUGUST 1992 


Foreign 

Broadcast 

Information 

Service 


JPRS Report — 


East Europe 




REPRODUCED BY 

U S. DEPARTMENT OF 
NATIONAL TECHNICAL IN 
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161 


DnC QUALITY mSPEUTED a 











East Europe 


JPRS-EER-92-109 CONTENTS 18 August 1992 


BULGARIA 

National Democracy Party Officially Founded . 1 

Background Information [ZORA 19 May] . 1 

Editor’s Note [ZORA 2 JunJ ...... 1 

Chairman Interviewed [ZORA 2 Jun] .... 1 

I>eputy Chairman Interviewed [ZORA 2 Jun] . 2 

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 

Political Platforms, Problems of Separation Viewed [NARODNA OBRODA 14 Jul] . 4 

Doubts About Advisability of Separation Voiced [NARODNA OBRODA 17 Jul] . 4 

Havel’s, Meciar’s Political Ideas Compared [KULTURNY ZIVOT 25 Jun] . 5 

German Foreign Investments in CSFR Viewed [EKONOM No 19, 1992] . 6 

Czech ‘Unique Antichauvinism’ Explained [LIDOVE NOVINY 8 Jul] . 1 

Slovak Culture Will Favor ‘National Realism’ [MLADA FRONTA DNES 8 Jul] . 8 

Slovak Economist Says Common Currency Possible [LIDOVE NOVINY 14 Jul] . 8 

Three Ways of Separating Currency Suggested [LIDOVE NOVINY 14 Jul] . 9 

HUNGARY 

Romanians Give Serbs Strayed Hungarian Pilot [NEPSZABADSAG 8 Aug] . 12 

‘Cultural Autonomy’Promised Ukraine’s Hungarians [NEPSZABADSAG 29 Jul] . 12 

SZDSZ’s Tamas on Government’s Aims, Tactics [HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 4 Jul] . 12 

Attorney General on Government’s Supervisory Role [HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 4 Jul] . 14 

Government Sues for ‘Offending the Authorities’ [HETI VILAGGAZDASAG II Jul] . 16 

Scant Support Seen for Hungarian Draft Resisters [MAGYAR SZO 6 Jul] . 18 

Novi Sad University Strike Leader Interviewed [MAGYAR SZO 7 Jul] . 18 

Restrictions in Abortion Draft Bill Proposals [NEPSZABADSAG 1 Jul] . 19 

POLAND 

Commentary on Walesa’s Military Doctrine Speech [POLSKA ZBROJNA 31 Jul-2 Aug] . 21 

Intelligence Problems Reflected in Lustration Law [PRA WO IZYCIE 20 Jun] . 21 

Defense Minister Comments on New Developments [POLSKA ZBROJNA 31 Jul-2 Aug] . 23 

Author Discusses Draft of New Electoral Law [POLYTIKA 20 Jun] . 24 

Economic Impact of German Unification Detailed [RYNKIZAGRANICZNE 13 Jun] . 26 

Commentary on State of Economy for First Quarter [GAZETA BANKOWA 5-11 Jul] . 27 

Views on Reprivatization by Sejm Deputies [RZECZPOSPOLITA 29 Jun] . 29 

Difficult Financial Times for Craftsmen Foreseen [ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE 19 Jul] . 30 

CROATIA 

Macedonian ‘Fear’ of Conference on Yugoslavia [NOVI VJESNIK 29 Jul] . 33 

Statistics on Type, Quantity of Serbia’s Weapons [NOVI VJESNIK 19 Jul] . 34 

SLOVENIA 

Minister Rupel Visits Lithuania, Byelarus [DELO 24 Jul] ... 36 

Refugee Exodus From Bosnia-Hercegovina Detailed [DELO 1 Aug] . 36 

UN, Western Attitude Toward Bosnia, ‘Killings’ [DELO 1 Aug] .. 39 

Wage Dispute Between Government, Trade Unions [DELO 29 Jul] . 41 








































JPRS-EER-92-109 


YUGOSLAVIA 

EC Decision Complicates Macedonian Politics .. 42 

Diplomacy Questioned [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 4 Jul] .. 42 

Government Crisis [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 4 Jul] .... 43 

Dilemma Continues [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 4 Jul] ... 44 

Power Struggle [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 4 Jul] . 45 

EC Decision on Macedonia Affects World Bodies [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 4 Jul] . 47 

Data on Refugees in Macedonia Published [Sofia 168 CHASA 4 Aug] ... 48 

Views of Montene^n Opposition on Cosic [BORBA 30 Jul] .... 49 

Darmanovic Describes Talks With President Cosic [BORBA 30 Jul] . 50 

Russian Opposition Leader Against Sanctions [NIN 31 Jul] . 50 

Declaration on Peaceful Resolution in Sandzak [BORBA 30 Jul] . 54 

Implications of General Vasiljevic’s Arrest [NIN 24 Jul] . 54 

Hercegovina Fighter Denies Forming Army [BORBA 30 Jul] ... 56 

Hercegovina Corps Commander Describes Problems [BORBA 30 Jul] . ... 56 

Serbian Opposition After Democratic Party Rift [BORBA 30 Jul] . 57 

Program of Social Democratic Party Discussed [BORBA 24 Jul] ... 58 


















JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 Aagost 1992 


BULGARIA 


1 


National Democracy Party Officially Founded 

Background Information 

92BA1087A Sofia ZORA in Bulgarian 19 May 92 p 2 

[Unattributed report: “National Democracy”] 

[Text] The National Democracy Party was officially 
registered on 7 April 1992. 

Earlier, on 15 February 1992, the delegates attending the 
National Conference of OKZNI [National Committee 
for the Defense of National Interests] in Khaskovo 
unanimously resolved that, having fulfilled its political 
role of defending the national interests in the conversion 
to a democratic society, the OKZNI must disband itself. 
The delegates determined that the present circumstances 
required the founding of a new party. National Democ¬ 
racy, which was founded. Its statute was adopted and its 
leading authorities elected. Dimitur Amaudov was 
elected president of the National Democracy Party, and 
Rumen Kasabov was elected his deputy. 

In its next issue, ZORA will publish interviews with 
Amaudov and Kasabov on the party’s objectives and 
tasks and its place in political life. 

Editor’s Note 

92BA1087B Sofia ZORA in Bulgarian 2 Jun 92 p 8 

[Text] In its issue No. 19, ZORA reported on the 
founding of a new political formation—^the National 
Democracy Party. The name itself indicates the princi¬ 
ples and priorities that will be upheld by the party in our 
social life. Something else is also clear What is sought is 
unity, not confrontation between the national idea and 
the principles of democracy. 

ZORA has always encouraged understanding and con¬ 
sensus among all patriotic forces that aspire to work for 
the good of the fatherland. In this sense, as well, we look 
with tmst and hope at any patriotic initiative aimed at 
the consolidation of social and national energy. 

Chairman Interviewed 

92BA1087C Sofia ZORA in Bulgarian 2 Jun 92 p 8 

[Interview with Dimitur Amaudov, chairman of the 
National Democracy Party, by Ventseslav Nachev, 
ZORA political observer, place and date not given: 
“Euphoria Must Be Replaced by Reason”] 

[Text] [ZORA] Mr. Amaudov, you did not mn for 
national representative in the October elections, 
although, according to mmor, you had a good opportu¬ 
nity. Instead, you founded a political party. Is there any 
connection between these two events? 

[Amaudov] The decisions concerning both events had 
been reached by me as early as Febmary 1991, when my 
former fellow workers adopted the policy of seeking a 
way to enter parliament and chose to form a coalition 


with the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and its satellites. 
The inevitable confrontation with the positions held by 
the membership and the subsequent rejection of this 
action logically led to an alternative, the creation of a 
new political association based on a new ideological 
platform, using new political methods and displaying a 
new type of behavior. I was already prepared, the more 
so because, in January 1991,1 proposed to the OKZNI 
[National Committee for the Defense of National Inter¬ 
ests] Administrative Council a variant that called for the 
creation of a new organization to be known as “National 
Democracy,” as a way of rejecting the unconstructive 
confrontation with other organizations on the political 
scene. The euphoria had to be replaced with reason. 
Time proved that this was politically correct. 

[ZORA] Was this the reason for the creation of the 
National Democracy Party? 

[Amaudov] In no case was this the sole reason because 
reasons are merely a direct reflection of views on the 
adequacy of the form to be taken in terms of political 
realities. Even then, it was clear to me that the OKZNI is 
inconsistent with the dynamically changing political 
situation and that the form—a social movement—^will 
result in a real loss of its political autonomy. Even the 
OPT [Fatherland Labor Party] created within the 
OKZNI was unable to further develop the political 
objectives and tasks of the movement, 

[ZORA] You are thus hinting that the journalists have 
justifiably made a distinction between you and the 
remaining leadership of the OKZNI and the OPT. It is 
interesting to find out how you were able to preserve 
your autonomy and reputation, surrounded as you were. 

[Amaudov] If you were to ask the current OPT activists, 
they would tell you that I am a political corpse, a 
national representative who has totally failed, who was 
elected in vain, and who betrayed the hopes of his 
electorate. They would be unable to think in any other 
way about someone who dared publicly, using the mass 
media, to oppose them and rally the dissidents. In the 
parliament, I tried to and succeeded in establishing a real 
differentiation between political opposition and human 
interrelationships. I am satisfied that I remained true to 
myself and to the people who, at this moment, are the 
foundations of the National Democracy Party. 

[ZORA] A party is created for the sake of actively 
participating in political life and struggling for political 
power. In that sense, what are the chances of the party 
you are heading? 

[Amaudov] You are asking me to answer a Hamlet-like 
question: To participate or to observe political life? 

More than one year passed between the idea of founding 
the party and its official registration. This was a time 
used for renovating structures, for getting rid of people 
who made use of the situation to pursue personal objec¬ 
tives, for reinterpreting realities, and so forth. As an 
elitist party stemming from the circles of private owners, 


2 


BULGAMA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


the intelligentsia, and the financial circles, the party at 
this time is currently involved in developing its financial 
power and teams of experts. 

The Latin saying “More haste, less speed” applies to the 
present organizational principle, which, in turn, indi¬ 
cates that the strong party manifestations are projected 
to occur in the course of time. We would not like to be 
thought of by the public as a party that talks a great deal 
but says nothing—^that is, that prefers statements aimed 
at gaining the public trust. An example of this is found in 
the statutory concept that the party will set up teams of 
professionals, who will assume within the state hierarchy 
positions consistent with their skills. Our aspiration is to 
provide a practical manifestation to the concept of 
“statesmanlike wisdom.” If, as a party, we are able to 
concentrate the thinking of more people on the applied 
aspects of the principles of democracy and to reject 
power as a means of governing but accept it as a means 
of managing social progress, it is understandable that 
this ^11 be a party with i^ssibilities. What matters is to 
consider the type of political decisions that would create 
conditions for individual prosperity and for meeting 
human ambitions and needs. Individual realization is 
the regulator and the criterion of the possibilities of a 
society. 

[ZORA] Do you feel stronger being the leader of a party 
or more vulnerable? 

[Amaudov] Vulnerability comes with responsibility. The 
uninvolved person does not risk very much. The fact that 
I have something to do with the appearance of a party is 
rather the result of efforts to prove existing truths than 
the realized aspiration to prove myself. My credo has no 
market equivalent, and inevitable compromises neither 
are nor will be the result of any insinuation. If I am 
vulnerable, I am vulnerable because of my own char¬ 
acter, because I have frequently forced myself to reeval¬ 
uate my ways of thinking and behavior. Strength lies in 
the feeling of responsibility, and the National Democ¬ 
racy Party has the ambition to prove its own worth 
precisely by assuming responsibilities and displaying 
political morality. Without such morality, it would have 
no opportunity of rallying around itself people who 
accept universal well-being as a prerequisite and a factor 
for national prosperity. 

[ZORA] Does that mean that such qualities are not 
found among the ruling coalition or the opposition? 

[Amaudov] The concept that is developing today is that 
life in politics must be such as to answer the questions 
“Who is what?” and “Who appointed him?,” asked 
against the background of a comprehensive crisis. They 
reflect the party positions, if you will, and the aspect of 
the parties themselves. TTie psychosis of conspiracies 
and compromises dominates the thinking of leaders and 
the electorate, and doubts lead to rejections. The 
problem is the way the individual parties accept as valid 
a criterion that controls the choice of the arsenal to be 
used in achieving political superiority. Such a choice is a 


strictly individual matter. To be able to judge means to 
have a clear idea of the psychological foundation of an 
action. Today such foundations are all too numerous to 
be subject to a simplistic evaluation. 

[ZORA] Are you looking for allies among the various 
parties? 

[Amaudov] Our assessments are related to the forecast 
that, sooner or later, there will be a consolidation of 
political parties with similar or closely resembling polit¬ 
ical ideas—that is, that we shall eventually have three or 
four political blocs that will engage in a struggle for 
control over the power institutions. We see our position 
in something like a national liberal-democratic bloc, 
about which we would be willing to discuss and develop 
contacts and cooperate on the basis of existing possibil¬ 
ities. This is simply necessary according to the laws of 
social life, and we must be prepared for it. If we are a 
party with ambitions, we must be able to meet the needs 
of our time. 


Deputy Chairman Interviewed 

92BA1087D Sofia ZORA in Bulgarian 2 Jun 92 p 8 


[Interview with Rumen Kasabov, deputy chairman of the 
National Democracy Party, by Ventseslav Nachev, a 
ZORA political commentator, place and date not given: 
“The Interests of the Citizen Are the Interests of Society”] 

[Text] [ZORA] Mr. Kasabov, you are a specialist in 
commercial law and economics. Bearing this in mind, 
what would you say about your party’s economic plat¬ 
form? 

[Kasabov] The National Democracy Party supports the 
liberal-democratic principles of economic development. 
This means that we support the idea of enabling every 
Bulgarian citizen to feel comfortable within his state, to 
be able to realize his potential, and to be protected from 
the legislative and executive powers. It is only after we 
have synchronized the interests of the individual citizen 
and those of society that we can say that Bulgaria has 
become a democratic law-governed state. That is our 
aspiration. 

[ZORA] Do you believe that your program documents 
have developed such fundamental basic stipulations? 

[Kasabov] Our statute and program are based on the 
principles of free private initiative, economic autonomy, 
and guaranteed ownership. What makes upholding such 
principles even more necessary is the fact that the SDS 
[Union of Democratic Forces] doctrine is aimed at 
protecting foreign investors, ignoring the interests of 
Bulgarian producers and private business. We believe 
that such an extreme position could greatly harm the 
interests of the state and, in the final account, threaten 
the innate initiative-mindedness of the Bulgarian people. 
All modem countries, including the members of the 


JPRS-EER-92-109 

18 August 1992 BULGARIA 3 


European Economic Community, have legislation (cus¬ 
toms, tax, and so forth) that encourages and assists the 
development of the national economy. Briefly put, it is a 
question of state preferences. At the very dawn of 
Bulgarian statehood, Stefan Stambolov encouraged the 
passing of laws in the National Assembly to protect 
precisely Bulgarian industry and the Bulgarian economy. 

[ZORA] What is your assessment of the newly passed 
privatization law? 

[Kasabov] We believe this law to be the result of a 
political compromise. That is what also predetermines 
its difficult implementation. What am I referring to? 
First, the fact that this law has to be backed by no fewer 
than 30 executive rulings. As a result of this, its mecha¬ 
nism predetermines its very low efficiency. In other 
words, every year about 2 percent of production capac¬ 
ities in Bulgaria could be privatized. In Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary, for instance, the privatization laws made it 
possible, after sensible preliminai 7 preparation, for the 
citizens to have the opportunity, if they wish, to acquire 
property in the most promising enterprises and sectors. 
No such alternative is contemplated in our country. 
Furthermore, the law on privatization docs not even take 
into consideration the views of our creditors in terms of 
foreign debt. The stipulations of the law presume that 


our debt will become the property of foreign banks and 
investors before the Bulgarian citizen has been offered 
the same opportunity. 

[ZORA] After the quiet and slow collapse of the old 
governmental economic team, do you trust the new team 
that once again, it seems, will be functioning without a 
program? 

[Kasabov] The fact that Mr. Rostov was retained as 
flnance minister means that the government will con¬ 
tinue to support the monetaristic approach in the imple¬ 
mentation of the reform. From our viewpoint, the proper 
approach would be to combine a monetaristic policy 
with economic incentives and a specific program for the 
development and strengthening of the leading sectors in 
Bulgarian industry. For the time being, no member of 
the government has yet indicated what should be done 
with our electronic, military, chemical, or heavy- 
machine-building industries. It is precisely this lack of 
direction of the economic team that led to such a huge 
production decline. In our view, it is mandatory for the 
economic team of the government to rely on a scientific 
expert potential and to formulate and support in parlia¬ 
ment a program that, good or bad, will be implemented 
within the period of its mandate. 



4 


CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


Political Platforms, Problems of Separation 
Viewed 

92CH08I2B Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 
14Jul92p3 


[Article by Julius Gembicky: “Is the Best Defense an 
Offense?”] 

[Text] Both sides, the representatives of the Czech and 
the Slovak political scenes, have each won more than one 
battle, but in the end, both sides have lost the war for an 
acceptable form of national coexistence. 

Even as we have been hunting around retrospectively in 
our memories since the November revolution, the 
Slovak side considered the redistribution of authority in 
Trecianske Teplice two years ago as a great breakthrough 
in mutual state legal relationships. That general offen¬ 
sive by the Slovak prime minister at that time, Vladimir 
Meciar, representing the VPN [Public Against Violence] 
on the bedrock of unitariness, brought forth panicky 
opposition on the part of the Czechs. 

Unmasking the fact that the dominant Czech interests 
were identical with the Czechoslovak interests was 
received with excessive sensitivity by almost all Czech 
politicians in general. The differing views of the OF 
[Civic Forum] representatives on eliminating this unex¬ 
pected pre^ure obviously accelerated the breakup of 
that victorious movement. Only a similar process of 
differentiation took place in the Slovak governing coali¬ 
tion, which was much more fragmented. 

The KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] made use 
of the extremist idea of a state treaty at a suitable 
moment for a break in the deployment of political forces 
in Slovakia. For the Czech political scene, a transition 
from the threatening revolution in the staters legal com¬ 
position to a more evolutionary and drawn-out discus¬ 
sion of the national councils was simply more accept¬ 
able. It was a matter of time and a test of endurance. 
Everyone knows the results Mil had; it was an obvious 
retreat from the more striking concept Meciar had. 
Embedded deep within the opposition, the HZDS 
[Movement for a Democratic Slovakia], after it was 
released of the feeling of bitter disappointment from 
b^ing pushed aside, took up the position of confedera¬ 
tion in the debate over the state’s legal composition. 

To tell the truth, there was practically no other free space 
in the configuration of ideas of the future arrangement of 
coexistence. The DS [Democratic Party] accepted the 
Czech idea of a unitary form of federation with nothing 
left over. The ODU [Civic Democratic Union] 
demanded only cosmetic changes in it. The KDH moved 
them in the direction of a loose federation with the 
confederative component of a state treaty and a dream of 
Slovakia’s own small seat at the European integrational 
process. Sin^ the SNS [Slovak National Party] defended 
the totally simplistic concept of an independent Slovak 


state, only the area of confederation remained unoccu¬ 
pied for the HZDS. And even in its first platform there 
was also room ensured for some permissible type of loose 
federation. 

The fiasco the federalist parties suffered in the recent 
elections in Slovakia puts them between a rock and a hard 
place. The HZDS strategy after the elections used as a 
point of departure the questionable assumption that the 
Czech side would remain in the defensive trenches of the 
joint state. It assumed that it represented a value for them 
that they would defend even up to the point where it would 
be permissible to accept even the more extreme concept of 
a confederation of two states, each with its own interna¬ 
tional legal identity. It assumed that the alchemy of 
possible concessions by the HZDS after the elections 
would be put into a crystallized form between the two 
differing substances that create states: a loose federation 
that is being promulgated by the SDL [Party of the 
Democratic Left] and an independent state, the alpha and 
omega of the SNS platform. The victory in the elections in 
Slovakia, which were occupied with these problems, 
somehow overlooked the fact that there was a significant 
shift mainly in the key Czech political grouping that in the 
meantime had successfully gone from the defense to the 
offense. 

Kalvoda’s government commission for the preparation of 
a Czech constitution yesterday received the basic thesis 
from the parliament in which they outline the principles of 
the future constitutional system, including the position of 
the Czech president. Obviously, they are putting together 
the concept of synchronizing the unilateral steps of the 
SNR [Slovak National Council] and the CNR [Czech 
National Council], that is, approving the constitutions of 
the SR [Slovak Republic] and the CR [Czech Republic]. 
They are creating a practical basis for a dual constitutional 
system. They still need to develop steps to proceed so as to 
painlessly overcome the legal vacuum, which today’s obso¬ 
lete constitution did not anticipate. And then the Repub¬ 
lics’ governments will take the initiative in dealing with the 
dissolution of the state. 

The fact that the Czech Constitution obviously is incorpo¬ 
rating a number of the principles of the 1920 constitution 
is worthy of note. Possibly they are just the ones that will 
allow the Czech Republic to claim the inheritance of the 
former CSFR in international organizations, which are 
advantageous for it in conferences for signing agreements 
on associations. From that standpoint, the future of Czech- 
Slovak relations does not look very optimistic. 

Doubts About Advisability of Separation Voiced 

92CH0812A Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 
17Jul92p3 

[Article by Ivan Horsky: “Do We Have What We 
Want?”] 

[Text] The Slovak National Council today will obviously 
approve what is from the political standpoint perhaps 
the most important document of its recent 48-year 


JPRS-EER-92-ia9 
18 August 1992 


CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


5 


history: a declaration on the sovereignty of the Slovak 
Republic. For now, according to the ideas of the gov¬ 
erning bloc, it is not supposed to be a document with 
legal force, but rather a declaration of the intention for 
the future. For the long term, however, there are other 
problems that are not with their consequences. 

Let us start at the beginning. The approval of the 
declaration, at least from the formal legal standpoint, is 
not in conflict with the postwar developments. As early 
as the Kosice governmental program, its Article 6 spe¬ 
cifically states: “Putting an end to all the old conflicts 
and starting with the recognition of the Slovaks as 
nationally unique people, the government will strive 
strongly from its first steps to apply the principle of 
‘equality with one another’ in the Czech-Slovak relations 
and thus institute true fraternity between the two 
nations. Recognizing that the Slovaks should be masters 
in their own Slovak land, just as the Czechs should be in 
their own Czech national homeland, and that the 
Republic will be restored as a joint state of equal 
nations—the Czech and the Slovak—the government 
will express that recognition by important state political 
actions.” 

But before February 1948, and after it, that path was not 
taken because the Prague agreements were broken and, 
right after the usurpation of power by the communists, 
strict centralization and rejection of even these reduced 
rights for Slovakia were instituted. And so the problem 
of a new form of national legal composition was resolved 
in 1968, more precisely by the constitutional law on the 
Czechoslovak Federation, Nr. 143, where the preamble 
specifically states “...recognizing the inalienable nature 
of the right to self-determination, up to and including 
separation, and respecting the sovereignty of each people 
and its right to create freely the method and form of its 
own national existence....” 

Unfortunately, there were a number of modifications 
during the so-called normalization period, which, 
although they expressly recognized and formally made 
possible the existence of national agencies, in substonce 
took away from them any actual possibUity of influ¬ 
encing the control of social and economic matters, since 
it was not in the interest of the center. Therefore, not 
even the decisions contained in Article 142, Paragraph 2 
of the constitutional law on the Czechoslovak Federation 
(with supplements and changes). Nr. 103 of 8 April 1991, 
were carried out, where it specifically says in regard to 
the republics’ constitutions: “Until such time as a con¬ 
stitution of the Czech Republic and a constitution of the 
Slovak Republic are approved, the constitutional rela¬ 
tions of those republics will be governed by this consti¬ 
tutional law and other regulations.” 

This is the framework of constitutional law approved by 
the former Federal Assembly. From that standpoint, the 
efforts of the republican legislative and executive agen¬ 
cies do not exceed the constitutional framework. But 
that is a purely formal, legal view of the overall problem. 


Much more substantive is what is hidden behind all of 
this—^the devil’s hoof of politics. 

In this, there are on both sides the most dishonest mutual 
accusations of a wide variety of sins against, and viola¬ 
tions of the proper functioning of the state. In the 
meantime, according to the constitution now in effect, 
the republics do liot have the authority to dissolve the 
joint state. But those people who say that if all social and 
political changes had to take place only on the basis of 
the jurisdictions in effect at the time are right; it would 
be hard for them to take place at all. Reality always 
precedes the law, which then is modified afterwards, 
changed, or even abolished. 

That reminds one a lot of the old saying about the thief 
who yells, “Stop, thiefl” Both sides, or to put it another 
way, both governing political representatives, thus sign 
the prepared scenario for the breakup of the joint state 
with a joint and inseparable hand. There is no doubt that 
they are taking an enormous burden of responsibility on 
their shoulders. At the same time, however, we should 
state that it did not have to come down to such dramatic 
developments if, in the period of the last two years, the 
letter of the constitutional law had only been carried out 
and if some groups had not speculated excessively about 
the question of national emancipation. And it was not 
just the Slovaks, but also the Czechs. 

And so in the whirlwind of events, we ended up at the 
point where we now find ourselves. We stand before the 
need to seek out completely new forms of cooperation 
and coexistence. Obviously, these will not be the ones to 
which we are accustomed, but against which we have 
protested, each for our own reasons. Obviously, how¬ 
ever, the process was unavoidable, or at least I have a 
feeling that it was. Politics is not a matter of sentiments. 
Pasting up ideological posters, accusing each other of all 
kinds of transgressions, frightening each other, or even 
making threats is all, in fact, the moment’s accompa¬ 
nying music to the avalanche that is roaring down upon 
us. Who may escape it can only be seen in the immediate 
future. 

But the question is whether or not it is what we want. 

HavePs, Meciar’s Political Ideas Compared 

92CH08I0A Bratislava KULTURNY ZIVOT in Slovak 
25Jun92pl 

[Article by Martin M. Siihecka: “Our Assurance”] 

[Text] It seems that, after the first days of chaos and 
confusion that took place after the elections, the outlines 
of what actually occurred and what was revealed are 
beginning to be clearly seen. Husserl should be happy. A 
fatal difference has now been revealed in how, to what. 



6 


CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


JPRS-EER.92-109 
18 August 1992 


and to whom the Czechs and the Slovaks relate; of 
course, not all Slovaks and not all Czechs, but still a 
decisive majority of them. 

While today there are intensive discussions being held 
on the technology of the division of a unified state into 
two states, there is somehow no time for wondering at 
the division is actually happening. It is as if it was totally 
obvious from the results of the elections that the federal 
hybrid of two differing concepts of politics and two 
different nations is impossible and there is no need to 
deal with it any further. Actually, I almost agree with 
that attitude, but I do not want it revealed solely for 
observation; I want to think things over. 

When I read Paul Johnson's book, I resisted his persis¬ 
tent interpretation of history based on the conviction 
that individuals are the embodiment of history; not the 
chosen ones, but the elected ones or, in some cases, those 
who caused themselves to be elected with the aid of 
violence. His history is the history of human characters, 
behind whom stand thousands or miUions of wasted 
lives or, on the contrary, millions of lives saved for 
freedom. I have the feeling today that Johnson is pos¬ 
sibly right. Individuals—and to^y we see that quite 
obviously—^are truly the embodiment of history, all the 
more so if they are legitimately elected. 

I think that the untenable nature of Czechoslovakia 
today is founded on a basic conflict of individuals. 
However, there is no point in hoping that by exchanging 
those individuals for others anything would change, 
because they are not only a symbol, but also the actual 
emlxKliment of today’s concepts and the attitude of the 
majority. That conflict is most clearly expressed in the 
attitude of Vladimir Meciar toward Vaclav Havel. When 
V. Meciar accuses V. Havel of not having enough under¬ 
standing for the Slovaks and of being partisan in his 
politics, it is a precise expression of his opinion and, at 
the same time, it is a world view that stands in sharp 
contrast to V. Havel’s thinking. Vaclav Havel was 
elected president two years ago, that is, at a time when 
the majority of the Slovaks and the Czechs still related to 
the idea of individual freedom, under the impression of 
the events in November 1989. Havel embodied that 
ideal through his life and his works and was possibly 
more than the ideal as president, in the political sense of 
the word. It was possible to identify with him, to like 
him, and to admire him, and at the same time, in his 
office there was for many people not only a political, but 
also a metaphysical assurance of their personal freedom. 
Vaclav Havel, as a person who relates to an absolute 
perspective, could not simply “understand the Slovaks” 
in the way that V. Meciar imagines. In fact, he would 
have had to exchange that abstract perspective for an 
everyday perspective and an idea of pursuing nationalist 
politics, as Meciar himself pursues it. 

By electing Vladimir Meciar and the nationalist oriented 
parties, the majority of Slovakia deliberately gave up 
that absolute perspective and chose for themselves the 
nationalist perspective. It is totally obvious that the 


nationalist perspective is, in V. Meciar’s understanding, 
in opposition to Vaclav Havel’s thinking. Vladimir 
Meciar symbolizes an assurance for the voters that it is 
possible not to speak the truth in order to achieve a goal, 
that it is possible to change one’s views according to 
need, and a certainty that exceeding the agreed-upon 
toundaries of decency will not be punished either mate¬ 
rially or by scorn, as long as everything is covered up by 
a declared desire to help the nation. Paul Johnson calls 
that “moral relativism” and, according to him, it is the 
reason that the 20th century became the bloodiest one in 
the history of humanity. It is, of course, no accident that 
the greatest danger for the adherents of moral relativism 
is just such people as Vaclav Havel. 

It seems like today Vaclav havel, as president of the 
CSFR, is powerless against the Slovak elections, I think 
that is go^. It is possible to relate to the ideal he still 
represents for many people, even in Slovakia, even if he 
is not our president. It is, in the final analysis, even more 
authentic because we should learn that we cannot place 
the burden of our personal freedom on the shoulders of 
our presidents, even if they are the best of the best, and 
we must each learn to carry it on our own shoulders, 

Grerman Foreign Investments in CSFR Viewed 

92CH0740G Prague EKONOM in Czech No 19. 1992 p 25 

[Article by Jiri Kosta: “Do We Need More Foreign 
Capital?”] 

[Text] In 1991. German investment in the CSFR 
amounted to 790 million German marks [DM], that is to 
say. not quite 3 percent of the entire volume of DM29 
billion which was invested abroad last year by FRG 
capital. Last year. FRG investments in Eastern and 
Central Europe amounted to DM1.4 billion as compared 
with DM250 million in 1990. Thus, despite the fact that 
Czechoslovakians share in FRG foreign investments is 
low—definitely lower than would be necessary—part of 
our public is voicing fears regarding the "sell-off of 
national property and sometimes even speaks of the 
"danger of German colonization." We asked Prof. Jiri 
Kosta. one of the cocreators of the economic program of 
the "Prague Spring 1968." who has been at Goethe 
University in Frankfurt am Main for more than 20 years, 
to give us his opinion. 

I believe that the rejection of the influx of foreign capital 
the Czechoslovak economy so badly needs, given the 
shortage of domestic investment resources and the lack 
of managerial know-how, tends to be more indicative of 
emotional rather than any kind of rationally justifiable 
motives. Skeptics should realize that the unprecedented 
expansion, which the developed nations of the West 
have experienced over the past 40 years, is based prima¬ 
rily on the openness of national economies and the 
libNeralization of their external relationships. To create 
that “economic miracle,” which is so admired by the 
countries of Eastern Europe, it was not enough to merely 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


7 


exchange goods and services, but there was a need, 
primarily, for the unfettered movement of production 
factors: labor, capital, and information. 

In 1989, that is to say, during the last year prior to the 
unification of Germany, foreign investments made on 
the territory of the FRG amounted to DM22.7 billion, 
which represented approximately 5 percent of all invest¬ 
ments. The value of foreign property in the FRG 
amounted to DM125 billion. On the other hand, in 1989 
German firms invested DM27.8 billion abroad, brining 
German property abroad to a value of DM185 billion. 
The case of Austria is also instructive for our purposes, 
where participation by foreign capital in industry 
amounts to approximately one-third. 

If we consider that Czechoslovakia was more or less cut 
off from the West for a period of four decades, whereas 
West Germany benefited from the first injections of the 
Marshall Plan for the entire period of its existence as a 
result of its openness toward the world economy, then it 
is as clear as daylight that the share of foreign capital in 
our country must grow at a much faster pace than it does 
in Western countries. 

Data regarding participation of foreign capital in prewar 
Czechoslovakia is also of interest. In 1937, the share of 
foreign capital in the overall capitalization of industry 
and in the banking industry in Czechoslovakia 
amounted to 27 percent. In the overall volume of foreign 
capital, British capital dominated (30.8 percent), second 
place was occupied by France (21.4 percent), and third 
place by Austria (19.1 percent). More than 50 years later, 
we come to realize that the celebrated economic effi¬ 
ciency of the pre-Munich republic stemmed considerably 
from its extensive integration into the world economy. 

If German capital plays a dominant role in today’s joint 
enterprises, I believe it to be a natural consequence of 
not only our geographic position, but also as a result of 
additional geopolitical factors. They include, for 
instance, the confidence expressed by German managers 
in the renewal of the productivity of our workers, an 
intimate knowledge of the problems involved in the 
post-totalitarian economy (based on the example of the 
eastern laender of the Federal Republic), the compara¬ 
tive advantage offered by relatively low wage costs, and 
an effort to readily penetrate the Eastern European 
markets through us. 

The FRG Government in no way intervenes in questions 
of the allocation of capital resources—such decisions are 
made exclusively by the enterprises themselves and are 
made purely from the standpoint of long-term profit¬ 
ability. 

As far as FRG foreign investments are concerned, 
Czechoslovakia was in sixth place in 1991 among 
nations in which Germany was investing—even ahead of 
France and Austria. That fact should be a major stimulus 
for us because it creates an important signal to the other 


developed nations. In no case do we need to fear any 
“German expansionism” in connection with the influx 
of German capital. 

Today’s FRG is in no way comparable to that Germany 
which has so many times threatened the national exist¬ 
ence of the Czechs in the course of history. Today, 
Germany is one of the consolidated Western democra¬ 
cies and a pioneer of the idea of European cooperation. 

The cautious negotiation of foreign capital participation 
involved in the approval of competing offers from 
abroad (as even an outside observer could see, in many 
instances, such as the Skoda Mlada Boleslav Enterprise, 
as well as the Skoda Plzen Enterprise, the Sklo-Union 
Enterprise, the Avia Enterprise, the Czechoslovak Air¬ 
lines Company, etc.) moreover guarantees that it is not a 
question of a “bargain sale.” 

Czech ^Unique Antichauvinism^ Explained 

92CH0772A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 
8 Jul 92 p 5 

[Article by Milos Kubanek: “Czech Antichauvinism”] 

[Text] The postelection emancipation that attempts to 
renew independent Czech statehood emphasized an 
exceptional characteristic of Czechoslovakia in the 
ardently nationalist postcommunist Eastern Europe. 
While the Russians and Serbs flex their power-hungry 
inclinations in the attempt to maintain smaller nations 
under their imperialism, and while Romania and Hun¬ 
gary would like to regain territories occupied by their 
national minorities, the Czechs, as a larger nation, have 
resigned themselves with relative equanimity to sharing 
a common state and territory with a smaller and eco¬ 
nomically weaker partner. 

The Czechs will not invade Slovakia—weapon in hand—^to 
fight to maintain a larger economic region and “to enslave 
and exploit” the Slovaks. To the contrary, on the whole, 
the prevalent belief among the public is that the sooner the 
common state breaks up, the better. There are three main 
reasons for this unique “Czech antichauvinism”: 

The first is the Czechs’ traditional lack of aggressiveness 
and the concomitant liberal attitude toward interna¬ 
tional relations. 

The second is the postwar practice of central reallocation 
of resources between the two republics, which was and is 
perceived in Bohemia-Moravia as being clearly to the 
benefit of Slovakia. Yet it is obvious that the present 
political order and constitutional mechanisms (regard¬ 
less of their political impact) enable—in fact, more- 
or-less guarantee—^that it will continue. That is also the 
source of the strong emotional aversion of the public 
toward Slovakia’s statement that it was abused by Bohe¬ 
mia-Moravia. 


8 


CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


The third cause has its roots in wider general changes in 
international economic and political relations, which 
have gradually been implemented since World War II, at 
least in the peater part of Western Europe. It is based on 
the realization that the traditional conquest, power, and 
colonial model of linkages are no longer the optimal 
structure for developed countries and their closely linked 
exclusive satellites in regard to the economic, political, 
national, and moral realities of the postwar world. If ties 
with economically weak countries are too strong, espe¬ 
cially from the economic point of view, a number of 
problems (reallocation of resources being one of them) 
are caused, and in an era of free movement of interna¬ 
tional capital, liberalization of trade, and relative polit¬ 
ical security, there are ever fewer positive results. It is 
becoming apparent that a compact and balanced 
country, naturally open to regional and international 
relations, is now a more solid foundation for prosperity 
than a state with problem-ridden linkages to poorer 
units. One way in which these facts are expressed in 
Western Europe is, for example, the unalterability of 
postwar borders and, scruples about, and problems with 
accepting poorer countries into the European Commu¬ 
nity. 

The fact that Czech politics is more likely to react to this 
postwar current of European relations than to Eastern 
European power excesses, with their traces of colo¬ 
nialism, indicates that the Czechs are moving in the right 
direction as they travel around Europe. 

Czech antichauvinism may finally be able to celebrate 
success. 

Slovak Coltare WiU Favor ^National Realisin’ 

92CH0772B Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 
8Jul92pl4 

[Article by Martin Skopec: “National Realism? The Style 
That Is To Be Dictated to Artists in Slovakia”] 

[Text] The Bratislava Artists’ meeting on Monday (6 
July 1992) turned into a seminar and its topic indicates 
the direction that Slovak culture will take in the near 
future. The seminar, called “Cultural Policy in the 
Coming Election Period,” aims its attention at unifying 
the “squabbling” about direction in Slovak cultural 
activities; in other words, it submitted to the participants 
the HZDS’s [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] 
ideas about what those activities should be. The Slovak 
Creative Union, whose members are the representatives 
of the HZDS Cultural Club, initiated the meeting of 
cultural groups and associations. In the seminar’s intro¬ 
duction, Igor Gazdik, art critic and member of the 
HZDS Cultural Club, read a proposal for the strategy for 
cultural development, authored by members of the 
aforementioned HZDS Cultural Club. Among other 
things, the proposal mentions the existence of three 
currents in Slovak art. The first current is made up of 
artists who advocate internationally accepted standards 
and strive for international recognition based on the 


present artistic trends. These are diametrically opposed 
to the second current, which, according to the HZDS 
club, is an adherent of national emancipation. As far as 
art is concerned, it prefers “national realism.” The third 
current portrays the weak cultural center. 

Ivan Mjartan, the Ministry of Culture’s state secretary, 
told those present: “A strong trend toward national 
realism is now beginning,” and he substantiated that by 
talking about the need for a uniform approach in the area 
of culture and for “the removal of conflicts between 
artists.” He pointed out that a proclamation about the 
sovereignty of the Slovak Republic would be made in the 
Slovak National Council, and that “the situation here 
will be totally different and therefore, it is necessary to 
agree on dignified representation within the state and 
abroad.” Ivan Mjartan went on to say that the democra¬ 
tization of culture should consist of committees of 
experts setting criteria for the quality of art and making 
determinations about it, and thus, also deciding on what 
support would be given to whom. “In the present finan¬ 
cial situation, we cannot allow everyone to be entitled to 
receive support.” 

According to Mr. Mjartan, members of the Slovak tele¬ 
vision council should not be representatives of political 
parties, but should be independent individuals. There¬ 
fore, in this connection, changes will be made in certain 
paragraphs of the relevant laws concerning the television 
council. 

The discussion that took place at the seminar was a sign 
of loyalty toward the members of the HZDS in the SR 
[Slovak Republic] Ministry of Culture rather than an 
attempt to resolve problems in Slovak culture. The latter 
will obviously not be able to avoid being politicized, 
which will ultimately mean a deterioration of culture as 
such. Would it have occurred to anyone two-and-a-half 
years ago that Soviet realism would be replaced by 
national realism in Slovakia? 

Slovak Economist Says Common Currency 
Possible 

92CH0811A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 
14 Jul 92 pp 1, 6 

[Interview with Slovak economist Hvezdon Koctuch by 
Beata Bernikova; place and date not given: “Currency 
We Can Share in Common”] 

[Text] How do you rate the efficiency of the Slovak 
economy as compared with the Czech? We put this 
question to Hvezdon Koctuch (HZDS) [Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia], chairman of the Slovak National 
CounciVs economy and budget committee and chairman 
of the Association of Independent Economists of Slovakia 
(NEZES). 

[Koctuch] It depends on how we measure it. At one time 
I defined efficiency as the ratio between actual produc¬ 
tivity and that which is maximally possible. When I take 
it from the categories still in use today, the Czech 


JPRS-£ER-92>109 
18 August 1992 


CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


9 


economy is 10-15 percent more efficient than the Slovak 
economy. But I think that the potentials of the two 
economies should not be added up but rather multiplied, 
as is the case in the European Community. Yet since 
1918 the Slovak economy has been constructed as an 
object to be built into the context of the Czech economy. 
Had these economies been integrated from the start, the 
situation today would be completely different. 

[Bernikova] Do you agree that the value of a currency is 
sustained by the efficiency of the given country’s 
economy? 

[Koctuch] Not only efficiency. 

[Bernikova] Efficiency first of all. 

[Koctuch] Yes, that is true, but a currency’s value 
depends first of all on competitiveness which is a con¬ 
cept broader than efficiency. 

[Bernikova] Can it be said that the Czech economy is 
what sustains the Czechoslovak koruna? 

[Koctuch] We must ask whether the service role of the 
Slovak economy also bears upon the currency’s convert¬ 
ibility. We maintain that it does. When looking at it we 
must consider that imports which are in Slovakia fabri¬ 
cated into intermediate products go to Czech lands at 
regulated prices. 

[Bernikova] You oppose the “Klaus” model of economic 
reform citing the harsh impact it has on the Slovak 
population. You assert that you have your own model for 
the Slovak economy. What is it? 

[Koctuch] The impact of “Klaus” economic reform on 
the Slov^ economy is three times as bad as on the 
Czech. We simply cannot go on with it. Our concern is 
not just with the transition from a centrally managed 
economy to a market economy. It is rather with the 
transition from an economy of chronic shortages to an 
economy of human hope. This process is going on 
worldwide in the context of transiting from an industrial 
society to an information society. Our concept is a 
socially and ecologically oriented market economy guar¬ 
anteeing the formation of a new quality of life as well as 
a new quality of the natural environment. 

[Bernikova] Why aren’t you in favor of dividing the state 
into two, each with its own currency? 

[Koctuch] Because we can still share in common a 
currency which will result from the Slovak and Czech 
economy working together. You still proceed from the 
premise that here we have a single economy, a single 
market, a single currency. Why not shared in common? 
If the Czech political representatives believe that a 
Slovak koruna will be only one-third as hard, so be it, it 
is their business. I want to draw attention to one more 
thing. On 24 March 1945 the Czech political represen¬ 
tation held talks in Moscow on currency matters. It 
found that the Slovak koruna was at least three times 
firmer than the Czech. Slovaks at that time agreed to a 


one-to-one exchange ratio. It was then a significant loss 
to Slovakia. And now they are telling us, “For 40 years 
we subsidized you, now let us each live at our own 
expense.” Only I don’t know if the Czech representation 
realizes what impact it will have on the Czech economy. 

[Bernikova] Of course if you reject a single model of 
economic reform the Czech political representation has 
not much of a choice.... 

[Koctuch] Not necessarily. After all, there are not just 
two alternatives, either one or the other. Does the 
economic interest of the Czech representation override 
the interest of the common state? This was ultimately 
expressed also by the Czech former prime minister, Mr. 
Pithart: “Should the Slovaks demand a different eco¬ 
nomic reform, then it is better that we part ways.” And 
we are being told: “The common state is the value of 
values for the Slovak Republic.” We ask whether this 
would apply even if its cost—from the economic reform 
perspective—is triply unfavorable for Slovakia? Our 
reply to this is: No. If the Czech side thus gives prefer¬ 
ence to its own economic interest, why then reproach the 
Slovak side for preferring its own as well. 

[Bernikova] What size of a budget deficit are you willing 
to allow? 

[Koctuch] That depends on the reasons for running up 
such deficit. I will tell you about it only after I become 
aware of the true situation of the Slovak economy in the 
first half of 1992. If the budget deficit results from 
financing highly effective investment projects it is a 
wholly different matter than using the funds for con¬ 
sumption. 

Three Ways of Separating Currency Suggested 

92CH0811B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 
14 Jul 92 p 6 

[Article by Petr Husak: “Run to the Dollar—Separation 
Would Cost Slovakia $1 Billion From Czech Lands 
Annually”] 

[Text] According to the latest information obtained from 
circles close to the Czechoslovak State Bank [SBCS], in 
Slovakia there has been a sharp increase in the amount of 
korunas exchanged for foreign currency within the 7,500 
korunas [Kcs] ceiling allowed to each citizen. During the 
week from 29 June to 3 July alone, citizens in Slovakia 
purchased foreign currency worth Kcs218 million. In the 
same period citizens of the Czech Republic purchased 
foreign currency worth Kcs220 million. Considering that 
Slovakia’s population is roughly one-half the size, it 
means that every Slovak citizens is now exchanging on 
average twice the amount of currency. This is an obvious 
sign of insecurity. Is a currency separation drawing near? 

According to information from quarters close to SBCS 
there are three principal methods of technically sepa¬ 
rating the currency which are under consideration: 


10 


CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


Affixing validation stickers to banknotes is a very labo¬ 
rious process. The state bank would likely begin first 
with validating supplies of banknotes stored in various 
secret locations. It would take approximately two 
months to print the requisite number of stickers and 
affix them to the banknotes. It would not involve coins 
which constitute 3 percent of the total currency in 
circulation. In the first stage KcslO notes would probably 
be also exempt from validation. As we were informed, 
the bank would exchange validated banknotes maxi¬ 
mally up to Kcs3,000 per citizen. Citizens would deposit 
the “remainder” of the cash in savings banks which 
would continue with a gradual exchange of cash for the 
validated currency. 

Franking—^that is, a kind of printed mark, is a simpler 
method and less time-consuming. But the banknotes 
would be more susceptible to forgery. Hence it may be 
assumed that the SBCS would resort to it only as a 
supplementary method. 

Issuing new banknotes is something the SBCS is report¬ 
edly considering in two versions: as provisional 
banknotes and a definitive issue. In the first case it 
would involve new lower-quality “quick stitch” 
banknotes. But even the provisional printing of these 
banknotes would require four to six months. Emission of 
the definitive issue would take a year at the minimum. 
The decision on which of the variants of currency 
separation may be chosen is contingent on the time 
factor. Depending on how much time is left until the 
possible division of the federation, the optimum variant 
of currency separation will be selected. Each variant has 
its pros and cons. Hence a combination cannot be ruled 
out—validation stickers for banknotes in storage, 
marking lower-denomination notes, issuing the newly 
planned Kcs200 and Kcs1,000 notes, and gradual prep¬ 
aration of a definitive issue which could also be printed 
abroad. On its own the state bank cannot initiate a 
currency separation. Currency is a legal tender and 
subject to regulation by laws passed by the Federal 
Assembly. The federal parliament alone (in the event 
legislation is deadlocked in the Federal Assembly) and 
the national council of one of the republics seceding 
from the federation can “sanctify” separation of the 
federal currency. How would one proceed afterward? 
One of the parliaments would probably have to adopt a 
law on currency separation on “D-2” day. On “D-1” day 
trucks would probably distribute the validated currency 
overnight to all bank branches. “D” day could then 
begin.... 

Separation and Foreign Currency Position 

An important prerequisite for a possible uncontested 
separation is a balanced foreign currency account of the 
state. Czechoslovakia’s foreign currency account is the 
strongest since World War II. If we add up the obliga¬ 
tions and claims of Czechoslovak enterprises, banks and 
the government, we arrive at a positive balance of 
Kcsl,138,()()0 [as published]. Deducting from it govern¬ 
ment claims uncollectible in the medium term, for 


instance in Syria, Libya, and so on, we “crunch” the 
numbers down to a negative balance of less than $ 1 
billion. The CSFR’s relatively favorable foreign currency 
account is an important factor enabling the Czech poli¬ 
ticians, driven into a comer by Slovak fables about 
functioning confederations, to possibly declare the 
Czech Republic unilaterally, as a legal successor to 
Czechoslovakia’s obligations abroad. Without fear that 
an independent Czech Republic would be unable to meet 
all obligations incurred by the federation. An eventual 
division of the assets and liabilities between two inde¬ 
pendent states of the “former federation” (for instance 
according to population size) could be a matter for 
further negotiation. 

But there are also other things involved—among them 
Czechoslovakia’s status vis-a-vis the IMF and other 
international, currency, and finance institutions. In the 
event the Czech Republic becomes a successor to CSFR, 
the Czechoslovak quota would become its quota. Should 
it be divided according to population (with one-third 
going to Slovakia), the Czech Republic’s quota would 
become smaller than Hungary’s. Presently Hungary is 
getting set to take over the post of an executive director 
in the World Bank—a post slated to go to Czechoslo¬ 
vakia effective on 1 November 1992. Similar conse¬ 
quences loom also in the event of successorship in the 
Bank for International Payments in London of which 
Czechoslovakia has been a shareholder since the 1930’s. 

What can worsen the foreign currency account of the 
successor states? If the federation is divided one might 
see an outflow of short-term capital—monies deposited 
by foreign banks with Czechoslovak banks. But this 
involves only a negligible (from the point of view of the 
foreign currency account) sum of $60 million. But in the 
event of the country’s division certain loans granted to 
CSFR become payable immediately. Among others, all 
creditors of a $200 million loan (G-24 countries) may in 
the event of division demand immediate repayment by 
the successor state. A similar danger arises for two more 
CSOB [Czechoslovak Commerce Bank] issues for which 
the State Bank is a guarantor. The first case involves 375 
million Deutsche marks [DM]; the second a somewhat 
smaller amount. Even though the terms of these loans do 
not contain an implicit clause on their becoming imme¬ 
diately due in the event of the country’s breakup, their 
language refers to the central bank of the republic, 
without any specific proviso or explanation of what is 
meant by the term republic. 

Separation and Foreign Capital 

In the first four months foreign capital investments in 
Czecholovakia amounted to $280 million. Assuming an 
unchanged tempo, at the beginning of the year the 
estimate of total investment for the year approached $ 1 
billion. The current struggles over the state powers 
arrangement and the political uncertainty resulting from 
them may slow down significantly the anticipated tempo 
of the foreign capital inflow into Czechoslovakia. 
According to sources close to the State Bank the CSFR’s 




JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


11 


trade balance is however for now developing very favor¬ 
ably. The current account balance is positive at an 
amount estimated as between $900 million and $1.5 
billion. The foreign currency reserves are permanently 
growing. The so-called gross foreign currency reserves 
(covering the entire banking sector) on 3 July 1992 stood 
at $4.7 billion, of which the State Bankas foreign cur¬ 
rency reserves amounted to $2.15 billion. Even in case 


when the capital inflow should briefly cease as a conse¬ 
quence of the separation and turn into an outflow, the 
Czech Republic has enough economic strength to meet 
the federation’s obligations without having to disrupt the 
currency’s convertibility. How would this play out in 
Slovakia? According to our information the Czech 
Republic finance ministry estimates the annual redistri¬ 
bution for 1992 from the Czech lands to Slovakia at 
Kcs25 billion—^that is, equivalent to nearly $1 billion. 


Location of Gold Reserves 

(in metric tons) 


Total CSFR GoM Assets 

Gold Assets Locatkm 

Abroad 


1 Czech Repoblic I 

1 Slovak Republic I 











12 


HUNGARY 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


Romanians Give Serbs Strayed Hungarian Pilot 

92CH0858A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 
8 Aug 92 p 3 

[Article by Peter Mag: “Pilot Has Not Returned from 
Romania; Balazs Toth Handed to the Serbs”] 

[Text] (From our county reporter) Balazs Toth, age 18, a 
participant in the Alfold Cup glider competition, went 
astray with his glider airplane Wednesday evening. He 
made a telephone call from Romania on Thursday 
morning and said that he had landed near Temcsvar 
[Timisoara]. 

Four members of his team crossed over to Romania on 
Thursday to help bring him as well as the airplane home. 
No official word has been received about them since. 

Sz^ed airport commander Andras Podolcsak was unof¬ 
ficially told by the heads of the Oroshaza border district 
that the young pilot had entered Romanian airspace 
from the direction of Serbia, that therefore the Serb 
authorities were requesting his extradition, and that, 
presumably, the Romanian party intended to fulfill this 
request. Andras Podolcsak sou^t help from the Hun¬ 
garian Foreign Ministry in this regard. 

(From our Bucharest correspondent) No information 
could be obtained from the Romanian Foreign Ministry 
spokesman before we went to press in the countryside. 
We were able to leam the following from persons in 
authority at the Hungarian Embassy in Bucharest: Balazs 
Toth, who landed in the Zsombolya [Jimbolia] area on 
Thursday, had been taken into custody by the Romanian 
border guards, and guards have also been assigned to the 
glider. 

The border guard command stated that since the air¬ 
plane had approached Romanian territory from the 
direction of Yugoslavia, Balazs Toth and his airplane 
had been handed to Yugoslav authorities on Friday at 
1600. Romanian officials denied that the Hungarian 
sportsman had been locked up in a dark cell. 

In response to a question raised by the Hungarian 
Embassy in Bucharest as to why Balazs Toth had not 
been permitted to contact the Hungarian Consulate or 
Embassy in Bucharest, the Romanian official said that 
there was no need to make such contact because the 
airplane had entered Romanian territory from the direc¬ 
tion of Yugoslavia. 

^oltural Autonomy^ Promised Ukraine's 
Hungarians 

92CH0858B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 
29Jul92p3 

[Article by Z.Sz.: “Lower Carpathians; Kiev Provides 
Cultural Autonomy”] 

[Text] “Ukraine provides cultural autonomy to the Hun¬ 
garian minority in the Lower Carpathians, as required by 


the Constitution,” Mikola Makarevics, Ukrainian first 
deputy foreign minister, responded to a question raised 
by a NEPSZABADSAG reporter at the organizational 
meeting of the Hungarian-Ukrainian joint committee on 
minorities, which was held in Budapest. 

In addition to government organs having jurisdiction, 
the minority organizations involved also participate in 
the committee’s work. The committee is expected to 
meet twice a year to make recommendations to the 
respective governments for the resolution of emerging 
issues. 

Possible problems arising between the two countries are 
expected to be of a practical nature based on everyday 
life, rather than political issues, Geza Entz, the head of 
the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Border, said. 
Hungary’s good relations with Ukraine could set an 
example for relations between Hungary and the rest of 
the neighboring countries, the state secretary said. The 
present organizing meeting supports Ukraine’s partici¬ 
pation in the workings of the Central European Initia¬ 
tive. Henceforth the Hungarian and the Ukrainian par¬ 
ties are going to present joint positions to various 
international organizations. The two parties also dis¬ 
cussed the matter of completing construction of the 
hospital at Beregszasz [Beregovo] and the issue of sim¬ 
plified border crossings. Regarding the latter, Geza Entz 
said that, although there is a common desire to do so, 
differences in the levels of economic development 
between the two countries do not yet permit the full 
opening of the borders. 

SZDSZ’s Tamas on Govemmenf s Aims, Tactics 

92CH0779A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 
in Hungarian 4 Jul 92 pp 64-65 

[Article by Gaspar Miklos Tamas, parliamentary repre¬ 
sentative of the Alliance of Free Democrats: “1994”] 

[Text] The wittiest political satire of the past two years 
appeared under the above title in the June issue of the 
MOZGO VILAG. The scenario of the article is this: 
Hungary rushing toward a totalitarian dictatorship and 
war. It is not customary to interpret antiutopistic pam¬ 
phlets reminiscent of Swift and Orwell—^literally. But, 
without doubt, there is a solvent market for the various 
timetables of total doom. While the liberal and left-wing 
gramblers shiver themselves to sleep struggling with the 
nightmare of nationalistic dictatorship. Prime Minister 
Antall is struggling with the nightmare of the returning 
communist cadres. FIDESZ [Alliance of Young Demo¬ 
crats] consultant Andras Kovacs tries to elicit insomnia 
by trying to bring to life the astral body of a coalition of 
the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and the 
MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party]. The great cosmetic 
moment of cooperation with the liberals seems to be 
fading away. The liberals’ suspicion is not entirely 
incomprehensible. Here is just one example of the tactic 
of infiltration and “subversion,” known from the ugly 
old days of the antifascist popular front: On 1 May, the 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 Ai^iist 1992 


HUNGARY 


13 


spokesmen of the Oemocratic Charta, which ended up in 
the hands of the MSZP’s social-democrats, together with 
the most important trade unions, published a proclama¬ 
tion, the main elements of which have been adopted 
directly from the MSZP’s platform. No one consulted us; 
the thousands of liberal signatories of the Charta. A 
month-and-a-half later—after the MSZP’s success at the 
elections—the “Charterian” socialists (Vitanyi, Agh, 
Hegyi) were so bold as to make the threat: If the liberals 
would not comply with them (especially in the affairs of 
the MSZOSZ [National Federation of Hungarian Trade 
Unions]), then they would face grave consequences. 
Following the libera-socialist MAGYAR HIRLAP, the 
socialist NEPSZABADSAG also announced that Miklos 
Nemeth was their candidate for the post of prime min¬ 
ister. In the meantime, no one knows whether the 
MSZP’s policy is a continuation of the course of market- 
oriented reform or it has completely shifted over to a 
tax-raising and money-diluting syndicalist social- 
demagogy. The worker’s fist may well be an iron fist, but 
one cannot be sure that it will punch exactly where it 
should. The short-lived dream of the “coalition of oppo¬ 
sition” has disappeared for the time being. 

Imre Konya (MDF), in his bitter loss of hope, recalls the 
anticommunist solidarity with the onetime Opposition 
Roundtable. 

I am always glad to display anticommunist and antifas¬ 
cist solidarity but, whenever possible, I always carefully 
select the political forces with whom I have solidarity. At 
this moment, the MDFs auxiliary forces do not seem 
very capable of a coalition. 

As people say, the political fronts have become rigid. 
But, then, what will happen in 1994? 

Any serious answer to this question may come only if we 
take our eyes off the mesmerizing quadrille that is a 
characteristic feature of today’s Hungarian party poli¬ 
tics. According to Tolgyessy, the SZDSZ keeps an equal 
distance between the MDF and the MSZP. According to 
Orban, the FIDESZ keeps an equal distance between the 
SZDSZ and the MDF. According to Horn, the MSZP 
keeps an equal distance between the MDF and the 
SZDSZ (according to Suijan, the KDNP [Christian- 
l>emocratic People’s Party] has not committed itself to a 
coalition with the MDF and, according to Torgyan, the 
Smallholders are in opposition while other Smallholders 
contest that)—gentlemen, I am dizzy. 

First of all, we must clarify why Hungary is “an island of 
peace” in East Europe. There are two principal reasons 
for this historic luck, both being connected to the inher¬ 
itance of the recent past. Everyone fashionably criticizes 
one of the primary reasons, the so-called spontaneous 
privatization (“asset salvation”), but the late Kadarian 
Hungary’s elite of managers and technocrats no doubt 
had less to lose than their counte^arts in the neigh¬ 
boring countries and, thus, they participated more or less 
constructively in the democratic turn ^though, unfortu¬ 
nately, the excessive cheating soured the new free order. 


The second prima^ reason was that the opposition and 
the legal-expert elite obstructed settling the bill politi¬ 
cally with the leading groups of the defunct regime and 
their serfs—^the attempt of such a settling morally 
destroyed Czechoslovakia and East Germany, and is 
administering the final blows to Polish political stability 
at present. 

The preservation of the “island of peace” status depends 
in large part on the MDF administration. More pre¬ 
cisely, it depends on how the MDF-pseudo-Smallholder 
camp evaluates its own position and what conclusions it 
draws from its assessment. By now, the strategy of 
joining the opposition, relaxing and regaining strength 
(for 1998) has lost its attractiveness for the splintering 
government coalition. But it is almost certain that the 
present government majority cannot be maintained in 
1994 in a lawful and permanent way. Part of the MDF 
group, which is reckoning with defeat, is fleeing into 
supervisory committees, bank boards, foundations, 
questionable corporations just as the MSZMP’s [Hun¬ 
garian Socialist Workers Party] convertible clique did in 
1989; it is fleeing into high-ranking posts just as the 
banknipt gentry did at the end of the last century. A 
future administration of a different color will have to 
reckon with an emotionally opposing, informal eco¬ 
nomic and political power concentration (and, I think, 
discreetly make peace with it now while it still can). 
However, the possibilities of—how should I put it?— 
paralegal solutions are rather attractive for the right- 
wing and extreme-right-wing lines which cannot tolerate 
the prospect of defeat. 

But it is time that I also mention the ^eatest danger, no 
matter how unpopular this may be in public opinion, 
which is inclined to equate foreign affairs with sticking 
one’s head in the sand. The MDFs best chance for 
turning around trends that it finds unfavorable is to get 
involved in one or another (or more) regional conflicts, 
Hungarian public opinion, traditionally unknowledge- 
able of East European affairs, is being successfully 
shaped already. With the partial exception of a few 
weekly papers and late-night radio programs, we cannot 
hear or read a single true word about the internal affairs 
of our unfortunate neighbors. With regard to onetime 
Yugoslavia, the vise of self-censorship has tightened 
hard. This is accompanied by the West’s disquieting 
confusion and lack of understanding (and Mitterrand’s 
pompous appearance has changed nothing in this). We 
are justified in expecting our neighbors’ crypto¬ 
communist and crypto-fascist factors to offer excellent 
pretexts for irresponsible Hungarian answers. Even a 
better administration, one that could be taken more 
seriously, would be in a difficult position amid the 
constant provocations of the various iron guards and 
others. 

“We are the ones in power,” said the MDFs blond 
deputy chairman at the end of last week. One (of course, 
not one with good manners) usually says something like 
this when one is not in control of the situation at all. This 
statement of the deputy chairman is not a report on the 



14 


HUNGARY 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


situation but a prophecy. Translated into plain language, 
it means that the 1994 elections will hardly be free. 

However, this is a false prophecy. It is false because, 
despite democracy’s loss of prestige, no one contests the 
democratic ideal in Hungary today. And there can be no 
action without ideals, no matter what kinds of hazy 
wishes are stirring in the heads of some crypto-Hungarist 
elements. Although social dissatisfaction may push the 
electorate to the left, the revival of communist dictator¬ 
ship has no significant number of followers despite all of 
the MSZP’s mistakes; the MSZP itself is not one of the 
followers either. Hungarians do not want an extreme- 
right-wing dictatorship. If the liberal parties will not pull 
themselves together in order to gain a decisive majority 
and if the MDF will not accept the principle of rotating 
parliamentary management, then we can reckon with 
uncertainty mixed with some coercion after 1994. There 
are forces in Hunga^ that, although they continue to be 
committed to certain principles of general democracy, 
are hardly loyal to the ideal of modem liberal constitu¬ 
tionality. We must live with these forces. This is the price 
of freedom. The MDF will not disappear into thin air 
like a bad dream, for it occupies a rather large space in 
Hungarian political culture. The liberal opposition, 
which is—^although clumsily—stumbling toward victory, 
must clearly state that antiliberal democrats are a per¬ 
manent part of Hungarian life, and that their temporary 
defeat would not mean that they would be forced off the 
stage or that their cultural and social preferences would 
be eliminated. There is space for all of us. 

The year 1994 will not be full of sunshine, but it will not 
be terrible either. 

(The author is a parliamentary representative and 
chairman of the SZDSZ National Committee.) 

Attorney General on Govemmenf s Supervisory 
Role 

92CH0779B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 
in Hungarian 4 Jul 92 pp 37’38 

[Interview with Attorney General Kalman Gyorgyi by 
Endre Babus; date and place not given: “If the Conflict Is 
Impossible To Resolve, the Attorney General Takes His 
Hat and Leaves”] 

[Text] The storm that was elicited by the appointment of 
county judges has hardly subsided, and now the adminis¬ 
tration would like to initiate yet another position-gaining 
action in the judiciary: It wants to take the public prose¬ 
cution department out ofparliament's supervision and put 
it under its own. The piquancy of the affair is that the 
executive branch found the attorney general to be a 
partner in its efforts to limit the autonomy of the public 
prosecution department; it was the attorney general him¬ 
self who wrote the *death sentence" of the public prose¬ 
cution department, supervised by parliament. Among 
other things, we asked Attorney General Kalman Gyorgyi 
(53), who himself, "off duty," is an eminent legal expert, 
why he did not try to win an independent position for the 


public prosecution department, akin to that of the 
Supreme Court, as has been proposed by many legal 
experts during the past century? 

[Babus] You stated last week in your widely publicized 
presentation that a public prosecution department, 
under the Ministry of Justice, would be needed in 
Hungary. What were your reasons for in the end 
accepting this standpoint, which strengthens the admin¬ 
istration’s position? 

[Gyorgyi] It has been my firm scholarly conviction since 
the 1970’s that, in a parliamentary state, the public 
prosecution department should function under the gov¬ 
ernment’s supervision. 

[Babus] Allow me, then, to remind you of your May 1990 
statement to the HETI VILAGGAZDASAG. At that 
time—a few weeks after you were elected—you still said 
that you did not want to commit yourself to the ideal of 
the public prosecutor working under either parliament or 
the government. 

[Gyorgyi] As one takes up a new office, one must handle 
one’s private whim and private scholarly conviction with 
self-restraint. Thus, after I was elected in parliament, I 
initiated a series of scholarly meetings in the fall of 1990, 
with the overt objective of thoroughly analyzing West 
European solutions and Hungarian legal historical pre¬ 
cedents, e.g., the circumstances of the enactment of the 
1871 Hungarian prosecution law. Subsequently, in the 
spring of last year, we worked out the concept of placing 
the public prosecution department within the govern¬ 
ment hierarchy. This concept is doubtless in line with my 
scholarly conviction. However, it does make a difference 
whether such an important constitutional issue is 
worked out on the basis of mere personal ideas or on the 
basis of thorough professional discussions. 

[Babus] It is possible that a much more prosaic assump¬ 
tion may have emerged in connection with your election. 
It could seem that, after a while, you had had enough of 
the ordeal that you had been subjected to in parliament 
where—as we all remember—your replies to interpella¬ 
tions by representatives were voted down one by one in 
the first three instances. It is a ready assumption, then, 
that the prosecution department could want to secure the 
loyalty of the given government majority and, at the 
same time, it could want to eliminate the possibility of 
calling the attorney general to account in parliament. 

[Gyorgyi] It would be hard to find a high-ranking gov¬ 
ernment officer who would wish to have a boss above 
him. Thus, it is not a private ambition of mine to seek a 
supervisory forum in the person of the justice minister. 
However, it is my conviction that, in the judiciary too, 
an operational constitutional structure must be devel¬ 
oped in Hungary. It is hardly accidental that the public 
prosecution department is under government supervi¬ 
sion in all the West European democracies—with the 
exception of Portugal. Incidentally, even the participants 
of the 1989 Opposition Roundtable agreed with such a 



JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


HUNGARY 


15 


change and, until last fall, the largest opposition party 
had supported the reform concept under discussion. 

With regard to your comment in connection with the 
interpellations, I am convinced that the prosecution 
department has no place in the first line of political 
struggle. Thus, I do not think that it is very fortunate that 
at present the attorney general has the same kind of 
political responsibility to parliament as the members of 
the administration. It is the justice minister who should 
be politically responsible to parliament for the operation 
of the prosecution department. 

[Babus] Obviously, the present concept was supported at 
that time by the Opposition Roundtable. However, the 
present legal status of county and municipal courts 
hardly coincides with the concepts of that time, as is also 
indicated by the scandals related to the appointments of 
individual presidents of court. Perhaps there is a rela¬ 
tionship between this and the fact that part of the 
opposition ceased to support the concepts of reforming 
the prosecution department—for which a two-thirds 
parliamentary majority would have been needed. Inci¬ 
dentally, why do you think that a status that is similar to 
that of the Supreme Court, i.e., independent from both 
parliament and the government, is not beneficial for 
prosecution department’s hierarchy? It would, by the 
way, automatically eliminate the possibility of directing 
an interpellation in parliament to the attorney general. 

[Gyorgyi] It is conceivable in theory that a country’s 
penal policy is determined by independent courts and an 
independent prosecution department. However, there 
are no such efforts in the Continent’s integrated demo¬ 
cratic states, which cannot be accidental. For instance, 
the Austrian People’s Party and the Austrian Socialist 
Party are fighting each other not in order to change the 
prosecution department’s constitutional position, but in 
order to gain power so that the winner can exercise 
supervision over the prosecution department. 

[Babus] I believe that these are precisely the examples 
that elicit justified fears. And these fears are not at all 
new. Already at the beginning of this century, none other 
but Attorney General Ferenc Vargha, one of your prede¬ 
cessors, wrote: What is independence for if the govern¬ 
ment can use the incumbent omnipotent attorney gen¬ 
eral for initiating a campaign whenever and wherever it 
wishes? Ever since, many legal experts have been urging 
for the establishment of an independent prosecution 
department, claiming that a prosecution department 
under the justice minister’s supervision would make it 
possible for political influence and party policies to 
permeate the judiciary. 

[Gyorgyi] It is without question that one can always 
quote outstanding thinkers who were dreaming of an 
independent prosecution department. One of the most 
dramatic readings of mine is the 1935 inauguration 
speech of Attorney General Ferenc Finkey, the ^eat 
criminal attorney. Finkey, who was appointed by Miklos 
Horthy at the recommendation of the justice minister, 


gave a lengthy argument in his speech that the prosecu¬ 
tion department should be given the same independent 
status as that of the courts. Thus, at the moment of 
assuming his office, a government officer questioned 
precisely those principles on the basis of which he 
occupied the attorney general’s chair. It was a magnifi¬ 
cent gesture and an impressive act—^but I strongly dis¬ 
agree with Finkey’s view. I think that the executive 
branch must take the responsibility for penal policy, e.g., 
when, in a given period, the state concentrates its forces 
on prosecuting violent criminal acts or criminal acts 
connected with drugs or perhaps arms trade. It would not 
be right if the government would be limited to the role of 
a mere spectator in connection with state justice. How¬ 
ever, without supervising the prosecution department, 
the executive branch does not have adequate means to 
influence the penal policy. 

[Babus] The police and secret police organizations of 
tens of thousands, is in the government’s hands. At the 
same time, the independence of the prosecution depart¬ 
ment with a staff of 920 persons would, once and for all, 
eliminate the suspicion—^after all, 50 years of condi¬ 
tioning may still be at work—that the prosecution 
department acts under political pressure in certain cases. 

[Gyorgyi] According to a bill that was worked out 
recently, the prosecution department would not be at the 
mercy of given political demands in the future either. 
The justice minister would issue directives only to a 
single person: the attorney general. 

[Babus] This is enough. For it is well known that the 
prosecution department operates under a strict hierarchy. 

[Gyorgyi] The attorney general’s task is to impartially 
adhere to the provisions of the law. He is the one who 
must fend off any potential political initiatives. And, as 
a final solution, in case the conflict is impossible to 
resolve, then the attorney general takes his hat and 
leaves. Such a thing is a noteworthy event in a parlia¬ 
mentary state. 

[Babus] Using your words, that may be an impressive 
moral act, but under no circumstance can it be called an 
institutional assurance for fending off potential govern¬ 
ment influence. 

[Gyorgyi] I can state on the basis of the talks during my 
visits abroad that in the middle-class democracies the 
justice minister does not directly interfere with judicial 
affairs. For it can lead to a serious loss of confidence 
when a government wants to put the judiciary under its 
control. And it is utterly inconceivable that a govern¬ 
ment party would try to defeat the opposition through 
judicial avenues. Such attempts would backfire, for after 
the next elections a reverse process would begin which 
could shake the judiciary apart and could cause constant 
political uncertainty. 


16 


HUNGARY 


JPRS-EER.92-109 
18 August 1992 


Govenunent Sues for ^Offending the Authorities’ 

92CH0803A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 
in Hungarian 11 Jul 92 pp 76-78 

[Article by Gabor Juhasz: “Offended Authorities; Being 
Sued, Within the Government”] 

[Text] Government officials filed complaints against 
Representatives Matyas Eorsi and Jozsef Torgyan last 
month; Jozsef Antall, Peter Boross, and Lajos Fur 
claim that both representatives committed crimes by 
offending the authorities before the greater public. 
Other signs also indicate that the government wants to 
provide greater criminal law protection to the author¬ 
ities and thus also to itself, to the extent that offenders 
may be punished with as much as three years in 
prison. 

“I am not only requesting, but I am expressly demanding 
that you release me, so that I have a chance to present in 
court all the proof 1 have,” SZDSZ [Alliance of Free 
Democrats] Representative Matyas Eorsi said on 23 
June when exercising his right to make the “last state¬ 
ment” in House debate about lifting his parliamentary 
immunity. This fighting statement also suggests that the 
case—^perhaps lawsuit—against the opposition represen¬ 
tative charged by the prime minister with having 
offended the authorities could still hold some surprises, 
but the issue much rather pertains to who is going to be 
surprised. 

On the other hand, it seems as certain that the govern¬ 
ment has gotten fed up with being accused in public of 
having even thought of violence. In his 6 June television 
statement, Matyas Eorsi said that during the 1990 taxi 
blockade “then Interior Minister Balazs Horvath consid¬ 
ered the possibility of having the authorities fire into the 
crowd.” Jozsef Torgyan suffered the same fate in June. 
Interior Minister Peter Boross and Defense Minister 
Lajos Fur filed complaints against the Smallholders 
Party chief; it seems that they copied the qualifying term 
used in the Eorsi case after Jozsef Torgyan had named 
the police and the security services as the supporters of 
the 11 June Smallholders coup that had been aimed 
against him (HVG 20 June 1992). 

The coincidence of the two cases may be regarded as 
accidental at first glance, or it could be ascribed to the 
deterioration of the manner in which the Hungarian 
political struggle is being conducted. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the number of proceedings and indict¬ 
ments initiated for offending an official or an authority 
(Criminal Code of Laws, Paragraph 232) has once again 
risen since last year, following a low point in 1989 and 
1990 (see table). Equally true is the fact that Justice 
Minister Istvan Balsai has recommended to parliament 
to legislate more stringent punishment regarding this 
crime. 


Criminal Proceedings Initiated on Grounds of 
Offending an Authority or an Official 
(Criminal Code of Laws, Paragraph 232)' 



Number of Proceedings 
Initiated 

Number of Indictments 

1987 

349 

286 

1988 

309 

268 

1989 

300 

231 

1990 

305 

157 

1991 

313 

269 


Justice administration statistics do not show the number of judg¬ 
ments pronounced in the various years. Similarly, no central records 
exist to show the number of rules violation proce^ings initiated for 
offending an authority or official. 

Matyas Eorsi and Jozsef Torgyan have undoubtedly 
taken a greater political risk today than the existential 
threat han^ng over their head when facing the adminis¬ 
tration of justice, even though the complainants believe 
that the graver version of offending the authorities—the 
variety of the offense committed “before the greater 
public”—has materialized. Under existing law this crime 
qualifies as an offense punishable by a prison term not 
exceeding two years, while the basic crime draws up to 
one year in prison, correctional-educational work, or a 
fine. The legislative proposal introduced by Balsai 
intends to add one year to each of these prison sentences 
based on the assertion that a “dual violation of laws” 
exists; the government wishes to accomplish this by 
amending the Criminal Code of Laws. Such amend¬ 
ments require the affirmative vote of a simple majority, 
not of a two-thirds majority. 

The government’s proposal for more stringent protection 
of the authorities and of officials under criminal law in 
itself indicates that an ever-increasing number of crim¬ 
inal proceedings may be initiated based on Paragraph 
232, but the growth in the number of proceedings can be 
regarded as certain if parliament adopts additional 
amendments that have already been introduced. These 
aniendments would also change in a single stroke the 
criteria governing rules violations. The government 
wants to abolish the rules violation variety of offending 
authorities for the future—an offense punishable only by 
the payment of a fine; “mild” cases like this would 
trigger either no proceeding at all, or the initiation of a 
criminal proceeding, and the latter would be the more 
likely outcome. As before, proceedings involving an 
offense to the authorities could only be initiated on the 
basis of filing a complaint (in a manner similar to slander 
or defamation of character, both of which are actionable 
only on the basis of a private initiative). Based on the 
government proposal, however, the superior of an 
offended person would have an obligation to file a 
complaint in the future, if the subordinate so requests. 
Present rules require the judicial machinery to be set in 
motion in response to a complaint filed by the “organ 
defined by law,” but filing a complaint may be refused 
even despite a request by an offended person, if the 
complaint is contrary to the “public interest.” This 
provision provides some latitude to the leadership of the 
various authorities. 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


HUNGARY 


17 


The question is, of course, whether Matyas Eorsi has 
indeed committed a crime by making his statement. 
Based on Criminal Code of Laws Paragraph 232, a 
person is punishable if he makes a statement, spreads the 
word, or uses an expression^—^perhaps an expression that 
conveys this effect, or commits an act that is suited to 
shake confidence in an authority or in the functioning of 
an official (former minister of the interior, presently 
Minister Without Portfolio Balazs Horvath, in this case), 
or is designed to infringe upon the honor of an official. 

There can hardly be any doubt that a statement is well 
suited to shake confidence in the jwlitical sense of that 
term, if it pertains to an active minister, and asserts that 
the minister, in his previous (opacity as interior minis¬ 
ter—moreover, substituting as the head of government 
for the prime minister who had fallen ill—^he had con¬ 
sidered to order the authorities to fire into the crowd. (It 
is yet another question that under Hungarian constitu¬ 
tional law the political fate of ministers dei^nds on the 
confidence of the prime minister.) But the criminal act of 
offending the authorities is also peculiar because of its 
unique rules of evidence: The offender is not punishable 
if his statement is proven to be true; on the other hand, 
the truth can only be proven if the statement of the fact 
is justified by the public interest or by any person’s just 
interest. 

Thus it is not at all certain that Matyas Eorsi—^a lawyer 
by occupation, just as Balazs Horvath—^need not worry 
about his ability to present his promised proof, not to 
mention the fact that a significant number of documents 
that might serve as proof—such as records and internal 
directives—could probably be found only in the files of 
the government (i.e., of the offended person and the 
complainant); in addition, how could one prove what 
another person had in mind at a given point in time? 

As of today both parties feel certain about being able to 
make their own cases: They do not even want to hear 
about a quiet, out-of-court settlement. Matyas Eorsi is 
talking about proof, Balazs Horvath is not satisfied with 
some kind of an apology, Jozsef Antall would at best like 
to accomplish a situation in which ^*a statement like this 
does not remain in Hungarian political consciousness,” 
as he told representatives. Accordingly, the question 
remains, who has caUed whose bluff. From the stand¬ 
point of the government and Jozsef Antall personally, a 
judgment against Eorsi will not suffice, even though that 
could put Matyas Eorsi in prison, of vital importance is 
that the government remain “clean” in the course of 
evidentiary proceedings. As a politician sued by the 
government and as an experienced lawyer, the opposi¬ 
tion representative is expected to launch an attack. He 
might lose because Balazs Horvath did not consider 
ordering the authorities to fire into the crowd, but even 
that way, certain details of the secret history of the taxi 
blockade may be revealed to the public in court, and 
such revelation is undesirable from the standpoint of the 
government, or of certain members of the cabinet. 


Only the timing of the proceeding is more uncertain than 
its outcome: At press time, professionals at the Budapest 
Prosecutor’s Office of Investigations had only been 
studying the complaint against Eorsi, because they had 
not officially received word of the parliamentary deci¬ 
sion lifting Eorsi’s immunity. A series of hearings lasting 
for months or even years is also conceivable, and the 
likelihood of protracted proceedings is suggested by the 
best-known suit in recent years. This case was initiated 
in response to a complaint filed by Interior Ministry 
Deputy State Secretary Laszlo Korinek, the head of the 
Ministry’s regulatory division, against journalist Attila 
Schmidt. The complainant believes that the NEPSZAVA 
journalist has shaken confidence in the authority under 
his jurisdiction by publicizing information Schmidt had 
in his possession, but without mentioning names or 
institutions, information, according to which criminal 
authorities had not done everything they could have to 
find out the truth about Peter Zwack’s house fire, and 
that this failure to act had been suggested by persons at 
higher levels of government (HVG 1 June 1991). The 
Korinek versus Schmidt case has taken a new turn last 
month: Despite an objection by the chairman of the 
Supreme Court, a council of the highest court had 
affirmed a judgment pronounced last August, in which 
the Budapest Court had found the journalist guilty and 
had ordered him to pay a 25,000-forint fine. 

The NEPSZAVA case, too, indicates that lawsuits like 
this are not independent from the freedom of the press: 
A series of lawsuits initiated by the authorities is capable 
of harnessing not only the yellow press, but it can also 
force political newspapers to become overly cautious. As 
a result of a proliferation of these kinds of proceedings, 
(and especially if three-year prison terms are enforced), 
editorial offices are most certainly going to impose 
self-censorship sooner or later, rather than pondering 
what is and what is not permissible, just to be sure. 
Newspapers will be encouraged to do so if the press law 
already introduced by the government is adopted by 
parliament. Upon the enactment of that law courts could 
order the payment of as much as 15 million forints to 
compensate for violating someone’s personal rights in 
one or or another newspaper article (HVG 30 May 
1992). 

In most instances political statements turn into criminal 
cases because the disputed statements reach hundreds of 
thousands and millions of people through mass commu¬ 
nications. Matyas Eorsi, for instance, would obviously 
not have to spend his summer vacation searching for 
proof, had he expressed his views about what Balazs 
Horvath had in mind for example, in the corridors of 
parliament and not as part of a television program. The 
possible Eorsi suit is also going serve as a test for political 
openness, because it will reveal whether certain, possible 
secret documents thus far unknown to the public will be 
presented to the court, the way Eorsi promises this will 
happen, and, if so, whether these documents will be 
printed, or if the thoughts of Balazs Horvath, or other 
members of the government as of October 1990 will be 


18 


HUNGARY 


JPRS-EER.92-109 
18 August 1992 


revealed only to the exceptional people participating in a 
closed hearing, protected by the veil of state secrecy. 

Scant Support Seen for Hungarian Draft Resisters 

92BA1224A Novi Sad MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 
6 Jul 92 p 4 

[Article by “ger”: “The People of Velebit Have a Dif¬ 
ferent Opinion; Most of the Town Does Not Support the 
Oromhegyes Protest Movement”] 

[Text] Velebit is located only a few kilometers from 
Oromhegyes. The one town has hardly any Hungarian¬ 
speaking inhabitants, while the other is almost 100- 
percent Hungarian. What the two have in common is 
that their inhabitants are diligent people, mostly 
farmers. During harvest time, there is not much time for 
“talking about politics”; the Oromhegyes reservists, their 
family members and supporters, and the crisis staff who 
have been directing the almost-two-month-old protest 
movement announced that during the harvest they will 
suspend their present form of protest and will do their 
share of the work, but they will nevertheless continue to 
assemble at “headquarters,” i.e., the Ziccer Club. The 
authorities have not yet employed any force against 
those who have resisted the call to active duty, but are 
ignoring their demands and frequent petitions for can¬ 
celing the call and for allowing the safe return of those 
who have fled abroad. It seems that the authorities have 
much more pressing problems to deal with, namely, the 
political pressure that is steadily increasing because of 
the economic sanctions. 

The official power establishment may ignore the Orom¬ 
hegyes peace movement and the demands of the dis¬ 
obeying reservists, but the inhabitants of the neighboring 
town of Velebit do have their opinion regarding the 
affair. In talking to local people, the outsider will 
unequivocally come to the conclusion that the things 
people are most interested in include the following: when 
will they get their diesel fuel ration, will they be able to 
harvest their few grains, why they get only nine dinars 
instead of 13 dinars for their com, and why the price of 
slaughtered veal has gone down from 120 dinars to 80 
dinars at a time when everything costs several times 
more than it used to? However, beyond the everyday 
problems, they also have their views regarding the 
Oromhegyes protest movement, which was summarized 
by community secretary Miordrag Dakovic as follows: 

“The MAGYAR SZO reported earlier that the people of 
Velebit support the participants of the Oromhegyes 
protest movement and, as a sign of their support, sent 
them food. It is possible that some people have sent some 
food to the protesters, but I can state that most of the 
town disagrees with the protesters. The reason why we 
do not support their act is not that they are Magyars, but 
that they think and behave as if they were exempt from 
the laws and obligations that the other citizens must 
observe. If the call to active duty had been resisted 
somewhere else, say, in Kragujevac, we would view it in 


the same way. The constitutional state must affect 
everyone in the same way. If it is stated in the Constitu¬ 
tion that Serbia is a state, then citizens should have the 
same rights and obligations, regardless of whether they 
are Magyars, Serbs, or others. As several people have 
commented, the Oromhegyes protest has been taken to 
an extreme. Many things have changed since it began, 
and their demands are not justified anymore. The reserv¬ 
ists did not report for active duty, and what is the 
situation now? No one bothers them, but, then, what is 
the point of their demands? What would become of us if 
we all opposed each other? 

“We maintain good relations with the Magyars of both 
Oromhegyes and Velebit. The Magyars are a minority in 
Velebit, but this does not mean that they must fkce 
discrimination. When MAGYAR SZO correspondents 
came to our town last spring, one of our townspeople 
said that he would be the first one to help his Magyar 
neighbor if anyone mistreated him. This is true indeed, 
but, unfortunately, some people interpreted this state¬ 
ment to mean that local Magyars are in need of protec¬ 
tion because they are being mistreated, and this is far 
from the truth. The townspeople help each other, they 
have to struggle with the same problems, and there is no 
political separation among them. They help each other 
both in sowing and harvesting,” said community secre¬ 
tary Miodrag Dakovic. 

Novi Sad University Strike Leader Interviewed 

92BA1224B Novi Sad MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 
7 Jul 92 p 4 

[Interview with Stanko Bosnic, student and president of 
the strike committee of Novi Sad University, by Marta 
Vaiju; place and date not given: “We Shook Vajdasag 
From Its Apathy”] 

[Text] [Vaiju] You, Ujvidek [Novi Sad] students, were 
somewhat delayed in organizing yourselves and begin¬ 
ning the strike. This subjected you to much criticism. 
What was, in your opinion, as strike committee 
chairman, the cause of the delay? 

[Bosnic] It is true indeed that the Ujvidek students did 
not join the Belgrade students right away. I think the 
reason for that was that the Ujvidek University Student 
Union, as an institution, did not react to the strike in 
time, and when it finally did, it did not represent the 
majority opinion of university students. It took some 
time until College of Liberal Arts students announced 
the truth and others joined them. Actually, we were 
delayed because of differences of opinion. 

[Vaiju] Incidentally, those in Vajdasag [Vojvodina] have 
a laid-back mentality.... 

[Bosnic] I was bom in Vajdasag, but my parents were 
“immigrants.” There is some truth in that those in 
Vajdasag are “laid back,” but I think that we live in an 
age when those of Vajdasag, Sumadija, and even Serbia, 
i.e., all citizens of Yugoslavia, have had enough of war, 



JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


HUNGARY 


19 


of the fact that fundamental human principles and 
norms are disregarded, and of the fact that what is 
happening today is not governed by rationality but by 
emotions and by the fact that the cup is running oven 
Well, as long as we have b^un talking about those in 
Vajdasag, it is true that civic loyalty and public order, 
and respect for the requirements of the power establish¬ 
ment and the law, permeated these people more deeply. 

[Vaiju] I myself was witness how Bogdanovic, the pres¬ 
ident of the Ujvidek Student Union, was a turncoat. He 
represented diametrically different views from one day 
to the next and, since he was the president, he probably 
exerted great influence on most university students. On 
Friday, he still supported the demands of the Belgrade 
students, but at the meeting held on Monday, he stated 
the opposite of everything he had said. What did you 
students think of that? 

[Bosnic] I do not wish to, and will not, accuse Aleksandar 
Bogdanovic personally, but his behavior was certainly 
contradictory in certain things. It is possible that he did 
this against his will. On the other hand, it is also true that 
politics do not tolerate mistakes. And he did make 
mistakes. He continued to be interim president of Vaj¬ 
dasag Student Union. While we were on strike, he visited 
us a few times, but never made a speech to those 
assembled. He told us that he agreed with our demands 
and with the students’ intentions in general, but he 
questioned our methods. He thought that we should not 
have locked ourselves in the university. 

[Vaiju] Looking back at the demonstration that lasted 
almost 12 days, did you achieve your goals? 

[Bosnic] The fact that most students and instructors 
rallied behind us was, in itself, a ^eat achievement. We 
were also regularly visited by the citizens of Ujvidek, but 
I think that our greatest achievement was that we shook 
Vajdasag from its apathy. For a few days, the College of 
Liberal Arts became the center of the city. I am glad that 
we were able to invite many people during the strike, 
who told us of their views; we talked with them, perhaps 
contributing to the promotion of tolerance. I cannot give 
you exact data on how many people participated in the 
demonstration; the only written evidence is the petition 
that was signed by 3,800 people. 

[Vaiju] The university students were visited even by the 
crown-prince... 

[Bosnic] It was very nice and moving when Aleksandar 
Karadordevic stepped into the stronghold of the pro¬ 
testing university students. What moved me the most 
was that the citizens of Ujvidek wanted to be eye¬ 
witnesses to that and not only the Serbs but also the 
Magyars, Slovaks, and other nationalities came to greet 
His Highness. The crown prince is a very open and 
pleasant man, and I believe that his presence here will 
provide a certain degree of prestige to the country. 

[Vaiju] The Ujvidek students ended their protest. What 
is the next step, what will you do next? 


[Bosnic] We will join the Belgrade students. Unfortu¬ 
nately, we will do this only symbolically for the time 
being, for we still have much to do here and, in addition, 
22 through 30 July is the time when students who 
participated in the strike may take their examinations. It 
is clear that all of us must concentrate now on the 
examinations. Those who wanted to have already gone 
to Belgrade. At the university there we are provided with 
room and board. The instructors are required to admin¬ 
ister the examinations during the week mentioned. 
Should any of them refuse to do so, the aggrieved person 
may turn to the rector, who will then take the necessary 
measures. 

[Vaiju] When was the last time you took an examina¬ 
tion? 

[Bosnic] My last exam was on 11 June, way before the 
strike. I will not make use of this so-called adjunct 
examination period, for I have only a semester exam to 
take for fulfilling admissions requirements, and I have 
time until September to do that. 

[Vaiju] Does this mean that you are not one of the weak 
students?... 

[Bosnic] This is proof that it was not weak university 
students who organized and promoted the strike. 

(The instructor who was present at the interview also 
corroborated that he was an excellent student.) 

[Vaiju] What changes do you think the student demon¬ 
stration will bring? 

[Bosnic] It will at least change the thinking of people, of 
individuals. Well, I do not expect any fundamental 
change, but the fact that increased efforts are being taken 
in Ujvidek to finally bring about a change is a great 
achievement. People will no longer accept smoke¬ 
screening or being reprimanded, and, above all, they will 
not tolerate tyranny and injustice. 

Restrictions in Abortion Draft Bill Proposals 

92CH0793B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 
1 Jul 92 p 4 

[Article by J.S.: “Variants on Abortion; The Administra¬ 
tion Surprised the Opposition”] 

[Text] As we already reported yesterday, Istvan Balsai 
described at a Salgotarjan meeting the administration's 
draft bill proposal The minister said that two versions will 
likely be submitted to parliament. One would allow an 
abortion only if either the mother*s or the fetuses life is 
threatened, while the other would allow an abortion in 
any so-called crisis situation. 

In reply to the NEPSZABADSAG’s question, Roza 
Hodosan, member of the team that worked out the 
SZDSZ’s [Alliance of Free Democrats] draft bill pro¬ 
posal, said that, in view of the events during the past 
weeks, she hoped that the Pusztai concept, which is 


20 


HUNGARY 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


much closer to the SZDSZ’s standpoint, would be sub¬ 
mitted. She thinks that both variants presented by Istvan 
Balsai give reasons for concern. The enactment of the 
first variant would mean a complete ban on abortions. 
On the other hand, the other variant would subject 
permission to committee decisions, for the existence of a 
“crisis situation” described by the minister would 
require an investigation. Representative Hodosan con¬ 
siders their own draft bill a proposal that is in line with 
European norms, and any similar proposal acceptable. 

MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] Parliamentary Rep- 
r^ntative Judit Csehak said that making abortions so 
difficult is not a European solution at all. According the 
MSZP’s standpoint, the present regulation should be 
legislated. Incidentally, Representative Csehak did not 


expect a separate proposal by the administration; as she 
said, she expected a discussion of the SZDSZ proposal— 
and extensive modifications on the part of the govern¬ 
ment parties. 

Judit Csehak subsequently stated that she would not 
endorse the making of the present regulations any 
stricter and, since the proposal of the government parties 
is likely to be enacted, she will support putting the issue 
on a referendum. 

Katalin Filo, chairman of the Women’s Council of the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum, did not wish to make any 
statements to the NEPSZABADSAG, but she stated that 
she was unfamiliar with the administration’s draft bill on 
abortion. 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


POLAND 


21 


Commentary on Walesa’s Military Doctrine 
Speech 

92EP0599A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 
31Jul-2Aug92p I 

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Tadeusz Mitek: “A Policy 
of Secure Sovereignty”] 

[Text] It was ascertained in the main planks of the Polish 
security policy outlined by President Lech Walesa that 
the republic should possess its own system for the 
defense of the state and military potential which would 
provide an opportunity to counteract any aggression. 
The Polish Armed Forces, as a basic element of the 
defense system, should be maintained in peacetime at a 
level of mobilization readiness that would make it pos¬ 
sible immediately to embark on combat actions in the 
event of a threat to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the state. 

In the event of a local conflict threatening our territory, 
we will undertake actions that would make it possible to 
stop the enemy. In turn, if a total war were to come 
about, the Armed Forces should be capable of deter¬ 
mined defense and resistance in order to inflict losses on 
the aggressor and cause an international response. 

These are basic statements for strategists, staff officers, 
and military logistics specialists. They will be built upon 
appropriately in conceptual studies and the executive 
decisions of commanders. 

We should note that defense military issues were out¬ 
lined in the aforementioned concept of security policy in 
a very broad context of the economy and government 
policy. Along with military issues, geopolitical premises 
and economic, ecological, ethnic, and social aspects were 
included in the notion of security. That notion also 
embraces issues of domestic security associated with 
threats of various types that weaken state structures and 
thus make them vulnerable to external pressure. 

In the nonmilitary dimension, the security of Poland is 
associated with the political and economic integration in 
Western Europe, with membership in the European 
Community being secured as soon as possible and, 
consequently, our lag in the development of civilization 
being overcome. 

It was stated unambiguously that Poland does not now 
have a designated enemy, and renounces the use of force 
in relations between countries. We want to locate mili¬ 
tary units throughout the territory of our nation. How¬ 
ever, we will simultaneously seek security through ties to 
existing defense alliances. Full membership in NATO for 
Poland was pointed out as the long-term goal, in recog¬ 
nition of the fact that the North Atlantic i^liance is a 
fundamental factor of peace and politico-military stabi¬ 
lization in Europe. 

The career servicemen of the Polish Armed Forces are 
eagerly awaiting decisions of the constitutional oi^ns 


concerning the Polish security policy. It is highly signif¬ 
icant that at present, this policy is being developed in an 
atmosphere of the uniformity of intentions and under¬ 
standing among institutions responsible for national 
security. Defense of the state is one of the basic elements 
of the raison d’etre of the state. Absolutely unequivocal 
statements and straightforward decisions are necessary 
in this area. It should become the rule that from now on, 
the defense sphere will not be burdened by a contest of 
extemporaneous political interests. 

Intelligence Problems Reflected in Lustration Law 

92EP0523B Warsaw PRAWOIZYCIE in Polish 
No 25. 20Jun 92 p 4 

[Article by Krzysztof Dubinski: “Intelligence—the Big¬ 
gest Loser”] 

[Text] In the heat of the debates over the balance of 
political and moral losses caused by Minister 
Macierewicz’s lustration law, the losses have entered 
another dimension and the results have been felt by the 
security apparatus itself. The last weeks of the lustration 
law disrupted the work of the special services, disturbed 
the governing structure of these services—which had still 
not stabilized following the radical changes of 1990— 
and finally had a disintegrating influence on the staff and 
employees. 

The biggest loss is that level of Polish special services that, 
until now, were most diligent about staying in the back¬ 
ground, and the one that is now most needed for the Polish 
state’s proper functioning: the intelligence service. 


Agent Elite 

“Remember you are responsible for the life and well¬ 
being of your source.” This is the motto that is instilled 
in every new intelligence officer. Its basis is the protec¬ 
tion of the agent’s identity , or concealment of the source 
of information. It is binding on all intelligence services 
in the world, regardless of the political or ideological 
system. And no one has ever heard of its being volun¬ 
tarily broken. 

For the most part, intelligence agents are a true elite. 
These are people who must have access to the most 
important political, economic, technological, and 
defense information. It is important that they have 
unrestricted access to decisionmaking and opinion¬ 
giving centers, as well as have the ability to move around 
freely on the international level. You do not recruit such 
people off the street. The selection, development, and 
training of a good intelligence agent can sometimes take 
years and requires great operational effort, and let us not 
conceal the fact, also financial costs. This frequently also 
requires recruitment of additional agents that are essen¬ 
tial both for the very process of recruiting as well as later 
service, or liaison of the agents. 


22 


POLAND 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


An individual who undertakes work for the intelligence 
service commits, in his country of residence, one of the 
most serious offenses: He becomes a spy. In case of 
exposure, in the best case scenario he faces a long prison 
term, and in the worst case he faces the death sentence. 

Unmasking 

Because of these and many other reasons, Department I 
of the former MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the 
Intelligence Administration of the current UOP [Office 
of State Protection] possess separate lists of sources. 
Until now, it was completely compartmented and inac¬ 
cessible to other special services. This was one of the 
most successful methods of maintaining agency secrecy. 

The end of this secretive character occurred under quite 
dramatic circumstances. If one believes obscure press 
reports, the intelligence chief Colonel Henryk Jasik 
refused decisively to carry out Minister Piotr Naimski’s 
r^mmendation with regard to providing lists of intel¬ 
ligence agents. Consequently, he was dismissed. His 
duties were turned over to one of his deputies, who also 
went against this recommendation. At that time another 
deputy was appointed director of the Intelligence 
Administration. The editorial staff is not disclosing the 
nam^ since they were not made public. Apparently, 
certain rezydentura chiefs (chiefs of station) abroad were 
recalled home and pressure was exerted in order to 
obtain information from them concerning their agency. 
However, I doubt if these press reports can be verified. 

Minister Naimski, however, achieved his goal. As it 
appears from the document in Macierewicz’s so-called 
third envelope, the information in the Intelligence 
Administration active files was made available to the 
Department of Studies of the Minister of Internal 
Affairs. Seventeen individuals, neither intellectually nor 
professionally qualified, and not sworn to an oath, and 
what is more important not investigated as far as their 
outside loyalties and responsibilities, obtained informa¬ 
tion that should have never been revealed to anyone 
outside the intelligence community. 

It appears from information presented to deputies by the 
MSW that exposure of intelligence staff officers also took 
place. Their personal files are kept in the Independent 
Staff Section of the intelligence service and like the 
source files they were inaccessible to other MSW ands 
UOP organizations until now. Information can be found 
there, among other things, concerning covert agents. The 
important interests of the service require that their 
official biographies should never be linked with any 
building on Rakowiecka Street. 

A Chief in Difficult Times 

During the decadent era of Kiszczak, and the retirement- 
age General Sarewicz, Col. Henryk Jasik became head of 
the intelligence service. The appointment of this career 
intelligence officer from the young generation proved to 
be a salvation for the organization. The dissolution of 
the SB [Security Service], of which the intelligence 


service was by law a part, the verification procedure and 
establishment of the UOP, began a several week process 
of complete disintegration of the special services. The 
state’s interests were placed in the background, and all 
group solidarity mechanisms broke apart. A complete 
relaxation of discipline and sense of duty took place in 
the Rakowiecka Street building. The only rule that 
applied was that of save your own skin. 

All of these highly demoralizing phenomena affected the 
service to a small degree. Col. Jasik became a chief who 
was able to maintain discipline and a measure of normal 
working conditions for his organization at a most diffi¬ 
cult time of historical transformation. He also was able 
to find a method, comparatively without conflict, for 
adapting the structures and goal of intelligence activities 
to the expectations and needs of the Polish Republic’s 
sovereignty. 

What is more important is that the Polish intelligence 
service retained intact the operational ability that had 
brought it high praise throughout the world. Undoubt¬ 
edly, one of its greatest achievements was precise infor¬ 
mation obtained by one of the intelligence sites con¬ 
cerning the location of various western hostages in Iraq. 
Thanks to this information, during Desert Storm not 
even one allied bomb struck a target where there was a 
hostage. 

This was one of those intelligence successes that Col. 
Jasik attributed to a very positive evaluation made 
publicly to him by Krzysztof Kozlowski. 

Col. Jasik’s return to the UOP is expected. This would be 
a personal decision guaranteeing the stabilization of the 
situation in the intelligence service, restoration of cred¬ 
ibility, and minimizing of damage that for this service 
could result from the lustration actions. 

Restoration of Credibility 

Whatever one says about the ideological origin and 
character of intelligence in the PRL [Polish People’s 
Republic], it built its organization and network of 
sources throughout all those years and achieved a repu¬ 
tation as one of the most competent and most profes¬ 
sional services. It is not coincidental that CIA Director 
William Webster warned Minister Krzysztof Kozlowski, 
who was dismantling the former MSW empire, that it is 
easy to destroy an intelligence service but to rebuild it 
takes years. 

Minister Macierewicz’s team could not understand this. 
No one could convince them that exposing even a 
nonoperational network of intelligence sources, not even 
mentioning operative agents and staff, would totally 
destroy the intelligence service’s reputation, and would 
result in the loss of trust in its representatives. For all 
those cooperating with Polish intelligence, the lustration 
law signifies uncertainty and deathly fear of exposure. 

It may happen that for many years to come few will want 
to cooperate with a service that cannot guarantee them 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


POLAND 


23 


security and discretion. Who can guarantee that 
someone sometimes for similar extemporaneous reasons 
will not repeat lustration. 

The underming of the Polish intelligence service’s cred¬ 
ibility occurred at the most unhappy moment. Faced 
with new geopolitical surroundings, which carried with it 
unknown and, until now, unforeseen dangers, the 
republic needs efficient “eyes and ears.” Polish intelli¬ 
gence should effectively make itself at home with the 
new course of action and ensure the flow of valuable and 
timely information from it, and build new source net¬ 
works. Such is the complete requirement for national 
security, which is quite poor and alone, to trust other 
conventional guarantees, for example, our own military 
potential. 

Together or Separately 

The disintegration of the hitherto existing secretive 
character of intelligence should once again begin discus¬ 
sions concerning its place within the nation’s framework. 
A change in this placement could protect the service 
against interference that is unfounded and results from 
improvised regional political interests. 

Currently, it is similar to the former MSW. The intelli¬ 
gence service carries out autonomous tasks of great 
importance for the state’s security and occupies a decid¬ 
edly lower position as one of the organizational units of 
the UOP. The intelligence chief, who is a dispenser of 
intelligence information, is separated from intelligence 
consumers, who normally are the prime minister and 
president, by two higher government levels. Manipula¬ 
tion and distortion of reported information is possible 
on these two intermediary levels. 

As a matter of fact, this intelligence hierarchy is a legacy 
of the organizational and centralized tradition of the 
KGB. In the majority of democratic nations, intelligence 
agencies are a separate part of the government and are 
subordinate to the prime minister or the president. 

When the SB was dissolved in 1990, proposals were 
made to separate the intelligence service from the secu¬ 
rity apparatus. Deputy Jacek Merkel presented this pro¬ 
posal to former Prime Minister Mazowiecki. He stipu¬ 
lated the establishment of an intelligence agency that 
would be distinct from the central government UOP 
office. These ideas had been discussed earlier in the 
intelligence serivce itself and were considered very 
advantageous for the service itself. 

The rejection of these ideas was probably due to practical 
considerations. After separating the intelligence service, 
the same would have to be done with counterintelli¬ 
gence, and then each of these organizations would have 
to double their logistic and technical base. It was there¬ 
fore decided that an Office of State Protection, indepen¬ 
dent of the MSW, would be created and would integrate 
the special services. 


Today, following the experience with the lustration law, it 
would perhaps be worthwhile to return to this discussion. 
It appears that the transformation of the intelligence 
service into a central office with a clearly defined consti¬ 
tutional subordination is the most sensible solution. 

Defense Minister Comments on New 
Developments 

92EP0599B Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 
31JuL2 Aug 92 pp 7-2 

[Article by Stanislaw Lukaszewski: “Minister Janusz 
Onyszkiewicz: To Replace the Old Structure With a New 
One”] 

[Text] A meeting between Minister of National Defense 
Janusz Onyszkiewicz and journalists was held on 30 July 
at a conference center. Zbigniew Skoczylas, chief of the 
Department Personnel of the Ministry of National 
Defense was present. The minister wanted to outline 
what is happening in the Armed Forces and what will 
certainly happen. A lot is happening in the Armed 
Forces. First of all, a process of finalizing work on the 
concept of the Ministry of Defense and the concept of 
the Armed Forces has been set in motion. 

That concept was developed as early as one year ago. It 
was confirmed by decisions of both the government and 
the National Defense Committee. Unfortunately, it has 
not been implemented to this day. It is worthwhile to 
revisit the concept one year later in order to check how 
thinking about a reform has stood up to the test of time. 
The proceedings of two special commissions are devoted 
to that. One of them is involved in reviewing the concept 
of the civilian-military component of the Defense Min¬ 
istry. The other commission is working on the structure 
of the General Staff and the entire Armed Forces. The 
work of the commissions has made great progress 
because the point of departure was advanced, if for no 
other reason. 

Minister Onyszkiewicz hopes that the commissions will 
finish their work before mid-September, and subse¬ 
quently the concept will assume its final shape. What is 
the concept about? It has to do with the fact that the 
structure of the Defense Ministry still dates back to the 
1960’s, a structure from the time of the Warsaw Pact. It 
is basically a military structure. However, the require¬ 
ments of a democratic state make it necessary to think 
about civilian control over the Armed Forces. Therefore, 
that reform will be concerned, in particular, with sepa¬ 
rating the responsibilities of the civilian and military 
elements in the Armed Forces. 

Therefore, the structure of the Armed Forces and their 
leading organs will be completely different from the 
current one. Adopting that structure will necessitate 
effecting large-scale personnel reassignments and thus 
filling new positions in the civilian-military and military 
elements. The number of such positions will not be 
greater, it will be smaller. However, their subordination 


24 


POLAND 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


will be of a different kind. That is why it is necessary to 
think about filling those positions anew, to some extent. 
One of the goals of the reforms is to cut back central 
structures. At present, they are too extensive. As large- 
^le personnel reassignments lie ahead for us, the min¬ 
ister of national defense primarily discussed the per¬ 
sonnel policy and a model of our Armed Forces. The 
minister said that we have studied many models of 
armed forces, and that there is no single model that 
would reflect a multinational model. Therefore, we will 
try to develop our own, Polish model. After all, other 
countries that are emerging in post-Yalta Europe are 
taking an interest in it. That is proof that the model is not 
bad. 

The minister communicated that at present, a review of 
the cadres in the Armed Forces is underway. That is, in 
a way, a routine annual action that has always taken 
place during the winter season or in early spring. This 
year, the review did not take place, and only now we are 
embarking on it. Certain decisions were made on the 
strict interpretation of legal provisions that refer to the 
age at which career servicemen should retire. So far, the 
regulations have been fiction of sorts. Exceptions have 
been the rule, and what should have been the rule has 
been exceptional. As far as generals are concerned, one 
clear-cut and transparent criterion will be used. Each 
general who turns 60 this year will retire, without any 
exceptions. That will result in 20 more generals retiring. 
If the same guideline is applied next year, 30 generals 
will retire. There are now 86 generals in the Armed 
Forces. Therefore, it is easy to imagine what the scale of 
the forthcoming personnel changes is going to be as far as 
generals are concerned. 

It will have to be offset, to some extent, by new promo¬ 
tions. As far as other officers are concerned, the principle 
has been accepted that officers with the rank of colonel 
and lieutenant colonel will retire at the age of 58. It is not 
a legal provision, but that guideline was adopted in order 
to speed up a certain generational change. 

It will mean that about 1,200 officers will retire, if 
majors are included. Therefore, a promotion opportu¬ 
nity for young people will open up. As a result of the 
cutback, the number of general billets will drop consid¬ 
erably. At present, there are 448 of them; after the 
reform, there will be about 150. 

^ich candidates will be promoted? Minister Onyszk- 
iewicz offered assurances that it will turn solely on 
professional qualifications for particular positions in the 
future structure of the Armed Forces. How will verifica¬ 
tion fit within that? In the opinion of Minister Onyszk- 
iewicz, absolutely different criteria are decisive for ver¬ 
ification. The authors of the verification law and those 
who voted to pass it lacked knowledge, or perhaps 
imagination, of what its implementation in the Armed 
Forces would mean. Perhaps, the authors lacked knowl¬ 
edge about arrangements that were in effect in the 
Armed Forces at one time. 


Therefore, if it becomes necessary to implement the law 
in the Armed Forces, Minister Onyszkiewicz will not do 
it. The reform of the Armed Forces has not been person¬ 
ally authored. It is the result of extensive consultations. 
It has the support of the government and the president of 
the Republic of Poland. Minister Onyszkiewicz under¬ 
takes to assume responsibility for the introduction and 
format of the reform. The minister is convinced that the 
Armed Forces and our society need it, and that it will be 
useful. 

We will report separately about other issues touched upon at 
the press conference given by the defense minister. 

Author Discusses Draft of New Electoral Law 

92EP0523A Warsaw POLYTIKA in Polish 
No 25, 20 Jun 92 pp 1, 4 

[Article by Bartolomiej Nowotarski: “Time for New 
Regulations; On the Way to Elections”] 

[Excerpts] There are many indications that new parlia¬ 
mentary elections are close by. Therefore, passage of a 
new electoral law becomes an important matter for the 
agenda of the day. 

As a rule, we agree that the result of the parliamentary 
elections should serve as a reflection of party pluralism 
in a given country, and at the same time assist in 
bringing about the proper functioning of the national 
representations from which, in due course, a stable 
government can be created. Undoubtedly, these are 
fitting proposals. However, in a country with a party 
system which is not yet formed, a country with many 
weak parties, these stipulations are basically mutually 
exclusive. However, it is true that elections could give a 
clear answer by the electorate to the question: Who will 
wield power and based on what program, and who will 
constitute the parliamentary opposition and based on 
what program? 

Extreme opposing views exist concerning the role of the 
electoral law. The exponents of one of these believe that 
the electoral law does not exert any practical influence 
on the stability of the makeup of the parliament, and the 
social situation, as well as the established and consoli¬ 
dated preferences of the voters constitute the decisive 
factor. Others, on the contrary, are apt to attribute a 
significant role to the electoral law, frequently citing the 
famous words of M. Debre that it was not that the 
presidential system of the French Fifth Republic has so 
much to do with its stability, but rather the so-called 
majority electoral law, which, in this case, required the 
candidates starting out in the second round to obtain 12 
percent of the important votes from their constituency 
beforehand. 

As usual, the truth lies somewhere in between. In order 
to obtain a clear-cut answer to this electoral issue, we 
must aim at the preservation of those electoral priorities 
that would clearly demonstrate certain guiding forces 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 Angust 1992 


POLAND 


25 


and political programs in a given country. In those 
countries where there is a two or three party system, it is 
the voter who, by voting for one of the main parties, 
decides on the program to be carried out by the govern¬ 
ment. This occurs because there is no need to appoint 
broad government coalitions, whose programs often 
result in wide ranging mutual compromises, coordinated 
without the electorate's approval. The natural solidifica¬ 
tion of democracy constitutes a long-term process. It can, 
however, be delayed or accelerated. 

A Law That Should Be Changed 

The 1991 electoral law delayed this process. It never did 
give a clear answer to the question of who should govern. 
On the contrary, parties that, mathematically speaking, 
won the election found themselves in the opposition. 
The fundamental conclusion of last yearns elections is 
that, in a society of vague election preferences, one must 
begin by passing an electoral law that will be good for the 
country. In defense of the obligatory law we can say that 
it was not exclusivly responsible for the party fragmen¬ 
tation of the Sejm. It only preserved the indecisiveness of 
the electorate, by simply producing an uncertain out¬ 
come. Of course, party interests and the desire to be 
reelected to the Sejm have somewhat obscured the raison 
d^etre of the state for some of the deputies of the tenth 
parliament session. But even the experts have shown 
themselves to be indecisive and have not pressed for a 
more stabilizing electoral law. 

This law could be acceptable if it resulted in fewer parties 
being needed to achieve a parliamentary majority (for 
example, by adopting d’Hondt’s but not Hare- 
Niemayer’s vote-counting method). Secondly, we could 
have had a Sejm made up of nine parties (plus a national 
minority party) and not 29 or ultimately 18 (after certain 
deputies joined larger deputies clubs). Thirdly, in the 
majority of regions because of this and not another 
system, natural thresholds were created with four per¬ 
cent of the vote, and it was necessary to add an artificial 
threshold on the national level. In conclusion, I believe 
that if there are too many divisions in the country, the 
law should not serve, as some believe, as the exclusive 
reflection of framentation. 

Voting for a Person 

It is assumed that elections in single-seat areas that use 
the majority method serve to bring out a stable party 
representation in parliament. It is certain that a law of 
this type works well in a somewhat more firmly estab¬ 
lished democracy, perfectly confirming by example a 
two-party system with single-round elections being suf¬ 
ficient as a rule. When there are several leading parties 
and also small parties, for better answers as to who 
should govern then voting should be carried out in two 
rounds, thereby forcing the conclusion of electoral alli¬ 
ances among the parties after the first round. However, 
this variant does not lead to the crystallization of a 
two-party system. An indoubitable qu^ity of this law is 
the ability to vote for specific individuals. As a rule, 


voters prefer to vote in this manner when they do not 
have greater recognition of the political parties which are 
in conflict with one another. This is generally confirmed 
by the phenomenon of the personalization of politics 
when political parties are seen through the exclusive 
prism of their leading figures. In addition, this law gives 
a chance to various regional leaders, persons who are 
popular on a gmina or provincial level, [passage omitted] 

However, in this system, I see a definite preponderance 
of positive over negative elments. 

Voting for a Party 

Voting for a party or another political group is the main 
intent of so-called proportional systems, which serve to 
develop the party system in the nation. From the point of 
view of the nation as a whole, these systems can be 
viewed positively for the most part, provided they are 
moving toward a clearer answer to the question of who 
will lead; to the question of who will be served by 
methods of vote-counting favoring strong parties (for 
example d’Hondt); and to the question of what per¬ 
centage thresholds would block access to parliament 
specifically for small parties and for the best-placed 
parties on the national level in voting districts, [passage 
omitted] 

A Mixed System 

It appears that for the most part two types of laws 
acceptable in our reality have a real chance of passage. 
The first is the proportional law, which involves the 
d'Hondt method of vote-counting in electoral districts 
with a five percent margin on the national level. Its 
shortcoming is the inability to vote for a person and this 
is what the voter likes best. On the other hand, the 
proposed law, which is exclusively majority oriented, 
could be difficult to accept because of a lack of tradition. 
After all, we also care about the development of the party 
system. There remains the mixed law, which links posi¬ 
tive traits of both types mentioned and thus largely 
eliminates their negative aspects. Democratic Union 
Parliamentary Club proposals took this path and are 
currently under Sejm deliberations. 

The new draft law assumes the election of 115 deputies 
in single seat districts using a system of simple majority 
as well as 345 deputies in multi-seat districts in a 
proportional system election. In the first instance, the 
electoral dispute will take place between well-known and 
lesser well-known politicians supported by different 
political groups and this fact, as frequently noted in 
other democratic countries, as a rule contributes effec¬ 
tively to increase the voting frequency which is signifi¬ 
cant for a democratic country. Whereas in the second 
case, we would vote for a party, a political group, or more 
precisely the symbol “X” would be written next to those 
political parties supported by us. This signifies the 
resignation from the need to vote for a name within the 


26 


POLAND 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


scope of a given electoral committee list, a fact fre¬ 
quently believed to be an unnecessary complication of 
the November 1991 electoral law. 

The basic goal of the proposed legislation is the adoption 
of solutions which serve to make the work more efficient 
and to stabilize the future Sejm and therefore the gov¬ 
ernment of the Polish Republic. 

Therefore, the main intention is the restriction of access 
to the Sejm by small parties which have especially poor 
support among the electorate and also creates a parlia¬ 
mentary structure which by denoting certain leading 
parties would facilitate the process of forming a govern¬ 
ment or would be instrumental in its relative stabiliza¬ 
tion. Therefore, in some of the elections under the 
proportional system proposals were made for counting 
votes by the d’Hondt method and for the use of the five 
percent national threshold level. However, as a principle 
this level would not concern the electoral committees 
established by national minority parties. 

Priorities proposed in the law for parties able to show 
significant electoral support should also favor the estab¬ 
lishment of a stable representation in the Sejm. Those 
parties to be considered include parties which have 
registered their candidates and lists of candidates in at 
least one-half of the country’s electoral districts and 
regions, as well as parties which already have indepen¬ 
dent parliamentary clubs in the Sejm. This is or at least 
should be evidence of their substantial participation in 
the state’s affairs. These priorities concern, among other 
things, precedence in drawing the same numbers on a 
national level under which lists of these parties will 
appear on election rolls. This matter is important insofar 
as it is not insignificant from the voter’s point of view on 
whether a given party is number 1, 2, or 60 on the list. 

The parties mentioned in the draft law’s reasoning will 
also have the authority to come out with a proposal 
about the right to a longer period of time being allocated 
for free radio and television time for their electoral 
programs. 

In work on the draft law, attempts have been made to 
take into account all negative experiences resulting from 
the previous electoral campaign, and those which are a 
result of an imprecise formulation of the regulations of 
the 28 June 1991 law. Of course, the final form of the 
electoral law will depend on the results of the work by 
Sejm committees and the political compromises con¬ 
tained therein. We should only hope that solutions which 
will serve to stabilize the Polish political scene will not 
be sacrificed on the altar of various compromises and 
specific interests. This is especially true after the most 
recent experiences. 

Economic Impact of German Unification Detailed 

92EP0562A Warsaw RYNKIZAGRANICZNE in Polish 
13 Jun 92 p 3 

[Article by Ewa Rzeszutek: “Uniting Germany: Conse¬ 
quences for the Polish Economy”] 


[Excerpts] 

[passage omitted] 

Polish Threat and Opportunity 

Considering painful historical experience, the matter of 
balance of power in the coming united Europe is most 
crucial for Poland, especially in light of our relations 
with European Associations and the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. In Maastricht, the leaders of EC countries 
informed us that a broad economic chasm separates us 
from the Common Market and that we have a long road 
to full membership in it. The agreement on joining the 
European Community gives us a truly great opportunity 
in that sphere, but at the same time it raises the cross-bar 
very hi^. For our young democracy and the market 
structures just being formed, it may be a somewhat high 
barrier. Accepting this invitation is, however, the only 
way out of the state of economic “collapse.” 

The considerations cited above refer also to our cooper¬ 
ation with the market of the united Germany, our largest 
market in Western Europe. For us, the present and 
future threats of German unification are economic in 
nature. In the first place, there is the enormous dispro¬ 
portion in the economic potentials of the two countries, 
[passage omitted] 

The unification of Germany and the accompanying 
rapid process of integration into Western Europe 
exposed with great clarity the enormous asymmetry 
between the economic potentials of Poland and Ger¬ 
many. But the economic strength of the FRG may also 
be an opportunity for our country. 

The widely developed trade with our western neighbor, 
his investments and credits, may constitute the principal 
incentive for the development of the Polish economy. In 
the long term, our country presents itself as an attractive 
economic partner for Germany. Following the economic 
integration of part of the eastern former Soviet bloc into 
the body of western Germany, Poland may become, 
especially in the border regions, a profitable sphere for 
German investments. With a rise in living standards, our 
country of almost 40 million will be a significant market 
for German exports. 

Economic ties between Poland and the West, where 
Poles have much trade experience, may be helpful for 
further expansion of German capital to eastern markets. 
Moreover, Germany is not only the road to the west for 
Poland, but our country may also be a landbridge to the 
east for Germany. 

At present, united Germany is not only Poland’s first 
trading partner, it is also the largest sales market and 
supply source in the EC. In the last two years, trade with 
Germany averaged 25 percent of our total foreign trade, 
while the FRG dominates trade with EC countries by 
more than 50 percent. 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


POLAND 


27 


Economic and Trade Cooperation 

Polish-German exchange continues to be characterized by 
great asymmetry. Against a 25 percent FRG participation 
in Polish foreign trade, FRG trade with Poland amounts to 
scarcely 0.7 percent. That puts Poland somewhere between 
30th and 40th among Germany’s trading partners. 

The structure of traded materials is also unfavorable. 
Materials that are little processed dominate our exports 
(fuels, raw materials and agricultural- food products 
constitute approximately 60 percent). Among imports, 
products of the electrical machinery, chemicals and 
metallurgical industries occupy the main position. 

Other forms of cooperation, including especially capital 
investments and cooperative production, continue to 
remain in the initial phase of development and have no 
great influence on mutual economic relations. That fact 
cannot satisfy either party. It is also contrary to such 
conditions as longstanding traditions of cooperation, 
geographical proximity of both markets, economic 
potentials of the partners and Poland’s real financial 
dependence on Germany as our principal creditor (Ger¬ 
many’s share in Polish debt to the West is at present 
approximately 28 percent). 

Meanwhile, positive manifestations of the last two years 
include: a real increase in access of Polish goods to the 
German market as a result of amelioration of the EC 
trade policy with respect to our country, a clear increase 
in dynamism of trade mainly of exports to the German 
market and a significant improvement in mutual finan¬ 
cial relations. Moreover, a treaty- institutional basis has 
been created for development in such spheres as scien¬ 
tific-technical cooperation and technical training, envi¬ 
ronmental protection, cooperation of small and average¬ 
sized companies, contacts with FRG laender, mainly 
within the framework of regional and cross-border coop¬ 
eration and development of the economics in the food¬ 
stuff sector in Poland. 

On the basis of Central Office of Statistics data, we must 
say that exports from Poland to FRG increased by 
approximately 23 percent in 1991 and imports by 10 
percent (as against 1990). In 1991, trade with the 
German market amounted to 34,117.9 billion zlotys [Z] 
in exports, and Z 14,012.8 billion in imports. So the 
closing positive balance amounted to Z20,105.1 billion. 

During the last two years, access to the German market 
improved decidedly. Specific indicators of that were the 
EC’s granting Poland preferential tariffs within the GSP 
[General System of Preference] framework as of 1 January 
1990 for a term of five years (it is estimated that in 1990 
Polish export to the FRG of materials covered by the GSP 
preferential tariffs exceeded 800 million German marks 
[DM]) and regulation by treaty of access to the German 
market in the area of technical services and construction. In 
accordance with that, during 1992-93, the average yearly 
limit of employment of Polish workers in Germany on a 
work contract basis will be 35,170 individuals and includes 
all German territory. 


A series of meetings on the consequences of Germany 
unification and access to the market of the former GDR 
established that past regulations guaranteeing access for 
materials at a level not less than the level set in the trade 
agreement of 1989 would be binding for that territory to 
the end of 1992. Exports from Poland to the territory of 
the former GDR will not be subject to tariff except for 
agricultural goods, which are subject to compensator^ 
payment. During that period, technical standards in 
force at that time will be binding with the exception of 
sanitation and measuring apparatus where deviations 
from EC standards will not be tolerated. 

Normalizing Financial Relations 

The last two years also brought a marked improvement in 
Polish-German financial relations and the restoration to 
Polish economic entities of access to credits granted on the 
western German market. Among the most substantial 
elements of improvement in that sphere are: the contribu¬ 
tion of the FRG to the stabilizing fund for Poland 
amounting to DM421 million, agreements on restructuring 
Polish debt to Germany, and a definitive regulation of 
repayments of the so-called jumbo credit of 1975. The 
agreement anticipates remission of DM759.6 million and 
payment of DM568.8 million in zlotys. The Fund for 
Polish-German Cooperation to administer the zloty fund 
was created at the same time. Its responsibilities are: 
supporting youth exchange, programs in the area of envi¬ 
ronmental protection and infrastructure formation, specif¬ 
ically, the development of transportation and telecommu- 
nication networks, and training personnel for 
management, operation of cultural institutes, restoration 
of monuments, German language teaching and main¬ 
taining German culture. 

Poland was also awarded credit lines for 1990-1992 
amounting to DM2.5 billion as a Hermes guarantee. The 
guarantee ceiling was divided into two pools: DM2.2 
billion for export to Poland of investment goods and 
DM300 million for short-term finance export to Poland. 
Of the DM800 million covered by Hermes guarantees in 
1990, contracts in the steel industry were valued at 
approximately DM300 million, DM185 million was 
earmarked for telecommunication development and 
DM150 million for railroad development. 

The advantages of the Hermes guarantees are great in 
comparison with the ceilings of other countries. The ceiling 
pool is managed directly by a Polish-German joint commis¬ 
sion that analyzes and recommends proposals. 

Commentary on State of Economy for First Quarter 

92EP0566A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish 
No 27. 5-11 Jul 92 p 20 

[Article by Slawomir Lipinski: “A Somewhat Crooked 
Mirror”] 

[Text] The Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK] has 
presented a summary report on the results of inspections 
it conducted in the first quarter of this year. During that 


28 


POLAND 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


time, inspectors rummaged through 1,078 organiza¬ 
tional units (including 290 units of the state administra¬ 
tion and the administration of justice, 182 units in 
industry, 98 in trade, and 65 in finance and insurance). 

The NIK says that these inspections yielded a financial 
result of nearly 185 billion zlotys [Z], a figure which 
comprehends the resulting reduction of excessive bud¬ 
getary subsidies, the covering of losses by those guilty of 
creating them, the collection of back taxes, and the 
return of profits derived from overstating prices. Let’s 
look at the comments the NIK submitted in regard to 
selected sectors of the economy. (In some cases these are 
preliminary comments because final reports have not yet 
been prepared.) 

Banks 

We have already written about the results flowing from 
inspections of the banking system (including the discus¬ 
sion of “Principles and Money” in GAZETA 
BANKOWA No. 25). Consequently, we will add here 
just a few supplementary things. Half of the banking 
system is subject to inspection. Together these banks 
account for 60 percent of deposits and also 60 percent of 
credits extended. The portion of delinquent payments on 
credits fluctuated in these banks (at the end of last year) 
from 10 to 60 percent, with an average of 30 percent. In 
some of these banks, the portion of delinquent payments 
exceeded its own net funds. The NIK realizes that this is 
in part an effect of the economic recession, but it 
recognizes that the basic cause is irregularity in the 
functioning of the banks (irresponsibility in the exten¬ 
sion of credit). Proof is to be found, among other places, 
in the fact that just 25 percent of the banks that were 
examined did not give credit in excess of 15 percent of 
their own net assets, and more than half of the banks 
inspected gave so-called large credits (greater than 15 
percent of its own net funds or more than 10 billion) in 
violation of Article 35 of the banking law. The NIK 
maintains that in small banks large credits and guaran¬ 
tees were often given to persons who were in some way 
connected to the bank. The weakness or absence of 
banking remedies and the sloppy documentation in 
private banks were also mentioned. The flow of money 
from large state banks (limited to commercial paper) to 
private banks oftering more expensive credit has also 
been criticized. (For the sake of precision, let’s add that 
since the middle of last year the deposits of state banks 
that have been directed to other banks are counted as 
limited commercial paper.) The NIK maintains that the 
irregularities in the banking system are in part the result 
of the weakness of regulation. 

Commercialization^ Privatization 

According to the NIK, inspection of the joint-stock 
companies of the State Treasury (from September 1990 
to February 1992, 404 state enterprises were trans¬ 
formed into joint-stock companies) demonstrated that 
there is no system to protect the interests of the State 
Treasury in these companies. The NIK asks whether the 


placement of persons not connected with the state (pri¬ 
vate businessmen) at the head of the board of directors 
guarantees that type of protection. Payments for shares 
made available to employees do not flow into the budget 
for many months. The example given is the sale of the 
Krakchemia trading company to a private company with 
capital of Z 1,000,000 for Z18.6 billion, which is to say 
ZIO billion less than its book value. The profitability of 
the sold enterprise was 130 percent. 

The NIK says that it stopped a similar transaction in 
relation to Novita of Zielona Gora. The inspection of the 
MPW [Ministry of Privatization] led the NIK to con¬ 
clude that the lack of unambiguous direction as to 
whether privatization is to be directed by the budget’s 
immediate interest or the economy’s long-term interest 
has hindered privatization, as has the lack of an explicit 
strategy with respect to particular industries and 
branches, with respect to foreign investment, and with 
respect to promotional and informational policy. 

The Customs System 

In this sphere the NIK made, along with an overall 
inspection, a few spot inspections, including some con¬ 
cerning the import of liquid fuels. In the examined 
import of 800,000 metric tons of fuels, so-called bud¬ 
getary reductions were estimated at Z288 billion, and 
because last year’s entire import amounted to nearly 2.5 
million metric tons, it is estimated that total losses were 
correspondingly higher. 

The trade of cattle imported from the former German 
Democratic Republic as stock but in fact destined for 
slaughter was also examined quite closely. In sum, about 
28,000 head of cattle were brought in, but the inspected 
import of one fourth of these showed that budgetary 
reductions amounted to approximately Z725 million. 
One third of the spot inspections confirmed that there 
was no regulation of goods diverted in transit. In large 
part these goods finished their journey in our country. 

The on-going overall inspection proves that none of the 
previously identified problems have been solved. 
Arrears in customs payments at the end of last year 
amounted to more than Z600 billion (with total inflows 
of Z16.7 trillion), and the customs offices do not do 
much to recover them. Customs officials continue to 
have troubles with the SAD [Standard Administrative 
Document] system, and the GUC [Main Customs 
Office] is slow to issue basic instructions. The explana¬ 
tion these customs officials offer is the horrible infra¬ 
structure of border crossings, and the lack of a computer 
system and of quick communications. Consequently, the 
humiliating occurrences of trucks testing their strength 
at border crossings will multiply: In the past year, 
thirteen vehicles crashed the barrier at Sieniawka and 
five at Zawidow. 


JPRS-EER-92-ia9 
18 August 1992 


POLAND 


29 


Foundations 

Examination of 85 foundations indicates that the motive 
behind their formation was not so much noble aims but 
the desire to take advantage of various preferential 
regulations of economic activity. In 1990 and 1991 the 
income of the foundations studied amounted to Z1.89 
tnllion, of which 73 percent (Z1.38 trillion) was trans¬ 
ferred to them by budgetary units. Their own income 
comprised twenty percent, but this was mainly interest 
on capital investments. Donations from natural persons 
constituted barely 0.03 percent of income, and donations 
from abroad, 2.6 percent. 

In this period barely 7.6 percent of income was allocated 
for the purposes described in the foundations’ charters, the 
rest was treated as interest- bearing capital or was invested 
in economic activity. The operating expenses of the foun¬ 
dations themselves absorbed Z112 billion, and nearly half 
of that was spent on salaries. Tax breaks amounted to Z27 
billion, in the foundations studied. The NIK is critical of 
the lack of supervision over the foundations’ boards on the 
part of the state donors. For our part, we add (unfortu¬ 
nately, this is not in the NIK’s material) that one founda¬ 
tion tiimished with laige budgetary resources has an enor¬ 
mous influence on the magnitude of the given figures, and 
this distorts the total picture. 

Small Industry 

In the first quarter, the NIK conducted its own appraisal of 
the influence of the economic and financial system on the 
development of small and medium-sized industrial enter¬ 
prises that have remained socialized (51 state enterprises, 
10 cooperatives and joint-stock companies, and eight 
voivodship offices). The NIK is of the opinion that a small 
enterprise still does much worse than a large one. Last year 
the average gross return on investment for all state 
industry amounted to somewhat more than six percent, 
with large firms showing an average of 7.9 percent, 
medium-sized ones just 1.4 percent, and small ones minus 
4.5 percent. This leads to the conclusion that the once 
massive desire to divide up the greedy behemoths, and to 
separate the small companies from them, yielded results 
contrary to those intended. It is more difficult to answer 
the question of why it happened this way, for the causes 
given by the NIK seem only to confirm the saying that the 
thin will be furious until the fat become thin. In times of 
crisis, it is easier for large firms to save themselves from 
the lack of demand (that is how it is everywhere in the 
world), and they do so at the expense of small cooperatives. 
However, it will certainly not be permissible to disregard 
the NIK’S statements that we still have no policy on small 
business. But let’s add that it is difficult to expect that such 
a policy would also embrace the state sector. State-owned 
small business is self-contradictory. 

The Unemployed 

Regional employment offices, mainly due to lack of 
money, are not pursuing an active employment policy 
but instead are limiting themselves to registering people 
who are on relief. Employment councils have not been 


convened, and those that have been formally convened 
have not begun activity. The thesis that there is an 
epidemic of unemployment swindles, carried out 
through the filing of false financial statements, has been 
confirmed. This is done mainly by people from the 
countryside and small towns. The estimates of the 
regional employment office in Wolomin, outside War¬ 
saw, indicate that 70 percent of the men receiving relief 
there are working, although illegally. 

Splinters 

Finally, here is some information from other spot inspec¬ 
tions. The NIK believes that forei^ loans obtained in the 
third quarter of 1990 for modernization of transport are 
being employed horribly. Of the $170 million allocated in 
the course of 12 months, only about $4.7 million have been 
put to use, two times less than what was indicated by the 
timetable that was established with the World Bank 
(chiefly due to the PKP’s [Polish State Railroad] nonper¬ 
formance of the agreements). Large—in the opinion of the 
NIK—^sums burden the State Treasury because of the 
creation of a high, positive balance of payments in 
accounts with the former USSR. (A figure of Z30 billion 
has been mentioned.) The NIK believes that more than 
$400 million flowed out of Poland as a result of the 
numerous re-export transactions remaining beyond the 
control of the MWGzZ [Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Cooperation] and the Bank of Commerce. In these trans¬ 
actions Polish firms filled the role of currency exchange 
offices for companies from the former USSR. It happened 
this way due to the improper establishment of the 
exchange rate for the transfer ruble and the lack of a 
mechanism to establish a level of exchange with the USSR 
that would be advantageous to the state. 

The Ministry of Finance has been accused of recklessly 
extending government guarantees for bank credits to 
enterprises (among others for the bankrupt Ponar in 
Tamobrzeg and the privatized Krosno). The ministry 
has also been accused of having no control over the 
creation of new banks with the participation of the State 
Treasury and of responsibility for the disorder in the files 
concerning debt and foreign amounts due. 

When reading a review of NIK reports, one should realize 
that it is not a faithful description of reality, because the 
basis of the NIK is to catch someone else’s errors. There is 
probably no institution that does not make mistakes, and 
this applies to the NIK as well, but that obviously does not 
diminish the importance of its work. 

Views on Reprivatization by Sejm Deputies 

92EP0562B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY 
AND LAW supplement) in Polish 29 Jun 92 p II 

[Article by Ada Kostrz-Kostecka: “Reprivatization: Who 
Expects What?”] 

[Text] Instead of a law on reprivatization, at present we 
have competition as to which plan will be presented to 
the Sejm: the government plan or the deputy plan. The 


30 


POLAND 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


Ministry of Privatization finished its work on its plan 
and sent it to the Council of Ministers, together with a 
schedule of differences after interdepartmental consulta¬ 
tions. Before a first reading at a plenary session, the Sejm 
Commission for Privatization submitted two deputy 
plans. Obviously, it would be best if the Sejm were to 
consider the three plans together, but everything indi¬ 
cates that the deputy plans have a better chance because 
we do not know when the government will accept the 
ministry plan. 

The plans differ on substantial points: Who will have the 
right to file claims, what the scope of property covered 
will be, and how the claims will be settled. On the first 
point, the deputies from the Union for Real Politics 
[UPR] are most extreme; they recognize the right of 
physical individuals who were citizens of Poland at the 
time their property was expropriated as well as legal 
entities who had headquarters in Poland at that time. 

Regarding the scope of the law on property covered, the 
deputy’s plans are fairly similar. They propose taking 
into account legal acts pursuant to which the property 
was nationalized in the years 1944-62. The departmental 
plan, for example, excludes the Zabuzan matter, water 
rights. As a method of settling claims, the UPR and the 
ministry propose first of all the return of property in 
kind, then substitute property, and as a last resort, shares 
or capital bonds; the deputies from the Democratic 
Union place compensation in the form of capital bonds 
in first place. 

And what do the former owners expect? 

From the beginning when claims were first filed to the 
end of the first quarter, the former owners or their heirs 
filed 9,135 claims; most of these, 3,939, were filed with 
the Ministry of Privatization. In the first quarter, 28.3 
percent were filed, in other words, the num^r of claims 
is increasing regardless of the fact that legal settlements 
are still lacking. 

Increasingly, those filing claims are not acting “blindly” 
as happened in the banning, but are describing their 
lost property and their right to it more precisely. The 
Ministry of Privatization makes this assessment in ana¬ 
lyzing the situation. 

The latest bulletin of the Department of Reprivatization 
of this ministry states that the greatest number of claims 
continues to come from the following voivodships: 
Nowo Sacz, Warsaw and Poznan. Dominant among the 
claims, are those of the so-called 2^buzan type. 

Compared with the past year, among the claims sent to 
the ministry, the number of former owners claiming 
rights to forests and buildings has increased. Of claims to 
arable land, the number of claims for lands of less than 
50 ha or more than 100 ha increased most rapidly. 

Frequently, it is persons presently living abroad that are 
interested in regaining property. In the first quarter, the 
Ministry of Privatization received 62 letters from 


abroad, mainly from Germany (84.6 percent). Second 
was Great Britain with only three percent of the claims. 
Most frequently, emigres apply to recover their rights to 
land, village buildings, and town property and real 
estate. Property most frequently claimed is located in the 
following voivodships: Wroclaw, Legnica, and Zielona 
Gora. 

Difficult Financial Times for Craftsmen Foreseen 

92EP0601A Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE 
in Polish No 29, 19 Jul 92 p 15 

[Article by Agnieszka Gutowska: “Eye for Loan”] 

[Text] “We should be appreciated in a free Poland,” say 
representatives of the Union of Polish Handicraft 
Workers, “but the unstable economic situation contrib¬ 
utes to the fact that chances for the development of the 
handicraft industry diminish from year to year.” How¬ 
ever, this industry has always been tough—even thrown 
into deep water, it would always surface. 

There were about half a million handicraft enterprises in 
Poland two years ago. Today there are many less. 
According to ZRP’s [Union of Polish Handicraft 
Workers] estimates, approximately 30 percent of enter¬ 
prises have suspended or ceased their business alto¬ 
gether. Deputy Henryk Rozpara, ZRP’s chairman of the 
board, said in his interview to Lublin’s PULS: “The costs 
of running a business are snowballing. It becomes 
unprofitable to provide services. Both, the craftsman 
and the customer are losing in this race.” 

There are many reasons for this. On 4 May, turnover tax 
rates were raised. Before that, the law which increased by 
two percent social security premiums for craftsmen, 
their employees, and coproducers went into effect. Fur¬ 
thermore, the financial situation of handicraft businesses 
has been worsened by the cancellation of tax brakes and 
preferences, the increase of prices for the raw materials, 
and the collapse of cooperation with the state-owned 
enterprises. At the same time, the demand for products 
and services offered by the handicraft industry is clearly 
declining, due to society’s growing impoverishment on 
the one hand, and the influx of imported goods, on the 
other. 

In addition, the costs of operating a business are rising 
because of the conversion to gross-wage taxation, and 
because the cost of electric energy, gas, heating, and rent 
is going up. Handicraft enterprises are usually located in 
old, rundown buildings, where rents are often higher 
than the places are worth. Because the service sector is 
much less profitable than trade, for example, the owners 
of those businesses are unable to continue their opera¬ 
tions, let alone to modernize or spruce up their shops. 
Thus, the handicraft businesses are disappearing not 
only from the main streets of cities, but in general. 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


POLAND 


31 


Antoni Odzimek, deputy chairman of the Poznan Hand¬ 
icraft Chamber, claims that the successive Solidarity 
governments have not been interested in the develop¬ 
ment of the handicraft industry. The people of this 
business had some hopes with regard to the Olszewski 
government, but in this case also “we have not seen any 
practical results of political declarations; apparently, it is 
still considered more profitable to live off interest than 
to invest.” 

Jerzy Bartnik, chairman of the Warsaw Handicraft 
Chamber is convinced that in a country with a normal 
economy it would not be possible to ne^ect “the second 
pillar of economy” to such an extent. “I can see how 
much craftsmen arc appreciated in Germany. But in our 
country? Last November, Poland hosted a convention of 
the European Handicraft Federation. No one from the 
government showed up there, except for some deputy 
secretary of state, who spent an ‘entire’ 15 minutes at the 
convention. My foreign colleagues claimed that in their 
countries at least half the government would attend such 
a meeting.” 

Besides, the craftsmen are envious of Germany’s eco¬ 
nomic policy, which is conducive to the development of 
small businesses and the handicraft industry. “Tax laws 
in the eastern lands are three times more favorable than 
in the rest of the country. Anyway, there are many more 
incentives. We don’t see a similar policy in Poland,” 
concludes Bartnik. 

That is why craftsmen loudly call for “pragmatism of the 
small business economy,” convinced that there is still 
time to save and utilize the potential of the handicraft 
industry. They are convinced that that sector can arrest 
the development of negative phenomena in the 
economy, such as unemployment. 

“The majority of handicraft businesses have vacancies,” 
points out Chairman Bartnik. “One could fill them out 
when appropriate economic conditions arise, such as 
demand for services and products.” 

In his opinion, what is needed to create such conditions 
is a return to investment breaks and preferential loans, 
and to rent control by the local authorities. “To activate 
small and medium-sized enterprises is more profitable 
for the budget and better from the social point of view 
than to support an army of unemployed,” he concludes. 

In a ZRP’s publication, titled Development or Progress? 
Stagnation in the Handicraft Industry—Threat to the 
Polish Economy, we read: “We want to devote the 
economic and organizational assets of the handicraft 
industry (26 chambers of commerce, 468 guilds, 494 
handicraft cooperatives, and 20 wholesale centers) to the 
construction of a modem Polish economy. The basic 
precondition is to pull Poland out of the recession. It 
cannot be accomplished without the involvement of the 
handicraft industry, as well as the small and medium size 
enterprises.” 


The same publication informs us what the handicraft 
industry is capable of doing. It can “steer a stream of 
money into the treasury, by enlar^ng and modernizing 
its production and its service-oriented assets; it can 
substitute foreign kitsch with high quality domestic 
products; it can energize the economy by establishing 
cooperation ties with large factories; it can pacify social 
tensions by employing and training a large number of 
unemployed people; and it can organize professional 
education for youth and adults alike.” 

In ZRP’s opinion, the handicraft industry is the biggest 
vocational school in Poland. The system of the adult 
professional education, used by the handicraft industry, 
can perfectly serve to retrain the unemployed. It takes 
two years and consists of practical training in enter¬ 
prises, supplemented with classes providing theoretical 
knowledge. This system is conducive to professional 
mobility and a fast retraining of employees, in accor¬ 
dance with the needs of the job market. At this time, 
60,000 enterprises train 180,000 persons, while another 
100,000 enterprises are able to accept new adult 
employees. 

However, in order to fully utilize this potential, a state 
policy which “would stimulate the development of the 
handicraft industry an its branches” is necessary, 
according to Chairman Rozpara. Craftsmen have pre¬ 
sented their proposals in that regard to successive gov¬ 
ernments. ZRP has even published a paper, regarding 
“principles of socioeconomic policy in 1992.” It has also 
appraised the principles of the state monetary policy. 
Among other things, it has addressed Prime Minister 
Olszewski three times. In the last address, it criticized 
the principles of the turnover tax. In particular, ZRP sees 
a threat to the handicraft industry in the 5-percent tax 
rate, levied on processed food products, construction 
materials, and the construction, repair, and installation 
services. 

Deputy Rozpara is amazed by the incoherence of the tax 
system. On the one hand, the income tax related to the 
housing construction is being reduced, while at the same 
time the turnover tax for the construction materials and 
services is introduced, which only increases costs of 
apartments. Therefore, “what the craftsmen want the 
most is civilization,” by which they understand intro¬ 
ducing clear credit regulations and a coherent and stable 
tax system, as well as breaking down economic, legal, 
and organizational barriers that discourage investors. 

The craftsmen are worried by the incoherent and 
unstable tax system, as well as by the red tape pertaining 
to various type of taxes. In that regard, they demand that 
the current, 40-percent rate of the turnover tax be 
declared the highest; that the tax brackets be dependent 
on the income per each family member; that a simple tax 
return form be upheld; that the tax on some types of 
turnover be amended; and that the other tax procedures, 
as well as the system of investment brakes be simplified, 
as a way of overcoming the recession. 


32 


POLAND 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


Craftsmen often have an impression that economic 
ministries work only on making their lives more miser¬ 
able. As an example, they bring up a proposal that 
each—even the smallest—economic enterprise have a 
bank account and pay taxes through it. “By the time a 
country blacksmith finds his way to a bank, many years 
will have passed,” Deputy Zapara commented on this 
issue at a session of the ZRP Iward. 

In addition, what the craftsmen understand as “civiliza¬ 
tion” is an efficient bank system, capable of providing 
loans to the handicraft industry and small businesses. 
The fact that the bank network in Poland is poorly 
developed (80 banks, compared with 403 in France), and 
that they do not compete with each other, results in their 
reluctance to make quick credit decisions and take risk. 
Even if the loan is small, they require a high collateral, 
mortgage, or guarantees from the loan-taker’s home 
bank. Machinery and equipment, bought with that loan, 
are not accepted as a collateral. All that extends endlessly 
the procedure of obtaining a loan. Furthermore, small, 
private banks have limited possibilities of providing 
loans. Moreover, high and unstable interest rates dis¬ 
courage businesses from applying for loans. 


“The interest rate could be as high as 60-70 percent 
yearly. Who would take an investment risk in this 
situation?” asks Zbigniew Cebula, craftsman and 
exporter since 1958. 

What is worse, foreign credits are practically inaccessible 
for the handicraft industry because guarantees from 
Polish banks are required, the minimal amount of a loan 
is too hi^ (usually at least $100,000), and a loan has to 
be used in the country where it originates, 

“We keep sending the same message: Let us work,” says 
Chairman Odzimek. And then he tells a story of a 
craftsman who took a 1.5 billion zlotys loan to mod¬ 
ernize his business. He was unable to pay interest and 
reached the verge of bankruptcy. So, he traveled to 
Switzerland and sold his eye. With the money he 
received for his eye he paid back the loan and saved his 
business. 

Surely, it is not typical for Polish craftsmen to save their 
businesses in this way, but this does not change the fact 
that the Polish handicraft industry, while not a relic yet, 
is barely surviving rather than flourishing. 



JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


CROATIA 


33 


Macedonian ^Fear’ of Conference on Yugoslavia 

92BA1305A Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 
29Jul92p 15 

[Article by Dra^n Djuric, NOVI VJESNIK permanent 
correspondent in Skopje: “Gligorov Is Playing the 
Turkish Card”] 

[Text] What can the French initiative to call an interna¬ 
tional conference on the former Yugoslavia mean for 
Macedonia? The Macedonian public is trying to find an 
answer to that, not without fear that Macedonia could 
experience a fate similar to that following the Balkan 
Wars in 1912 and 1913, when the agreement in Bucha¬ 
rest divided it among Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. That 
decision set forth in the agreement has held until the 
present day, with one essential change—^the former Ser¬ 
bian part of Macedonia, recognized in the second Yugo¬ 
slavia as the Republic of Macedonia, long ago moved 
toward independence, liberating itself, as has often been 
emphasized, from “Serbian occupation.” 

The independent and self-sufficient Republic of Mace¬ 
donia (as defined by the Constitution) has so far been 
recognized only by Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Turkey, 
and the Philippines, while still broader international 
recognition of the EC (under Greece’s pressure) is depen¬ 
dent upon changing its name. That is, if Macedonia 
should participate in the international conference in its 
present international status, the Macedonian newspaper 
VECER observes, Macedonians might be “unpleasantly 
surprised by an arrangement that could turn them into 
the victim of a possible ‘overall resolution’ of the Yugoc- 
risis.” The Macedonians would perceive attempts to 
thrust their country into a new Yugoslavia as a new 
Versailles. That formula, it is feared here, could satisfy 
the appetite of the Serbian regime, which in the West has 
had to step back. 

The offer has already been made to Macedonia to 
cooperate with the Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and 
Montenegro. That is, “FRY [Federal Republic of Yugo¬ 
slavia]” Prime Minister Milan Panic has publicly offered 
Macedonia economic union with Serbia and Montene¬ 
gro, and Greece is ardently supporting this with its 
attitude on the Macedonian question. At the same time, 
the resolve of Macedonians not to consent to a change of 
their name takes them further away from international 
recognition and is causing a very difficult economic 
situation, because they do not have access to interna¬ 
tional financial institutions and banks, nor can they 
enter into any very significant arrangements with foreign 
entities. 

Viewed pragmatically, the simplest thing would be to 
accept the Greek-European “recommendations” and, at 
least temporarily, agree to the necessity of changing the 
name. On the international plane, Macedonia would be 
without its name, but Macedonians would get an inter¬ 
nationally recognized state, which could join all interna¬ 
tional institutions on an equal footing. 


By contrast with that pragmatism, at the moment in 
Macedonia there is not a single political party or orga¬ 
nization that would consent to such a move. Anyone who 
made it, the assessment is, must take political death for 
granted. 

The stars have not been favorable to Macedonia at all. 
Because of Greek opposition to the recognition of Mace¬ 
donia if it bears that name, the EC will certainly not alter 
its decision while the British hold the chairmanship, 
because ratification of the document from Maastricht is 
anticipated by the end of the year in all the member 
countries of the EC. At the beginning of next year, how¬ 
ever, if Denmark refuses to take the chairmanship of the 
EC, and there are suggestions to that effect, then Greece 
would take the helm of the European Community, and it 
will certainly know how to use its term of office to avoid a 
reopening of the “Macedonian question.” 

No very essential changes of direction in the attitude of 
the United States should be expected up to the end of the 
year, because in an election campaign it is pointless to 
hope that President Bush, whose political rating is on the 
decline, will make a risky move that would irritate the 
voters of the powerful Greek community in America, 
giving up their votes in advance. Macedonia should not 
hope to hear any encouraging accent from the other side 
of the Atlantic Ocean at least before the end of this year. 

Finally, rumors are spreading through Macedonia that 
the secret agreement signed in 1913 in Bucharest, which 
divides the geographic space of Macedonia among the 
three Balkan states that today neighbor Macedonia, 
expires this year. Is it not possible that this will a^in 
open the Macedonian question in the worst possible 
way—^with a new Balkan war? That is, will Macedonia, 
lacking international recognition, not become once again 
the spoils from a military viewpoint of the renewed 
appetites of its stronger neighbors? 

There are many questions and few answers. Neverthe¬ 
less, it is obvious that Gligorov is trying to find a magic 
formula “which will preserve Macedonia’s indepen¬ 
dence.” To some extent, he has already succeeded in 
winning over the Albanians, as a sizable ethnic group in 
Macedonia and their parties to come to the defense of 
Macedonian independence, and he is now attempting to 
find a way out of the uncomfortable encirclement of his 
neighbors via Turkey. Current Macedonian policy is 
trying to distance itself equally from both Bulgaria and 
Serbia, attempting to remove from the back of the 
Macedonian people the label of a “divided nation,” 
which follows the lines of “Bulgarophilism” and “Serbo- 
philism.” And there is no better choice than Turkey, as 
the most respectable force in the Balkans, it is felt in 
Skopje. Whether he will succeed in this, however, 
depends greatly on whether the firestorm of war spreads 
even to the hot south of the former Yugospace. 

If war breaks out between the Albanians and the Serbian 
regime in Kosovo, it will be very difficult to avoid 


34 


CROATIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


formation of a part of a “southern front” in Macedonia 
as well. That challenge could be disastrous for Mace¬ 
donia. The situation would be essentially changed, how¬ 
ever, if Macedonia obtained international recognition, 
because, in that case, the international community, 
through its security system, could also guarantee territo¬ 
rial integrity, security, and if necessary, provide it appro¬ 
priate military assistance. 

Statistics on Type, Quantity of Serbians Weapons 

92BA1277B Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 
19Jul92pl9 

[Article by Fran Visnan “Three Times as Many Cannons 
as America”] 

[Text] You might not like it, but according to the 
statistical indicators, Serbia is the world’s second power 
in artillery. When last July the former YPA [Yugoslav 
People’s Army] commenced the war against Croatia, it 
possessed 19,029 various artillery guns—1,799 antitank 
guns, 4,200 recoilless cannons, 6,400 mortars; the heavy 
hand-operated artillery consisted of 1,934 guns, there 
were 250 self-propelled cannons, 4,286 antiaircraft guns, 
and 160 multibarrel rocket launchers. 

After the losses of equipment on Croatian soil (including 
those in Slovenia and Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H]), the 
Serbs at the moment possess 17,270 artillery barrels, 
which continues to be an important strength on a world 
scale. For example, the ground forces of the United 


States have 5,789 cannon barrels (including mortars), 
and the Marine Co^s—922. Germany has some 4,579 
artillery guns, Ukraine—5,000, Turkey—4,187, India— 
4,000; the Italians have 1,952, the French—1,403, and 
the British—only 729 guns in their artillery arsenal. 
Serbia is followed even by the Chinese Army with its 
millions—China has 14,500 artillery guns (3,800 of them 
mortars). 

The greatest artillery power is Russia. It possesses 55,000 
various artillery weapons (before its disintegration, the 
USSR had 64,000 artillery barrels, 13,000 of these 
mortars). Taking the Soviet doctrine of superior artillery 
power as its example, Yugoslavia at one time, and now 
Serbia, consistently enjoys the advantage of possessing 
such a large number of heavy guns with which it is 
systematically destroying the peripheral areas of Croatia 
and almost all the cities and settlements in B-H. The fact 
that the Americans and NATO are hesitating to send 
ground forces into Sarajevo lies precisely in the fear that 
an air strike could not quickly destroy this arsenal. 
Especially because in Vietnam the Americans were 
dealing with only 1,200 cannons and mortars of the 
Vietcong. 

Serbia has deployed its artillery over the entire area that 
it surveys: There are 3,000 artillery pieces in B-H, 4,000 
in Montenegro, and more than 10,000 artillery weapons 
in Serbia proper, Vojvodina, and Kosovo. All the more 
important ammunition stores and factories for the pro¬ 
duction of armament are also on parent Serbian terri¬ 
tory. The way things stand now, Serbia has prepared 
itself for an exhaustive war lasting several years in which 
artillery is its strategic stake. 


Total Quantity of Serbian Weapons on the Territory of Serbia, Montenegro, and B-H 
__ (July 1992) 


Type of Weapon 

Qoantity (Nomber of Heces) 

Production Status 

Stocks of Ammunition 

Rifles 

Automatic and 
semiautomatic rifles 

2,200,000 

Stepped up 

5 years 


Submachine guns 

600,000 

Continued 

3 years 


Machine guns 

25,000 

Continued 

18 months 

Mortars and 
bazookas 

Single-round antitank 
bazookas 

200,000 

Stepped up 

12 months 


Multiple-round antitank 
bazookas 

4,000 

Stepped up 

12 months 


Guided antitank missiles 

1,500 

Continued 

6 months 


Antitank bazookas and 
mortars 

2,000 

Stepped up 

10 months 


Mortar shells 

5,600 

Continued 

3 years; rate of output 
500,000 rounds per month 

Cannons 

Recoilless cannons 

4,000 

Continued 

2-3 years 


Light antiaircraft cannons 

3,900 

Continued 

15-18 months 


Heavy artillery 

3,400 

Continued 

2 years 


Self-propelled artillery 

220 


12 months 


Multibarrel rocket launchers 

150 

Continued 

^ 600,000 125-and 242-mm 

rockets 

Tanks 

Tanks 

800-900 

Shut down 

100- and 125-mm shells for 
10 months 































































JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


CROATIA 


35 


f 


Total Quantity of Serbian Weapons on the Territory of Serbia, Montenegro, and B-H 

(July 1992) (Continued)_ 


Type of Weapon 

Qoutity (Nomber of Pieces) 

Production Status 

Stocks of Ammunition 


Armored personnel carriers 
(armed) 

738 

Partially continued 

“Maljutka” antitank 
missiles, light cannons, and 
machine guns 

Aircraft 

Airplanes (operational) 

180 

Shut down (partial 
maintenance) 

Conventional bombs, cluster 
bombs for 8-10 months 


Helicopters (assault and 
transport) 

150 “Gazelles” and MI-8’s 

Shut down 

Antitank missiles, guided 
missiles 

Rockets and 
missiles 

Surface-to-surface tactical 
and medium-range missiles 

50-60 launchers 

Improved 



Fuel 

— 

Supply embargo 

Stored for 3 months of 
intensive combat 


Air-to-air (airplane) missiles 

600 

Service, modification 

— 


Air-to^urface (airplane) 
missiles 

400 

— 

— 


Surface-to-air (antiaircraft) 
missiles 

200 launchers 

Improvements 

500-600 pieces 

Ships 

Frigates and corvettes 

4 


All ships, missiles, and 
ammunition in Kotor Bay 


Patrol and missile boats 

60 

Shut down 

All ships, missiles, and 
ammunition in Kotor Bay 


Minesweepers 

8-10 operational 

Shut down 

All ships, missiles, and 
ammunition in Kotor Bay 


Amphibious vessels 

40 

Shut down 

All ships, missiles, and 
ammunition in Kotor Bay 


Submarines 

5 

Shut down 

All ships, missiles, and 
ammunition in Kotor Bay 


Pocket submarines 

6 

1 

Shut down 

All ships, missiles, and 
ammunition in Kotor Bay 


Marine helicopters 

16 


On naval pad in Tivat 


The condition and number were arrived at on the basis of recent British, American, French, German, Austrian, Italian, and Swedish published 
sources. The mutual discrepancies in these estimates amount to + 2 percent. The table gives the time it will take to expend the reserve ammunition 
in battles taking place daily. _.______ 


Former Romanian nationals, mainl y related to the former regime of N. Ccaucescu, are serving as individuals in Serbian ground troops. _ 

The presence of Russian volunteer pilots who arc reportedly flying MiG-23 and MiG-29 fighter-bombers is arrived at on the basis of the fact that 
on several occasions conversation of pilots in Russian has been detected during combat missions._ _ 




































36 


SLOVENIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


Minister Rnpel Visits Lithuania, Byelarus 

92BA1280B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 24 Jul 92 p 24 

[Article by Anton Rupnik: “Minister Rupel Visited 
Lithuania and Byelarus”] 

[Text] Lithuania was the first to recognize us, and we 
have only now agreed with Byelarus on establishing 
relations. 

(From our correspondent.) Moscow, 23 Jul—Yesterday 
and today Slovene Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel 
visited his counterparts in Lithuania and Byelarus. 
Whereas Lithuania was the second foreign state (after 
Croatia) that recognized Slovenia’s independence and 
established diplomatic relations with it, the head of 
Slovene diplomacy agreed (only) today with Byelarus- 
sian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchuk on establishing 
diplomatic relations at the level of embassies. 

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas invited 
his Slovene counterpart to visit as early as last year. On 
this occasion they met at the Baltic summer resort 
Palangi. 

Relations between Slovenia and Lithuania go back to the 
times when the republics were striving to achieve state 
independence. Since both of them are now seeking a new 
basis for economic ties with the world, the ministers 
devoted the most attention precisely to these issues. The 
Lithuanian side is offering to help Slovene businessmen 
strengthen their ties with the hinterland in the former 
Soviet Union, and for its own part it is expecting Slovene 
partners to provide corresponding assistance in pene¬ 
trating the markets of Central Europe. 

Lithuania and Slovenia have a similar position on the 
edge of crisis regions, and consequently they will further 
intensify their exchange of views within the framework 
of the CSCE. Dr. Rupel invited his host, Saudargas, to 
visit Ljubljana; his visit is expected as early as Sep¬ 
tember, i.e., before the elections that are scheduled for 
October. 

The Byelarusian interlocutors emphasized the tradi¬ 
tional fruitful cooperation between the former republics, 
now states, that has already been taking place for a full 
decade. The people in Minsk are expressing satisfaction 
because they are (at least one) Slavic state that can show 
itself before the world with its achievements. They are 
showing a great deal of interest in Slovenia’s experiences 
with its own money, and consequently it was agreed that 
a Byelarusian banking delegation would soon come to 
visit our state bank. 

Both sides are determined that they will soon conclude 
several necessary intergovernmental agreements on eco¬ 
nomic, financial, and tax matters. 


[Box, p 24] 

RupeFs Statement 

Bmik—“Byelarus is already a very important partner for 
Slovenia and its economy now, and even more impor¬ 
tant is the fact that Minsk is obviously becoming an 
economic center not only of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, but also of a future East European 
economic community, i.e., as important in the East as 
Brussels is in the West. Consequently our visit to this 
state, as well as the signature of the agreement on 
establishing diplomatic relations, seem to me to be very 
important for Slovenia,” Slovene Foreign Minister Dim¬ 
itrij Rupel stated at the Bmik airport after his return. 

The day before his visit to Minsk, Rupel was also in 
Lithuania, which may be interesting to Slovenia because 
it has numerous channels for economic and political 
communication with the states of the former Soviet 
Union, Slovene citizens still need entry visas, which they 
can obtain at border crossings, to travel to both states, 
and Slovenia will also introduce the same measures for 
citizens of Lithuania and Byelarus, although there are no 
difficulties at all at border crossings. 

Refugee Exodus From Bosnia-Hercegovina 
Detailed 

92BA1310B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 1 Aug 92 

pp 21-22 

[Article by Vinko Vasle, Slobodan Dukic, Peter Potoc- 
nik, Zoran Odic, Majda Vukelic, and Sasa Vidmajer: 
“Flight for Survival”] 

[Text] One of the biggest and most tragic **migrations of 
peoples” since World War II is being experienced by the 
states that arose on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 
According to unverified information, on the territory of 
the former joint state about 2.3 million people have been 
left without a home and a roof over their heads. The UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees warns that because of 
the consequences of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in 
Croatia, Europe will be flooded with refugees and the 
homeless over the next 10 years, even if the war ends. 

When the first exiles came to the Slovene border, it was 
a tragedy. Now, when a wave of more than 2 million 
refugees is rolling toward Europe from the former repub¬ 
lics of the late Yugoslavia, it is all still just a bare 
statistic, which politicians perceive as a nightmare, while 
Europe is shedding crocodile tears of despair and—what 
else—putting up a high wall, which is supposed to be 
bigger and stronger than the Berlin wall, to keep its 
territory from being flooded by Balkan refugees and 
Balkan filth. 

The statistical figure of more than 2.3 million refugees, 
however, includes children, women, the aged, the sick, 
and the wounded. It is more than 2 million personal 
tragedies of people who have lost everything—a roof 
over their heads, land, homes, their families, and their 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


SLOVENIA 


37 


neighbors. Before the war, Sarajevo had half a million 
inhabitants, and today only about 200,000 are still 
vegetating in it. There were 40,000 people living in 
Gorazde, and today there are supposed to be only 10,000 
still in that Bosnian city—^assuming that they are still 
alive. Fifty-seven new “cities” have arisen, in which 
more than 100,000 people are experiencing the horrors 
of concentration camps. These are camps in all parts of 
Bosnia under Serbian control and in Serbia itself—in 
mines in Aleksinac, in Stara Gradiska, and in the 
Omarsko mine. The river of refugees is spreading 
throughout Bosnia—^from Foca and Zvomik people fled 
to Gorazde, which turned into a city overnight in terms 
of the number of inhabitants, and into a tomb in terms of 
the quality of life. Those who did not flee ended up as 
prisoners inside the fence of the alumina factory in 
Karakaj, where one of the concentration camps is 
located. Some are fleeing to Mostar, and others are 
fleeing from Mostar, some are fleeing themselves, and 
others are being resettled by forces, in order to cleanse 
the area ethnically. Ethnically pure areas have thus 
emerged on the territory of all of Podrinje, from which 
Serbs have forcibly relocated the Muslim and Croatian 
inhabitants—^those who survived the massacres, obvi¬ 
ously. The self-styled state of the Serbian Republic of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina has already been cleansing 
Bosanska Krajina (Banja Luka, Bihac, Gazin, Prijedor, 
and other cities) for months now. The victims are 
non-Serbian inhabitants, without exception. In Banja 
Luka, an Office for the Resettlement of the Non-Serbian 
Population has been established and registered. They are 
thus achieving the basic goal of the war on the territory 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina: the emergence of ethnically pure 
territories with a Serbian population. The Croats are 
being relocated to western Hercegovina, and the Mus¬ 
lims have only been left an area in central Bosnia, in the 
valley of the Bosna River. 


Pay or Die 

Sarajevo is also being ethnically cleansed. The occupiers 
have already driven out almost all the non-Serbian 
inhabitants from Grbavica, since according to 
Karadzic's “cartography” Grbavica is part of “Serbian” 
Sarajevo. The non-^rbian inhabitants of this part of 
Sarajevo can leave peacefully—^and without all their 
property—only under the condition that they pay from 
2,000 to 5,000 German marks [DM]. Otherwise death 
comes, since all this is not just a matter of statistics, but 
also the financial ministry of the Serbian Republic of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Radovan Karadzic claims that he 
will thus collect DM30 to DM50 million for the treasury 
of his new state. 

Where did those who have managed to leave the territory 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina flee to? Most of them are in 
Croatia—^already about 400,000, according to the latest 
data. Almost 300,000 refugees are supposed to have 
found refuge on Serbian territory; according to the data 
of the High Commissioner for Refugees, about 163,000 
people fled to Serbia from Croatia, and more than 


219,000 from Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Serbian author¬ 
ities are keeping silent about the fact that all refugees 
who are fit for the army are immediately turned over for 
the ranks of the “army of the Serbian Republic of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina,” and sent back across the Drina to 
Bosnia-Hercegovina in the uniforms of the former Yugo¬ 
slav Army—^while young men from Serbia are also 
fleeing, as if they were from Bosnia, and seeking refuge in 
several European states. 

Almost 70,000 refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina have 
found refuge in Slovenia. According to statements from 
the Republic Civil Defense Headquarters [RSCZ], this 
has exceeded sixfold the financial and technical capabil¬ 
ities for housing and care here. 

According to the latest data (27 July), there are 48,271 
officially reported and registered refugees. Among them 
a full half are children under 16, 40 percent are women, 
and somewhat less than 10 percent are adult men, mostly 
elderly, although after the declaration of a state of war in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina and the introduction of general 
mobilization there has been an increase in the number of 
refugees who are seeking refuge here in order to evade 
military service. Some of them, however, have already 
been turned back at the border and did not receive 
temporary refugee status here, and likewise recently 
refugees at the reception centers have been warned 
several times about their military obligation. In this 
regard, we should add, as the RSCZ points out, that there 
is no legal basis for Slovenia’s returning presumed mili¬ 
tary conscripts to Bosnia-Hercegovina. 

As far as the ethnic composition is concerned, over 71 
percent of the refugees are Muslims, somewhat more 
than 20 percent are Croats, 1.5 percent are Serbs, and 6.9 
percent are members of other peoples and nationalities. 

They are housed at refugee centers which are located in 
47 Slovene opstinas, and those now completely occu¬ 
pied. Specifically, more than 17,000 people are living in 
them, including 8,833 childen under 16, 6,612 women, 
and 1,928 men. As the RSCZ has already been warning 
for some time, most of the refugee centers are completely 
unsuitable for living in wintertime, since it is not pos¬ 
sible to heat them, and at the same time the electrical 
and plumbing fittings and the sewage system are worn- 
out. They will consequently have to be renovated before 
winter, and so far a great deal of money has already been 
spent on this, but in spite of that, few centers are 
equipped in such a way as to meet sanitary and hygienic 
standards. Also used to take care of the refugees are the 
“strategic reserves of material resources intended for 
housing and taking care of the endangered population in 
case of mass natural and other disasters, food reserves, 
and the Red Cross reserves,” the RSCZ wrote in a special 
report. 

An increasingly bigger problem is represented by the 
families with which refugees are living, since up to 20 
refugees are living with individual families. These are 
mostly families that are socially weak and already do not 



38 


JPRS-EER-92-ia9 

SLOVENIA 18 August 1992 


have enough money to survive on themselves. So far they 
have received assistance primarily in the form of food 
and hygienic necessities, whereas they have not received 
money. That is why from day to day more and more 
refugees want to move to the reception centers. 

Already 3 Percent of the Population 

The refugees already constitute more than 3 percent of 
the population in Slovenia, and their proportion in 
individual obcinas is considerably higher. And, since 
taking care of the refugees to date is already exceeding 
our capabilities, there is a serious danger that the entire 
system for taking care of them would collapse upon the 
arrival of even more of them. That is why the RSCZ 
thinks that the acceptance of more refugees would be 
irresponsible both toward the inhabitants of Slovenia 
and toward the refugees themselves. 

The centers for social labor state that the social distress 
of the Bosnia^Hercegovina refugees is substantially 
higher than the distress of the Croatian refugees was. 
Specifically, there are many pregnant women, including 
a considerable number who were raped during the war, 
and there are many children who cannot be left to fend 
for themselves. There are also a considerable number of 
mentally and physically impaired people, and conse¬ 
quently settling them at the centers is problematic, and 
there is no more room for them at special medical and 
social institutions. 

Recently, there has not been a large number of refugees 
coming to Slovenia from Bosnia-Hercegovina. There are 
more and more people, however, who voluntarily leave 
the reception centers and leave for Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
but come back after a few days and bring relatives and 
acquaintances with them. 

For the time being, our republic—^from a security stand¬ 
point—^has not had any particular difficulties with the 
refugees. Their movements are restricted. They can only 
visit other reception centers if they have a special permit. 
Every refugee, in fact, can lose that status if he leaves the 
center without permission and moves to another center. 
As the RSCZ emphasizes, however, for the time being 
there are no major difficulties with the refugees and they 
mostly respect order at the centers as well as public 
order. 

From mid-April until now, Slovenia has spent more than 
712 million tolars on the refugees, and according to 
rough calculations, we would need more than 608 mil¬ 
lion tolars per month for normal care at the centers, and 
more than 737 million tolars per month to take care of 
those staying with families. So far our republic has 
received about a million dolars in assistance from 
abroad. We are getting continuous assistance only from 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Italy, the 
World Islamic Organization, and Austrian and German 
humanitarian organizations. 

Since ail the possibilities for accepting refugees have 
been exhausted here, the RSCZ thinks that we should not 


receive any more refugees, especially not those liable for 
military service. Immediately after the first secure areas 
are formed in Bosnia-Hercegovina and humanitarian 
corridors are ensured, repatriation of the Bosnia- 
Hercegovina refugees should be started. 

Thus, in practice all of Bosanska Posavina has been 
depopulated, many people have fled from Sarajevo, 
Podrinje has been depopulated, and a “defensive zone” 
has been created (where the Muslims and Croats have 
been killed or driven out), 30 to 50 kilometers wide from 
the Drina in the interior of Bosnia. Now Bosanska 
Krajina is being hurriedly cleansed; Hercegovina is still 
the most populated, but people have also fled here from 
the left, from the east, to the right, to the west, across the 
Neretva if they are not Serbs and in the opposite direc¬ 
tion if they are Serbs. Just like Karadzic’s, Boban’s 
kingdom is also emerging, ethnically pure and in accor¬ 
dance with Boban’s philosophy of a Croatian Commu¬ 
nity of Herceg Bosna, and with Tudjman’s pronounce¬ 
ment that “Croatia without Bosnia is like an apple with 
a bite taken out of it.” 


Unknown Fate of 800,000 ^^Units^^ 

Before the war that started four months ago, Bosnia- 
Hercegovina had 4,800,000 inhabitants. If we subtract 
more than 2 million refugees, we are left with the 
statistical fact of 2.8 million inhabitants. According to 
the official recount, on the side of Izetbegovic, Karadzic, 
and Boban, there are 2 million people left in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina. Then where are 800,000 statistical 
“units”? These figures cannot be rounded off, not even if 
we very generously subtract all those who fled and were 
not registered anywhere as refugees. If we subtract from 
it the 40,000 people killed in the war, 20,000 officially 
missing, and about 100,000 in Serbian concentration 
camps, it is still not clear where more than half a million 
people are! 

One of the Croatian paradoxes also has to do with the 
refugee problem. The HDZ [Croatian Democratic Com¬ 
munity] officials in Dalmatia were among the first to 
cause a refugee problem in Croatia, at the beginning of 
the uprising by the Knin Serbs (17 August 1990), when 
they literally invited Croats from the Knin opstina to 
move out to safety. The Croatian Government seriously 
began to be aware of the refugee problem after the fall of 
Baranja last August, when 25,000 Baranja residents fled 
to Hungary at once, and twice as many were scattered 
throughout Croatia. It was only then that an office for 
refugees, now headed by the well-known Croatian theo¬ 
logian Dr. Adalbert Rebic, was established as part of the 
Croatian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. As early as 
last September, more than 200,000 refugees were 
counted, among whom 150,000 were settled in Croatia. 
By 3 January, when the Sarajevo agreement on the end of 
hostilities was signed, the number of Croatian refugees 
had increased to around 700,000, but then it began to 
decline and stopped at the figure of 250,000. 



JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 Angnst 1992 


SLOVENIA 


39 


These are registered refugees, who have, along with free 
food, stays in Croatian hotels, gymnasiums, summer 
resorts, with private individuals, public transportation, 
and health care, the right to ‘-pocket money,” i.e., 
monetary compensation between 4,000 and 8,000 
Croatian dinars. Refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
who have already exceeded the figure of 400,000, are in 
a different position from Croatian refugees, because they 
are not entitled to monetary compensation. 

In spite of that refugee pressure upon Croatia, so far only 
two refugee centers have been set up from the former 
military barracks in £>zakovo and Pozega, which, in addi¬ 
tion to the temporary one in Zupanja—^where there are one 
and a half refiigees for every resident—and in Slavonski 
Brod, are primarily reception centers for sending refugees to 
the interior of Croatia and to Dalmatia. 

“The Croatian Government owes our hotels $150 mil¬ 
lion, but it has nowhere to get it. Admittedly, we are 
iweiving irregular assistance in the form of food, medi¬ 
cines, clothing, and tents, but we need money,” stated 
Dr. Adalbert Rebic. Croatian Deputy Prime Minister 
Mate Granic, who is responsible in the Croatian Gov¬ 
ernment for refugee problems, said, however, that the 
refugees were now costing the Croatian Government 
DM100 million a month, and that the refugee problem 
had already crossed the Rubicon of Croatia’s endurance 
a month ago. According to him, it has become a factor in 
Croatia’s instability and its sinking into complete eco¬ 
nomic collapse. Finally, this was also noted by represen¬ 
tatives of the High Commissioner for Refugees, who 
inspected the refugee camps in Slavonia and warned 
about the danger of the spread of contagious diseases, 
undernourishment, and poor hygienic conditions. 

Black Humor From Belgrade 

Batric Jovanovic, chairman of the Serbian Assembly’s 
committee for war damages, estimated a few days ago 
that “Serbia had received around 400,000 refugees from 
Croatia.” These, however, arc only rough estimates, 
according to this Belgrade politician, who is preparing to 
have Belgrade officially demand more than $24 billion 
from Zagreb for the refugees and war damages. The witty 
Jovanovic, however, also casually included in this 
amount damages for prisoners of war from World War 
II, and certainly with the hope that this sum could save 
Serbia from disaster. 

In any case, the figure most frequently mentioned in Serbia 
with respect to refugees from Croatia and Bosnia- 
Hercegovina is 300,000. Serbian official representatives 
claim that they do not know the exact figures, since many 
refugees are staying with relatives and friends, and a large 
number of refugees do not even want to report to the 
Serbian authorities. According to statisticians’ data, the 
most refugees, around 70,000, are in Belgrade, and more 
than 100,000 are in Vojvodina. The Kragujevac, Nis, and 
Kraljevo areas are suffering the most pressure from refu¬ 
gees. Because of the refugee problems, the Serbian authori¬ 
ties have passed a special law on refugees and established a 


commissariat; it is only through the latter that one can 
obtain official refugee status, which brings several privi¬ 
leges. Otherwise, the Serbian regime is accusing the interna¬ 
tional community and the UN of not doing anything for its 
refugees. At the same time, Milosevic’s regime looks away 
when Seselj’s forces, together with organized groups of 
refugees in Vojvodina, cleanse cities and villages of Croats, 
Slovaks, Hungarians, and other non-Serbian residents. The 
Serbian Red Cross claims that more than 100,000 refugees 
have come to the territory of Serbia from Bosnia- 
Hercegovina alone, and it estimates that there are at least 
that many more who have not reported to the authorities. 
Serbia has organized 30 reception centers for all these 
refugees, it is consuming about 150 metric tons of food for 
them daily, but all the international assistance that is still 
coming to Serbia, according to these estimates, is supposed 
to be sufficient to cover only 30 percent of the requirements. 

In any case, in recent days about 5,000 refugees have 
returned from Serbia to Croatia and Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, but many of them are already going back to 
Belgrade; they say that the “current authorities” in the 
so-called Serbian Krajinas have done much more evil 
than Pavelic’s Ustase caused in those regions. 

(Box, p 21] 

The refugee consequences of the war on the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia are also already threatening in the 
opinion of experts from the UN and the High Commis¬ 
sioner for Refugees. It is the largest exodus since World 
War II, which has included about 2.3 million people. 

According to data and estimates from the middle of July 
1992, 163,000 people fled from Croatia to Serbia, and 
219,000 from Bosnia-Hercegovina. From Bosnia- 
Hercegovina 41,000 people fled to Montenegro, and from 
Croatia 8,000. Thirty thousand refugees from Bosnia- 
Hercegovina ended up in Macedonia. According to these 
data 320,000 people fled from Bosnia-Hercegovina to 
Croatia, and somewhat less than 70,000 to Slovenia. There 
are 69,000 refugees in the areas under UNPROFOR [UN 
Protective Force] control. During the war in Croatia, 
140,000 people sought refuge in Bosnia-Hercegovina at 
that time, but have mostly returned to Croatia. 

Let us also look at data on the refugees who have found 
refuge in other European states. There are already about 
275,000 of them in Germany, 60,000 in Hungary, 41,000 
in Sweden, 50,000 in Austria, 26,000 in Turkey, 16,000 
in Switzerland, 10,000 in the Netherlands, 8,000 in 
Norway, 7,000 in Italy, 5,000 in Denmark, 2,000 in 
Finland, 2,000 in Belgium, 1,500 in France, and 38,000 
in other European states or around the world. 

UN, Western Attitude Toward Bosnia, ^Killings^ 

92BA1310C Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 1 Aug 92 p 22 

[Commentary by Vojko Volk: “Observing the Killings”] 

[Text] In the next few days and weeks, the world will sink 
into comfortable armchairs, and millions of mortals will 


40 


SLOVENIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


goggle at TV screens and watch the battles of athletes in 
the charming Catalonian capital; and, at least for a short 
time, the battles for life in Sarajevo, Gorazde, and other 
cities and villages in Bosnia-Hercegovina will be for¬ 
gotten. The deadly monotony of the portrayal of the 
terrible sights of death will certainly be pushed into the 
background in all the media. 

It actually starts to seem to a person who keeps seeing the 
same sights coming from bleeding Bosnia that he has 
already seen all this several times and never at all, and 
that he is watching a continuing series without an end. It 
is as if the whole world has simply reconciled itself to the 
insane actions of the Serbian conquerors, who are going 
off to “steal land” in an incomparably more brutal 
manner than the barbarian hordes and the “savage” 
Turks did centuries ago. That is why it is clearly true that 
the Bosnian tragedy is one of the bi^est spots on the 
conscience of the modem international community, 
bigger and worse than all the wars, and the brutal deaths 
of innocent civilians cannot be compared even with the 
thousands who are dying of starvation at the same time 
somewhere in the African boondocks. In comparison 
with Ethiopia, humanitarian assistance to Bosnia can 
only be an extremely bizarre cynicism, with which troops 
of politicians from the developed countries are easing 
their consciences and setting the tables for their cam¬ 
paign goulashes. 

It is not even slightly true that the international commu¬ 
nity, with the UN and the incredibly elaborate system of 
institutions, does not have the ability and power to 
intervene radically in events in which the constant 
perpetrator of massacres has already also been formally 
recognized as the culprit, namely the one against whom 
an international embargo has been introduced. Precisely 
the latest statements from the State Department, the 
Pentagon, and the UN Security Council directly prove 
that it is possible to do more. On orders from the latter, 
the bombers of the allied forces could bomb Baghdad 
and other targets just in order to destroy Hussayn’s 
atomic project in that extreme manner. In other words, 
this means that the international community is prepared 
to use force for “preventive” purposes, in order to 
prevent a project that could possibly threaten life, but it 
is not prepared to do so in order to prevent the bloody 
execution that is happening every day in front of its nose, 
to the disgrace of the achievements of human civiliza¬ 
tion. It is as though tens of thousands of deaths in the 
Balkans were nothing in comparison with Saddam^s 
paper with an atomic project. 

All the strategic, tactical, political, and military explana¬ 
tions of this council about what the difference is sup¬ 
posed to be like between military intervention against 
Iraq, on one hand, and against Serbia, on the other, 
stumble over the simple fact that Milosevic is just more 
adept than Saddam Hussayn at leading the ossified 
bureaucracy of the international security system by the 
nose. Slobo says that there are no Serbian military 
formations in Bosnia, and Butrus Butrus-Ghali is 
already accusing the Croats of military interference in 


Bosnia. JNA [Yugoslav People’s Army] military aircraft, 
which are systematically bombing Gorazde at the time 
that one of the world’s political leaders is landing in 
Sarajevo, of course, do not have any connection with 
either Serbia or Milosevic; they just fly that way, from 
memory and as a lark, and of course at their own will. 
None of them want to see the fact that it is precisely the 
activity of these aircraft that is the most glaring proof of 
the maximum possible involvement of Serbia, the FRY 
[Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], the JNA, the gener¬ 
als... in short, the entire murderous clique from Belgrade, 
in the slaughter in Bosnia—^neither Butrus-Ghali, nor 
MacKenzie, nor Carrington, nor the entire Security 
Council, in short, none of those whom the Serbian leader 
is leading up and down with his lies. On the other hand, 
they all see Paraga’s fighters, the Green Berets, religious 
police, etc., who are aiming rifles at the fortified cannons 
at safe distances, the tanks, and the aircraft of the JNA. 
Let whoever can, understand this. Whenever Milosevic 
says that he is in favor of immediate peace, the Muslims 
are already accused of their “stubborn lack of coopera¬ 
tion,” and when Panic, the phantom prime minister of 
the FRY, says insipid things about Serbia’s peaceful 
inclinations, the international community immediately 
yields to the comfort of hoping that peace will still come 
about in Bosnia. 

Obviously we in Slovenia are also slowly giving in to the 
syndrome of always the same pictures from Sarajevo. In the 
Slovene media’s reporting, there is virtually no longer any 
mention of the still continuing Serbian aggression against 
Croatia and the aggression against Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
They have adopted the Western media’s vocabulary about 
the “civil war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the parties involved 
in the conflicts,” etc., which is not only the wrong thing to 
do and misleading the public, but is also extremely unfair to 
those who are resisting the Serbian conquests and the 
cleansing of territory that has never been Serbian. This 
action really can only be characterized as a civil war by the 
unconcerned ignoramuses and sterile incompetents in the 
ranks of the international bureaucracy. It is easier to under¬ 
stand the cooling of Slovenes’ attitude toward the events in 
Croatia. The exacerbation of relations, and Croatia’s polit¬ 
ical and diplomatic tactlessness, mistakes, and stupidities, 
however, in spite of this cannot change certain facts: that the 
neighboring state is still at war, that it has to deal with the 
temporary or even permanent loss of a large part of its 
territory, that it is being threatened and attacked by the 
same aggressor that experienced a defeat in Slovenia some 
time ago and is devastating Bosnia, and that in these very 
months Croatia has been struggling with a catastrophic 
economic crisis, which is by no means without psychological 
consequences for its population, which has already been 
seriously affected in one way or another. In this bloody 
Balkan circus simply no one is innocent any longer, neither 
the functionaries in the UN’s glass palaces nor the politi¬ 
cians of the states that make up that leadership of the 
international community. It is actually just now, precisely in 
the last few months, that any consideration of the events in 
Bosnia has been intruded upon by the thought that every¬ 
thing that the international community has done to date has 


JPRS-£ER-92*109 
18 August 1992 


SLOVENIA 


41 


actually stimulated the bloody campaigns of conquest by the 
frustrated leaders of outraged Serbdom. Were the UN’s 
actions, above all the sending of the blue helmets to the 
newly conquered borders of Serbia, anything else but assis¬ 
tance for bloody Milosevic’s campaigns of conquest? Isn’t 
everything in Bosnia-Hercegovina happening according to 
exactly the same scenario, and isn’t the international con¬ 
cern about the refugees precisely what was planned in 
Serbia? Haven’t all the world’s actions to date essentially 
been a terribly valuable service for the Serbian “cleansing of 
the territory”? It is precisely for this reason that it is 
understandable that both Croatia and Slovenia are 
attempting a more restrictive attitude toward the refugees, 
so that at least in this way, which is not exactly suitable, they 
can perhaps nevertheless influence the international com¬ 
munity, and especially the international public, to exert 
more decisive pressure against the Serbian aggressors when 
it is directly involved and when it confronts the refugee 
tragedy. It would even have been a great success if they had 
punished the first violators of the embargo, since it is 
generally known that there is a swarm of states and enter¬ 
prises that are doing everything possible to support Serbia. 
The stories about the Romanian tugboats that are carrying 
oil to Belgrade before the eyes of pedestrians along the 
Danube convey the seriousness of the international commu¬ 
nity’s “concern” about implementation of this quasi- 
embargo. 

The politicization of the refugee problem and in a way 
also the manipulation of the international community 
through the refugees’ distress are of course an extremely 
harsh way of motivating it at least to undertake some¬ 
thing, but all of it together is incomparably less brutal 
than the other facts and events where people have fled 
from. Possibly at this time this is also all that can 
realistically be done or rather utilized in the struggle to 
keep and increase the attention of the world, which is 
being seized by the drowsiness caused by the syndrome 
of always the same Sarajevo pictures. 

Wage Dispute Between Government, Trade Unions 

92BA1280A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 29 Jul 92 p 1 

[Article by Vinko Vasle: “Without an Agreement 
Between the Government and the Trade Unions”] 

[Text] The trade unions are demanding withdrawal of the 
law on restricting wages in the public sector, but the 
government is opposing this; the chamber does not agree 
with the views on the causes of inflation. 

Ljubljana, 28 Jul—^Today’s talks between representa¬ 
tives of the trade unions and the Slovene Government 
fell through. The government did not want to withdraw 
the law on restricting wages in the public sector, and the 
trade unions said that they could not start negotiations 
on a social pact. They demanded withdrawal of the law, 
and the base wages were supposed to be regulated by an 
annex to the present collective contract. 

Of course, complications already arose over the first of the 
five points that the trade unions proposed as a condition to 


start negotiations with the government, i.e., regarding the 
demand that the government retract the legal, i.e., admin¬ 
istrative regulation of wages in the public sector. Viktor 
Zakelj, the deputy prime minister for social activities, said 
at the very beginning that the law was already in parliamen¬ 
tary proceedings, and it depended on the deputies whether 
they would pass it or not. Within the limits of the budget’s 
financial capabilities and its redenomination, the govern¬ 
ment acted in accordance with what it had available finan¬ 
cially, and it therefore could not back off from the law. He 
also emphasized that “the government could not agree to 
such a rigid formulation of the first point offered by the 
trade unions,” i.e., the withdrawal of the law. France 
Tomsic, who headed the negotiating group of trade union 
representatives today, said that all in all, this also repre¬ 
sented a touchstone for the Dmovsek government’s willing¬ 
ness to observe the international conventions adopted 
which regulate these issues. 

Later, Minister of Planning Davorin Kracun and 
Dagmar Suster, vice president of the Chamber of Com¬ 
merce, became involved in the polemics. Kracun said 
that Slovenia was in a crucial phase of eliminating 
inflation and that this was not only in the government’s 
interest, but also in the interest of the workers. Conse¬ 
quently, the most important instrument for achieving 
the goal that has been set is control over wages, especially 
those paid directly from the budget. 

If the present “mechanisms” were adhered to, this would 
mean a transfer of inflation from the past, and its rising 
again. Until there are anti-inflation mechanisms, it is 
necessary to restrict and control wages, he said. Dagmar 
Suster, however, said that the Chamber of Commerce 
did not agree by any means with such views of the causes 
of inflation. The assertions that wages in the economy 
are the reason for inflation indicate at least unfamiliarity 
with the matter, if nothing worse. 

Minister of Labor Jozica Puhar agreed with Tomsic’s 
assessment that all these issues were regulated by inter¬ 
national conventions, but this applies to stable econo¬ 
mies, and not here, when the state still has to intervene 
because of economic pressures and upheavals. 

The trade union side thought that if the government 
thought that wages could be regulated by laws, then it did 
not even need a trade union partner on the other side. At 
the end, Tomsic called today’s talks a dialogue with the 
deaf, and announced that after everything that happened 
today, the trade unions would have to resort to more 
radical measures. Consequently, Tomsic said, he did not 
see any particular argument for the trade unions’ 
meeting with the government again. In any case, they 
will also convey their position to the government in 
writing. 


42 


YUGOSLAVIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


EC Decision Complicates Macedonian Politics 


Diplomacy Questioned 

92BAI212A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA 
in Macedonian 4 Jul 92 p 11 


[Article by Ljupco Popovski: “Macedonia and Its Dip¬ 
lomatic Battle for Independence; With a Shield or on a 
Shield?”] 

[Text] Macedonian diplomacy was defeated in Lisbon. 
However, in retrospect, the EC declaration (and the lack 
of moral credibility it carried) was an expected step due to 
many specific interests. Instead of defining the strategy of 
the future steps to be taken at such crucial times, the 
debate in parliament degenerated into a naked power 
grab. 

It was quite understandable and even expected that the 
diplomatic defeat suffered by Macedonia at the Euro¬ 
pean Community summit in Lisbon (the public and the 
leading politicians were terribly distraught, although 
they could sense it) developed into a major argument on 
the success of the present leadership of the state in the 
course of the several days of debate in parliament on the 
strategy pursued so far aimed at recognition by the 
international community. If no serious remarks may be 
made concerning overall Macedonian policy (for, in the 
final account, there is neither a war here nor any major 
interethnic unrest other than an occasional spark, and 
Macedonia is not threatened by any major danger), 
because the announced strategy of tolerance and 
peaceful cooperation was particularly valued, some of 
the steps taken by the leadership of the countries sur¬ 
rounding this Republic and the promotion of this 
Republic throughout the world could be assessed some¬ 
what differently. 

The declaration of the EC, which frightened only the 
ill-informed and those who constantly cheered and sup¬ 
plied the local public exclusively with facts certifying to 
the rightness of our position, it seems, came more as a 
sobering fact, enabling us to realize the true place of that 
same Macedonia in Europe, Europe's demands toward 
Macedonia, and Macedonia's influence. The string of 
contacts President Gligorov, Assembly chairman Andov, 
Prime Minister Kljusev, and Minister Maleski had estab¬ 
lished and the discussions the parties had with a substan¬ 
tial number of European statesmen and influential 
people in the United States and Canada reflected, on the 
one hand, the dynamic nature of Macedonian contacts 
with the world and confirmed the support and recogni¬ 
tion of the policy Macedonia is following. Along with 
such approvals and recognition, there were the state¬ 
ments of the worldwide community that Macedonia's 
demand to become an equal member of the international 
community was not debatable; most of its members 
quickly guaranteed the inviolability of its borders. How¬ 
ever, the debates invariably got stuck on the question of 
name. 


Neither in Heaven nor on Earth 

Neither the citizens of this Republic nor its leaders could 
imagine how Macedonia's name could become such a 
major stumbling block to its recognition and prevent us 
from assuming our place in any of the European institu¬ 
tions or of opening a diplomatic mission in another counti^ 
and make us, instead, exist like a phantom state, neither in 
heaven nor on earth. For that reason, all that European 
recognition of the proper tolerant policy of compromise 
pursued by Macedonia seems to have been drowned by the 
deafening noise of those same Europeans demanding that 
the name be changed, and only then, perhaps, would 
everything be in order with the recognition. 

It seems that the people who created and implemented 
Macedonia's foreign policy were unable to influence the 
resolutions of the EC, starting on 16 December, when the 
prerequisites for the recognition of the new countries in 
Europe were formulated at the regular ministerial meet¬ 
ings and with the Guimaraes and Lisbon declarations, 
which were of key importance to us. The hasty amend¬ 
ment of some articles in the bylaws seemed to be the 
main basis on which, without any major problems, 
Macedonia would positively enter the structure of Euro¬ 
pean interests. When the Arbitration Commission, 
encountering no serious problems, said that it was only 
Macedonia, in addition to Slovenia, that was meeting the 
conditions for recognition as an independent state, the 
public in all countries—^politicians, the press, and radio 
and television—^was bombarded with statements that 
recognition was imminent, if not by 15 January, then in 
another month, at the latest. The occasional and, later, 
more frequent statements by Kiro Gligorov that “recog¬ 
nition will be a lengthy and torturous process'' were 
viewed as statements that, although accurate, would in 
no way prevent us from reaching the final objective. The 
heavy reliance placed on the resolution of the Arbitra¬ 
tion Commission appeared more like helplessness and a 
lack of realization that some recommendations, although 
formulated by top European rulers, were meaningless in 
terms of interests. The failure of the EC to honor the 
resolution and recommendation of the Arbitration Com¬ 
mission, although the EC had created the commission, 
led to the forming of a sphere of interests domestically 
that ignored the recommendations and the best possible 
decisions concerning the state symbols formulated by the 
Constitutional Commission of the Macedonian 
Assembly. The differences may seem to be insignificant, 
for which reason quite frequently the domestic interest 
groups hypocritically accused the Community of doing 
something that was being done in the country itself. 

It seems that the makers of our foreign policy made an 
error (regardless of how accurate the raving critics in 
parliament may be) in poorly assessing the importance of 
Greece in European integration and in the eyes of 
Europe's North American allies. By the time the realiza¬ 
tion came that the Greek folly would be supported 


JPRS-EER-92-ia9 

18 August 1992 YUGOSLAVIA 43 


because it suited numerous interests, it was too late. At 
that point, recognition of Macedonia began to be side¬ 
tracked. 

Our diplomacy, reduced to a small circle of people, 
either ignored or entirely forgot that one of the key 
articles on which the EC rests is that the interests of all of 
its members must be protected under all circumstances. 
In this respect, regardless of how correct our position was 
and regardless of the support we had throughout the 
world and in our discussions with eminent statesmen, it 
was to be fully expected that the European leaders would 
support their Greek colleague in order to prevent the 
outbreak of a crisis in yet another country within the 
Community. 

That is precisely why it was necessary to do what was 
done by all countries, but what Macedonian diplomacy 
either failed to do or simply sketched: a study of the 
position of Greece in Europe, the position of Macedonia 
in Europe, the operational methods and interests of the 
EC, and the direction our further efforts had to take. The 
several parliamentary debates (excluding the latest) were 
merely an amateurish exercise for a highly professional 
work and, above all, for providing political support to a 
given course of action. 

What Now? 

In the present situation, in view of all of the weaknesses 
displayed by our diplomacy and despite the great 
number of its accomplishments in terms of the patient, 
persistent, and cooperative treatment of the Mace- 
donian-Greek dispute (for which it was frequently 
praised), the key question is how we should work in the 
future. The unanimous condemnation of the declaration 
of the EC that was recently voiced by parliamentary 
spokesmen, and the refusal to change the name of 
Macedonia are the foundations of the situation in which 
this Republic finds itself in terms of future talks. How 
would the nation react if we were to take, for example, 
the suggestion that Macedonia be recognized as the 
Central Balkan Republic? In that case, the Turks would 
be referred to as Turks, the Albanians as Albanian, the 
Wallachians as Wallachians, and the Macedonians prob¬ 
ably as the Cebari. Or could depersonalization take 
another direction? 

The dispute in parliament, which quite clearly developed 
into a sharp quarrel and calls for replacing the leadership 
and seizing the power (ignoring the need for decent 
speech and respect for political opponents), once again 
proved the totally amateurish and tragicomic nature of 
our respected representatives. Neither the speech by 
resigned Minister Maleski (which he publicly justified as 
his own personal reaction) nor, even less so, the debates 
among the assemblymen provided even an outline, other 
than mentioning positive steps and errors, of how Mace¬ 
donia would pursue the diplomatic struggle in the future. 
The fact is that we find ourselves in a difficult situation, 
for which reason not only the highest political leadership 
but also the people, who have already confirmed their 


skill in assessing the situation, should consider the 
results of such an interregnum, if this phantom state of 
affairs were to last perhaps another year. However great 
the isolation of Macedonia may be and whatever the 
price that will have to be paid by all of the citizens of this 
country, whether they are prepared to pay this price or 
not, the question of the future of the state and not of any 
temporary division of powers should be the topic of a 
consensus between the government and the parties. That 
is why it is extremely important to especially set on the 
table the key problems and all of the options (as all 
skillful diplomats have advised us, both publicly and in 
private talks, to do) and reach a decision that would 
leave the least possible scars to, as an assemblyman said, 
avoid going back to the time of the Krusevo uprising. 
Now is the time to make key decisions and take far¬ 
sighted steps and, one could say, display the ability to 
reach a real compromise. 

Government Crisis 

92BA12I2B Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA 
in Macedonian 4 Jul 92 p 11 

(Article by Erol Rizaov: “Is the Government Falling?”] 

[Text] After an exceptionally significant parliamentary 
session that dealt with their greatest, age-old historical 
interests, the citizens of Macedonia expected of their 
representatives a dignified debate and a response to 
Europe for the great injustice inflicted on them. For 
three full days, instead of the incentive to endure, 
instead of a return to self-reliance, and instead of 
rejecting the shock that was triggered by that part of the 
EC declaration on changing the name, the Macedonian 
citizens were exposed to new disappointments, even 
worse than the EC declaration, inflicted by their own 
people, people in whom they believed and for whom they 
had voted. 

Everyone in the Republic witnessed the primitive 
internal party heartbreaks and abuses. Most assem¬ 
blymen ignored the interests of their people. Honor was 
saved by only a few assemblymen, who represented all 
political parties, a factor that cannot fail to please us. 

Meanwhile, one statement by a parliamentary 
spokesman opened a new dimension that is yet to 
preoccupy parliament. Blaze Ristovski, the deputy prime 
minister, publicly stated that the team of Mr. Kljusev’s 
experts had fallen into a profound crisis. The extremely 
party-oriented debate by the “nonparty” deputy prime 
minister was naturally the expected consequence of the 
series of errors made by the Macedonian Government. 
Masterfully concealing his personal motivations, the 
deputy prime minister could only openly confirm that, in 
the eyes of the Macedonian citizens, the government had 
totally lost its reputation and authority. One could 
clearly see the internal quarrels, party biases, long-term 
interparty imputed accusations, and personal intoler¬ 
ances and hypocritical relations among ministers. 
Regardless of how good the members of an orchestra 


44 


YUGOSLAVIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


may be, an orchestra that does not play in tune and has 
a poor conductor can play no tune other than that of 
economic chaos, mass disregard of the laws and the 
Constitution, which encompasses the government itself, 
a legalized black market, the blossoming of bribery and 
corruption, the compromising of people, helplessness, a 
lack of resolve, and political subservience. In practical 
terms, the statement by Deputy Prime Minister 
Ristovski does not include even a single argument in 
defense of the government. 

Any more serious study of the work of the government 
would prove that, under circumstances in which not a 
single party enjoys a parliamentary majority, despite 
high sldlls and competence, this composition of experts 
was unable to formulate even a single significant project 
that would help it earn points. 

Conversely, with each public statement made by the 
prime minister or by individual ministers, the govern¬ 
ment kept losing its reputation, eventually becoming 
totally compromised. We know that throughout the 
world governments consisting of experts are most firmly 
submitting draft bills and laws to the various parliaments 
(wherever there is no majority party) that could cause 
them to resign. In such cases, the parliament members 
are invariably more concerned with the survival of the 
government than are the prime ministers and the minis¬ 
ters. In our country, it was the opposite that happened. 
We acquired a government that is extremely sensitive to 
any kind of party or public criticism. It is a government 
that is always afraid of losing its positions, forgetting that 
it must do what it is most capable of doing. Expertise and 
doctorates vanish when confronting the various party 
and personal interests. Hence, the statement by Deputy 
Prime Minister Ristovski, although made for party rea¬ 
sons, merely proves that it is time for that government to 
go away. 

In a multiparty parliament, the fall of a government is 
nothing other than proof that democracy exists in that 
country. Any reference to the difficult situation, the 
international surrounding, internal conditions, and the 
need to complete significant projects under way is 
merely an effort to defend what is indefensible. It is a 
common belief in the Republic that it would be a good 
thing for that government to resign as soon as possible, 
and, as for the few ministers who do not deserve such an 
end, let the new prime minister-designate take care of 
them, as is being done throughout the world. 

Turning a change of government into a national tragedy 
is counterproductive because it also blocks the way to 
new elections. Changes made in a legal and democratic 
way would only indicate that one cannot remain in 
power in a democratic society without showing results. 
The government crisis and the eventual fall of the 
government will make it possible to deal in an entirely 
new way with matters that brook no delay, and to take 
new, concrete steps that will be visible to the Mace¬ 
donian citizens. Changes in the Eastern countries and 
the rich experience of the West clearly prove that voting 


lack of confidence in a government or an individual 
minister regularly trigger three days of excitement and 
commentaries in the mass media, and that, immediately 
afterwards, preparations are made to choose a new prime 
minister, who would form his own cabinet. It is this 
constant process that actually becomes the most signifi¬ 
cant motive and force for faster development and for a 
constant feeling of responsibility, accountability, and 
respect for a law-governed state, as well as the most 
powerful booster of democratic processes. It is totally 
logical and normal in a democratic society for parlia¬ 
ment to express its confidence or lack of confidence in 
the government. It is illogical when opposition in parlia¬ 
ment or the party that proclaims itself to be in opposi¬ 
tion tries to keep the government in power, while that 
opposition is, in general, dissatisfied with the condition 
in the state. Could such an absurdity happen to us? Why 
not? Here anything is possible. 

Dilemma Continues 

92BA1212C Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA 
in Macedonian 4 Jul 92 p 13 

[Article by Georgi Ajanovski: “Macedonia, What 
Now?”] 

[Text] After skillfully avoiding various obstacles, will 
Macedonia now let itself be involved in a situation from 
which it will never be able to stand up on its own two feet 
and speak in its own name and in the name of its people? 

The present rejection of the name of Macedonia by 
Europe is compared by some to the time of the Balkan 
Wars and the tearing up of Macedonian territory, as well 
as the Bulgarian attempt in World War II to occupy all of 
Macedonia, protected by the fascist shield. In both cases, 
it was actually a question of the overall and definitive 
destruction of the Macedonian name and Macedonian 
national identity. 

The difference lies in the fact that this time the country 
will be allowed “democratically” and generously to 
retain its territory and state provided it abandon its 
name and Macedonia never appear on maps and as part 
of human civilization, that there would no longer be any 
Macedonian people, language, or state but some kind of 
new, rechristened nation, with a fabricated language, a 
recently created state, something without historical 
roots, granted an existence by European kindness and 
interests. 

In other words, this means accepting that, in this Balkan 
area, along the Vardar and the lakes, there had been a 
nameless people who lived for centuries, participated in 
purposeless uprisings and rebellions, and had its own 
legends and songs not borrowed from anyone; that, in 
the antifascist struggle, a nameless nation had partici¬ 
pated extensively on the side of the allies, with its 
100,000-strong army, not knowing why it fought; that 
there was no ASNOM [Anti-Fascist Assembly of Peo¬ 
ple’s Liberation of Macedonia], with all its accomplish¬ 
ments; that, at that all-national session, there were no 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


YUGOSLAVIA 


45 


allied missions; and that, in general, all postwar state 
documents and international meetings dealt with a 
nameless state. And that the U.S. President George Bush 
and his Ambassador Zimmerman had not mentioned the 
name of the Republic of Macedonia in their recent 
written addresses to President Gligorov. 

In those circumstances, without getting into the argu¬ 
ment as to whether Macedonia and its leadership did 
everything necessary to ensure its international recogni¬ 
tion and whether errors were made in that area, let us 
mention one extant, irrefutable fact: Europe does not say 
a single word about Macedonia’s democratic state 
system, and the only thing it objects to is the use of the 
name “Macedonia.” Conversely, it is prepared to recog¬ 
nize it as a state under a different name and even to 
guarantee the inviolability of its borders. The only pre¬ 
requisite is for Macedonia to change its name; then it 
would become democratic, European, and internation¬ 
ally recognized, and Greece would be prepared to help 
and support it most extensively! 

Does this mean that the failure of Macedonian foreign 
policy is its unpreparedness to engage in talks about the 
Macedonian name? 

It would be truly pretentious to claim that some errors 
and omissions were not committed in foreign policy 
activities, or, for example, that, in this deliberation, it 
was only a narrow range of people who were included, 
that President Gligorov excessively trusted the advice 
and flattery of his foreign interlocutors, and that he did 
not And it necessary, in the face of a most important 
international meeting, to bring together most influential 
political parties and groups and thus develop a unified 
acceptable platform the way Mitsotakis did for Greece, 
that the present Ministry of Foreign Affairs is incapable 
of engaging in more delicate types of activities, and so 
on. 

You will agree, however, that none of this was of decisive 
influence concerning the nature of the real question of 
accepting the name of Macedonia. In that matter, the 
Macedonian leadership was categorical: discussions 
about anything but not about the name! 

Could this, too, have been a mistake? 

In the interest of truth, we should say that, until the last 
meeting of the EC, no single political party in Macedonia 
publicly stated its readiness to adopt a different name, 
althou^ isolated statements are now being made that 
one could have and should have discussed the question 
of the name, particularly the resolutions that included 
the name of Macedonia. However, it would have been 
more honest to mention this at that time and to publicly 
defend such positions. 

We know that the VMRQ-DPMNE [Internal Mace¬ 
donian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party 
for Macedonian National Unity], which most violently 
attacked the policies of the Macedonian leadership and 
called for its resignation, still has no specific platform on 


this issue. Other than a few assemblymen belonging to 
the highest party leadership who supported the European 
declaration, believing that Macedonia does not deserve 
to be internationally recognized as a state because it 
allegedly is not democratically constituted (!), the largest 
number of participants in the parliamentary debate had 
no problem concerning the unchangeability of the name 
of Macedonia. Nonetheless, it would have been good for 
that party to express a firmer view as to whether it would 
accept the international recognition of Macedonia under 
a different name. Because it is against it, its intentions 
become truly unclear. 

In any case, the basic question may be reduced to the 
following: Will Macedonia agree to exist under a dif¬ 
ferent name, or will it succeed in surviving with its 
age-old name? 

To answer yes to the first question would be the simplest 
and the easiest. Greece and some of our other neighbors 
would applaud it, and the EC would breathe more easily. 

Naturally, defending one’s name involves risks and 
uncertainties. In the worst case, it means a readiness to 
withstand strong pressure and eventual political and 
economic blockades and isolation, the purpose of which 
would be to further impoverish this nation, to provoke a 
crisis and destabilization, to trigger internal dissension, 
and then to find a political group or party that, as it came 
to power, agreed to a change in name. This would 
achieve the objectives of all those who, for quite some 
time, have wanted to see Macedonia shaky, renamed, 
and deprived of its national identity. 

After all of the road hazards, which it avoided so 
skillfully, will Macedonia allow itself to be involved in a 
situation from which it will never be able to stand up on 
its own two feet and speak in its own name and in the 
name of its people? 

Power Struggle 

92BA1212D Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA 
in Macedonian 4 Jul 92 p 14 

[Article by Ljube Profiloski: “Stability of the State on 
Trial”] 

[Text] This is a time when Macedonia and its stability 
and political cohesion are on trial, and it is our attitude 
that will determine the attitude that will be adopted by the 
EC and the rest of the world concerning our international 
recognition. Political quarrels are being impatiently 
awaited by our neighbors and may presage misfortunes. 

Two days ago, a high diplomat from the U.S. Embassy in 
Belgrade traveled incognito to Macedonia. He estab¬ 
lished contacts exclusively with the leaders of some 
parties considered by the Americans to constitute a 
relevant force on which they could rely. He avoided the 
state leadership, which was indirectly informed of his 
arrival. This visit by the U.S. diplomat is assessed in the 
Republic’s political circles as an attempt by this now 


46 


YUGOSLAVIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


exclusive superpower to “get a sense” of the deployment 
and correlation of political forces in Macedonia, and to 
rate the stability of the system and the current state 
leadership, and the possibility of supporting new polit¬ 
ical forces. 

This is only one of the efforts that will present great 
temptations to Macedonia, following the latest declara¬ 
tion of the EC, according to which recognition is based 
on changing its name. We have already witnessed a 
variety of examples of sounding out and even influ¬ 
encing the mood of the population and the stability not 
only of the leadership but also of the state. Efforts are 
thus being made to create a chaotic atmosphere of panic, 
from the simple example in Ohrid, where the assembly 
members were falsely threatened with a bomb in their 
building, to the euphoric demands by the National Party 
in the Macedonian Assembly, calling for the resignation 
of the government. 

Two Alternatives 

With the passing of time since the Lisbon summit, 
increasing emphasis is being placed on a statement 
suggesting that Europe was playing dirty games with 
Macedonia and that we apparently easily fell for them. 
The EC, taking into consideration the interests of Greece 
as one of its members, is seeking the ways and means for 
their verification, without concealing the fact that it 
would also like to talk to Macedonian forces and political 
parties that may be prepared to accept other alternatives, 
including a discussion about changing the name. It is 
normal for the Community to make use of its power in 
promoting a change in the current regime in Macedonia 
and replacing the present leadership, which firmly 
defended the name, rather than standing firmly by its 
decision not to acknowledge Macedonia by that name. 

Therefore, Macedonia would then become a real testing 
ground for the political options of the EC. A variety of 
experiments could be expected, based on the correlation 
among domestic political forces and the political unity 
within the Republic. Because Europe is unwilling to rely 
on the current regime in Macedonia, which is unwilling 
to discuss any change of name, there are those who 
believe that, if other forces and parties prepared to do so 
were to appear, it would do everything possible to 
promote a change in the present government. This even 
involves unannounced economic blockades, which 
would trigger social tension among the population and a 
chaotic situation in which conditions for undermining 
the regime could easily be created. Obviously, the most 
agreeable would be the parties that have already let it be 
known that one could discuss a name change. It is such 
parties and forces that would enjoy the support of the 
EC. 

This is a time when Macedonia and its stability and 
political cohesion are being tested, and it is our attitude 
that will determine the attitude that is to be adopted by 
the EC and the world at lai^e on the subject of our 
international recognition. Meanwhile, at least so far. 


there is an indication that individual forces and parties 
in Macedonia are swallowing the bait of the EC. The 
moment the Lisbon declaration v/as made public, it was 
the national parties that particularly displayed their 
great aspiration for power and their desire to assume it at 
any cost, at the expense of the national and state inter¬ 
ests, which was least expected of them. A public confer¬ 
ence was immediately organized (VMRO-DPMNE 
[Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization- 
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and 
MAAK [All-Macedonian Action]), at which the EC dec¬ 
laration was used as the pretext for gross attacks on the 
state leadership, demands for a change in government, 
and efforts to describe it as incapable, manipulative, 
pro-Yugoslav and, particularly, neocommunist, which 
especially pleases Europe. The attacks on and abuse of 
the state leadership continued ever more intensively at 
the parliamentary sessions also, the main topic of which 
was the Lisbon declaration. 

Power Struggle 

Under different circumstances, it would be entirely 
proper, normal, and democratic for any mistake made by 
the government and the leadership to be attacked by the 
opposition, and for the government to fall. A variety of 
games and hints and a lack of mercy are allowed. The 
struggle for power is governed by some rules, except that 
of forgiving the enemy. However, under circumstances 
in which Macedonia is facing fatal issues and when the 
citizens are extremely concerned about their future, 
expecting a political consensus on the most important 
national issues, the behavior of the national parties and 
other parties and political forces not represented in 
parliament is extremely symptomatic. This suits 
Greece’s interests, which are to destabilize Macedonia 
and its deletion from the political maps. These political 
forces have recently abandoned the national interests 
and are using the difficult situation of the state to assume 
power. What they are currently doing violates the stipu¬ 
lations of their programs, the pledges of the party lead¬ 
ership, and, to an even greater extent, the commitment 
of their memberships to defend Macedonian national 
and state interests. 

Parliament proved to be less mature than the individual 
citizens. The big question is whether individual repre¬ 
sentatives are expressing the thoughts of their electorate, 
of the members of their parties and their sympathizers, 
or whether these are their personal ideas and views, 
dictated by personal and narrow party interests. A 
number of members of parliament, particularly from the 
VMRO-DPMNE, have expressed a series of ideas that 
were untrue and disinformative and made extremely 
hypocritical turnarounds that conflicted with the pro¬ 
grammatic stipulations and commitments of their par¬ 
ties. In turn, the demand for the resignation of ^ro 
Gligorov, the president of the Republic, could also be 
interpreted as a call for an illegal putsch in the Republic. 

Furthermore, the fact that the representatives recently 
rejected the motion of elections ahead of schedule is a 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


YUGOSLAVU 


47 


question to be updated because, in a country that claims 
to support democratic principles, an election is the only 
legal institution on which power can be based. It is only 
the citizens, through elections, who will decide to which 
party to give their trust. Any other attempt at over^ 
throwing the government is, in practical terms, a call for 
rebellion and totalitarianism. 

Our neighbors, not only in the south and the north but 
on all four sides, are impatiently awaiting political 
developments in Macedonia and, regardless of the Euro¬ 
pean stipulations of guaranteeing territorial integrity to 
all countries, this could bode ill for the future. Political 
unity and partnership and tolerance among parties are 
what Macedonia most needs today. 

EC Decision on Macedonia Affects World Bodies 

92BAI2IIA Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA 
in Macedonian 4 Jul 92 p 13 

[Article by Josif Dzockov: “Closed Doors of the Inter¬ 
national Institutions; The Economic Aspects of the Non¬ 
recognition of Macedonia**] 

[Text] Membership in the International Monetary Fund 
[IMF], for which acceptance into the United Nations is a 
condition, opens broad opportunities for the entrance of 
capital into the Republic. The denar is not stable, and 
the trade deficit cannot be covered without financial 
assistance from outside. Will the already approved funds 
for building the road network in the Republic and for 
developing OKhlS [Skopje Organic Chemicals Plant] 
and the **Tito"" Metals Plant be lost? 

The recognition of nationhood or international legal 
existence is a political act. There is no argument here. In 
the meantime, every nonrecognition bears with it many 
repercussions with political and economic aspects. The 
Republic of Macedonia at this moment is in a position to 
feel these consequences. How long they will last and what 
they will bring to the former republic of Yugoslavia is 
even hard to imagine. 

However, one thing is sure: The economic problems with 
which Macedonia will be faced in the near future, if 
recognition of the country does not come, will have 
extremely negative implications on the economy and the 
development of the entire economy. The extremely stub¬ 
born behavior of our northern neighbor in its unscrupu¬ 
lous battle to keep the Republic from being recognized, 
with its amazing position in the European Community 
that the name be changed, is probably aimed in these 
directions. It is becoming clear that nonrecognition and, 
with it, economic impoverishment is part of the strategy 
that has the ultimate goal of some kind of forced con¬ 
federation, or, in the worst case, a dismembering of the 
Republic. 

Not paying attention to such irrational ideas, the 
Republic has to find strengths right now, to find the true 
solution to overcome the difficulties; otherwise, nothing 
will come of the situation. 


There is no question that a good part of the problems 
with which the Republic is faced results from our non¬ 
recognition, especially the economic ones. The act of 
recognition opens all of the doors of the international 
community, less as a privilege than as an opportunity to 
appear in the international political system as a regular 
partner for whom, certainly, all rights and obligations 
that derive from legal existence in an international 
framework will be in force. 

Acceptance into the UN will create all of the precondi¬ 
tions for membership in a large number of international 
institutions, irrespective of whether they are political or 
economic. If we leave aside the political ones, which 
undoubtedly are significant and a matter that surely will 
be solved in the highest agencies of the Republic on the 
basis of the interests of the citizens and the state, which, 
surely, is a subject that needs to be discussed separately, 
the economic ones are a necessity without which hardly 
any country could conceive of its existence and develop¬ 
ment. In conditions where the world economy recognizes 
borders less and less and profit more and more, any 
economic barriers could be fatal, even for countries 
much more developed than ours. 


The Main Word Concerning the IMF 

In the first place, membership in the United Nations 
provides access to the IMF. The fact is that there is no 
world monetary and financial institution that will permit 
itself the luxury of carrying out any deal with financial 
assistance or credit for participating in improving any 
financial conditions and financing development, if, at 
the same time, it does not have the approval of the IMF, 
which is a “unique** institution of this type in the world. 
It is not by accident that many people call the IMF a 
world financial policeman. Membership in the IMF 
opens access to the treasures of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD], the Euro¬ 
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and 
many other financial institutions, the basic goal of which 
is investment of capital. There is no doubt that these 
institutions are based on profit, and it would be an 
illusion for us to expect that mem^rship alone will bring 
a cup of dollars. However, on the other hand, it is 
certainly possible to expect that the financial world will 
have sympathy for us, knowing the potentials the 
Republic has at its disposal. 

The economy of Macedonia has already for a long time 
been feeling starved for additional capital and fresh 
money. There will be no development if it is not sup¬ 
ported by additional accumulation of capital. In partic¬ 
ular, we will not have development in conditions of an 
exhausted economy, begun by the wars and blockades 
that have happened to us in this region and in which 
Macedonia did not have any direct participation. 

The goal of creating a stable currency understands that 
this relies on currency reserves. These reserves most 
often are provided from one*s own resources, but also 



48 


YUGOSLAVIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


from significant funds that come just from these inter¬ 
national institutions. Our republic does not have enough 
cuirency reserves, and there are no conditions to acquire 
them from any of the financial institutions, again 
because of nonrecognition. Therefore, the monetary 
course is precisely one of the anchors in the anti- 
inflationary program of the government, but not the 
principle one. The absence of adequate currency reserves 
does not permit the national bank to support the stability 
of the denar with reserves at the necessary moment. 

Another problem just as significant is the trade deficit 
our country has with the world. How the proposed 
$200-million trade deficit will be covered is probably 
cl^r to few p^ple. Without financial injection, this is 
simply impossible. Actually, it is possible to expect that 
import of the things that are truly not a necessity may be 
reduced, but it is a drop in the sea if we consider that the 
greatest share of the funds goes to acquire oil, for which, 
at least at this moment, there is no substitute and with 
which our republic is not otherwise provided. At the 
same time, one must not forget that the greatest part of 
our economy is import-dependent, and any restriction 
threatens to stop the flow of production, which would 
have unforeseen consequences. 

Negotiations With Whom? 

The nonrecognition of the Republic also opens the 
problem in the area of the quotas for products the 
countries, especially the developed ones, receive from 
our manufacturers. These quotas, which the countries set 
up, represent a good opportunity for increasing the 
competitiveness of our products in these countries 
because ever^dhing that is ordered in the quotas is not 
subject to duties. Up to now, we have really been dragged 
along into the quotas that related to the former Yugo¬ 
slavia, with the treaties it concluded with these coun¬ 
tries. What will happen next year is more unknown. A 
similar situation obtains in the case of the crucial matter 
of the acquisition of a special status in exporting to 
certain countries. As an unrecognized international 
entity, when the contracts with the former Yugoslavia 
stop being in effect, the question is, with whom will the 
countries negotiate when we are looking for the corre¬ 
sponding quotas or favored trade. 

No less significant is our lack of membership in GATT 
and GATS [expansion unknown], when the general con¬ 
ditions of trade in commodities and rendering services 
are being determined. We remain handicapped in con¬ 
ditions where these international institutions already 
extensively discuss the rules of the game in which we 
obviously, at least at this moment, are only spectators. 

Although even more things of this kind can be enumer¬ 
ated, we will mention only the international organiza¬ 
tions and associations in which the so-called TIR [Inter¬ 
national Transport of Goods by Road] car networks are 
allocated in international highway transport and in rail¬ 
road transport, if, along with the no less essential code of 
the products our republic sends abroad, the computer 


symbol and number 860 are still being printed, a sign 
that the commodity came from Yugoslavia. To acquire 
our own Macedonian symbol and number, we need to be 
a member of the international association that assigns 
them. 

The World Bank Is Silent 

The postponement of the recognition of the Republic, 
when international financial institutions are concerned, 
causes us direct damage. The section of highway that 
passes through our Republic that had to be financed with 
international funds is blocked. In question were $22 
million, which were to finance the completion of the 
highway to the border with Greece. Now there is no one 
with whom to negotiate, if we bear in mind that we are 
still not recognized internationally. Even more, the 
banking institutions in the world owe us $5 million for 
the section up to Gradsko that has already been built, 
which, although the work is completed, cannot be 
obtained because the treaty was made with former 
Yugoslavia. 

The situation is the same with respect to the plan for 
consolidation of 10 enterprises of former Yugoslavia, 
which included two of ours: OKhlS and the “Tito” 
Metals Plant. The IBRD will finance, with its capital, the 
development of the enterprises. According to the infor¬ 
mation we received in OKhlS, obviously nothing came 
of this. On the basis of the treaty of the former Federal 
Executive Council, they told us in OKhlS that an English 
company was to come and, according to the examination 
of the situation, to propose a program that will finance 
this bank. The first contacts were reestablished, and the 
arrival of the representatives of this company was set up. 
However, the events obviously influenced the stopping 
of any collaboration. 

This is the situation. In essence, not at all rosy. Indeed, 
this is illustrated quite clearly in the remarks of the 
president of the Republic of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, 
with respect to the Declaration of the Lisbon Session of 
the European Community. 

“In practice, this is a strong blow against us. We are 
deeply aware of what the uncertainty of a continuing 
postponement of recognition on the part of the EC would 
mean: Not only is our inclusion in the international 
community, in international political, economic, and 
financial institutions, blocked, but also there is a threat 
of extreme economic impoverishment, political uncer¬ 
tainty, and the conditions for stimulating the known 
aspirations of Macedonia’s neighbors.” 

A sufficient commentary on the situation in which 
Macedonia finds itself because of the postponement of 
its recognition as an international legal entity. 

Data on Refugees in Macedonia Published 

92P20374A 

[Editorial Report] Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian on 4 
August on page 7 publishes three short articles on 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


YUGOSLAVIA 


49 


refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina who have fled to 
Macedonia. According to the secretary of the Mace¬ 
donian Red Cross, Ivan Narasanov, refugees began 
arriving in April and now number about 31,000. In 
addition to money from the Republic’s budget and local 
assistance, the Red Cross has received help from the UN 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Red 
Crescent organization in Turkey, the German Red Cross, 
especially its branch in Stuttgart, and the international 
humanitarian organization Caritas. 

Interviews with Red Cross workers and inhabitants of 
Skopje reveal disagreement over the number of the 
refugees. Velimir Stojanovski, manager of the temporary 
refugee camp at Vodno, said as many as 60,000 have 
come to Macedonia. Stojanovski outlined conditions at 
his camp—only 110 beds for 258 children, 37 infants 
under age one, and at least five pregnant women—^but 
indicated that more serious problems such as prostitu¬ 
tion and illegal trade in hard currency had emerged at 
other camps because of the impoverishment of the 
refugees. He estimated the daily cost for caring for one 
refugee at 2,890 denars, of which the Republic budget 
provides 610. A local resident, Nedjib Omerovski, was 
supplying milk for the children out of his own pocket and 
a calf for a Muslim holiday. Stoyanovski expressed his 
gratitude to Bulgaria for allowing departing refugees to 
transit Bulgaria but hoped that Bulgaria would accept 
refugees, as well. The refugees have been staying prima¬ 
rily in the Skopje region. Although the Macedonian 
people have been generous in sheltering refugees, the 
Republic’s growing unemployment and uneasiness over 
its own ethnic and religious diversity has begun to cause 
some misgivings regarding the reception of additional 
refugees. 

Views of Montenegrin Opposition on Cosic 

92BA1305B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 
30Jul92p9 

[Article by Z. Ivanovic: “Conversation With the Presi¬ 
dent and the Gentleman”] 

[Text] The general assessment that Cosic’s courting of 
Montenegro has ended triumphantly, that it has 
exceeded not only the expectations of the political 
public, but even of the president of the FRY [Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia] himself, implies that his 
meeting with the leaders of the Montenegrin opposition 
also went perfectly. Perhaps this was affected by the fact 
that President Cosic first discussed all the relevant issues 
and reached agreement with “those who hold the greatest 
responsibility,” the current government leadership of 
Montenegro. By and large, the preparation, course, and 
results of the talks with the opposition left the impres¬ 
sion that the president was acting more out of a desire to 
“do something to please the opposition” than out of the 
belief that these meetings would bring anything new and 
significant. 


Dr, Novak Kilibarda, president of the People’s Party, 
who took part in these talks, does not conceal his surprise 
at the fact that President Cosic received not only repre¬ 
sentatives of the parliamentai 7 opposition, but also 
certain parties outside the parliament. 1 would say that 
without any sound criterion sufficient attention was not 
paid to the parliamentary opposition, Kilibarda says. 

What Needs To Be Cleared Up 

Representatives of the People’s Party, he says, devoted 
most time in the talks with the S^Y president to 
preparation of the new democratic elections. 

“The People’s Party was unreservedly disposed to talk to 
Mr. Cosic, because he is the president of a state formed 
according to our party’s conception. We pointed out to 
him certain intolerable actions that have been under¬ 
taken here on Montenegrin soil,” Dr. Kilibarda goes on 
to say. “First of all, the Assembly decision to adopt a law 
whereby deputy caucuses obtain authority to conduct a 
policy independent of the policy of the party they repre¬ 
sent. We called his attention to the fact that POBJEDA 
and the TV are in the hands of the state, that the 
incumbent party has seized and continued to dispose of 
the property of the former SAWP [Socialist Alliance of 
Working People], and that there are many other things 
which first need to be cleared up if the upcoming 
elections are to be democratic. In answer to Mr. Cosic’s 
question as to why the People’s Party did not take part in 
the elections when it welcomed the formation of the 
FRY, I answered: If the last elections had been demo¬ 
cratic, new ones would not have been scheduled.” 

In answer to the question how much he believes in the 
good intentions of President Cosic after these talks and 
does he suspect that he will favor someone, Dr. Kilibarda 
answered: “As a writer and an intelligent man, Dobrica 
Cosic has every reason to fight for democratic elections. 
I think that certain of his deep-seated ideological beliefs, 
of which we must all be aware, ought not to outweigh the 
rational side of his personality.” 

We Are Not Satisfied at All 

By contrast with the “Populists,” most of the conversa¬ 
tion between President Cosic and Zarko Rakcevic, 
leader of the Reform Social Democratic Party (who was 
accompanied by Malisa Marovic), was devoted to the 
status of Montenegro, to its relationship with Serbia and 
with the other republics of the former Yugoslavia. 

“We openly communicated our views to Mr. Cosic, not 
President Cosic (because we do not recognize the legiti¬ 
macy of that state): A sovereign Montenegro, recognition 
of the other republics of the former Yugoslavia, reinte¬ 
gration on that space (through economic union as a 
beginning), and then demilitarization of Montenegro, 
along with the position that the federal form of arrange¬ 
ment, because of great differences in size and develop¬ 
ment of‘two eyes in the head,’ cannot bring Montene^o 
equality,” says Zarko Rakcevic, M.A. “Mr. Cosic replied 
that he did not believe in reintegration on the space of 



JPRS-EER-92-109 

50 YUGOSLAVIA 18 August 1992 


the former Yugoslavia in the near future, that confeder¬ 
ation was a utopia, and he evaded the question of 
sovereignty, observing that the citizens of Montenegro, 
according to his information, had expressed in a plebi¬ 
scite their convincing desire to live in the new state with 
Serbia. We called the attention of Mr. Cosic to the fact 
that Montenegrin statehood has not been recognized as 
well as to the fact that 61 percent of the inhabitants of 
Montenegro declared themselves to be Montenegrins in 
the census could bring about tragic differences between 
Serbia and Montenegro, to which Cosic responded: ‘Let 
people be what they are.’” 

Haran Hadzic, leader of the SDA [Democratic Action 
Party] for Montenegro, says that they devoted most of 
the time in the talks with Mr. Cosic to the position of 
Muslims in Montenegro and to the SFRY, and that “we 
are not satisfied in the least” with the outcome of the 
talks. 

“It is true that we did not expect much from them, but 
we wanted to prove that we are of goodwill and our 
intention to openly speak about the position of Muslims 
and about their increasingly unenviable status on the 
territory of northern Montenegro,” Hadzic said. “We 
put a number of questions to Mr. Cosic related to 
Muslim mistrust of the present government, to disrup¬ 
tion of civil peace by numerous paramilitary formations, 
to their disarmament, to the difference between the 
Sandzak and the Serbian krajinas.... We asked Cosic 
what he had done toward the return of the 60,000 
Muslims, the number that has fled from the territory of 
the FRY, to their homes? However, Mr. Cosic gave us no 
specific answer to any of these questions. He merely 
observed that we do not look at things straight and he 
shared with us a few well-known phrases about how he 
would do everything, that we can be certain that we will 
be equal, and so on.” 

Hadzic added in the end that he would soon be 
informing the public more extensively about everything, 
but that the general assessment that good intentions had 
been shown by only one side still stands. 

Darmanovic Describes Talks With President 
Cosic 

92BA1305G Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 
30Jul92p9 


[Article by D. Vucinic: “A Great Deal of Democratic 
Rhetoric”] 

[Text] Srdjan Darmanovic, the party’s vice president, 
talked with Cosic on behalf of the Socialist Party of 
Montenegro. 

“I presented to President Cosic,” he said, “the views of 
the Socialist Party of Montenegro, which are already 
fairly well-known. For example, that we do not consider 
the March referendum on the status of Montenegro as a 
state to have been democratic because a respectable 


portion of the electorate boycotted it and also because 
the referendum question was ‘pythian,’ that is, vague and 
ambiguous. 

“We also consider the last federal elections and the 
bodies that emerged from them illegitimate, and that 
also applies to the office of Mr. Cosic, although, of 
course, we do not underestimate the individual role both 
of Mr. Cosic and also, if not more, of Mr. Panic insofar 
as they are advocating peace, removal of the sanctions, 
and democratic change, above all a change of the regime. 

“The Socialist Party of Montenegro for all those reasons 
considers the upcoming elections necessary, but it will 
take part in them only if the conditions are democratic 
and fair. The new election law does not in and of itself 
guarantee certain conditions which are necessary: a 
change in the editorial policy and personnel in the public 
media, disarmament of the citizens illegally armed by 
political parties, recovery of the property of the former 
Montenegrin LC [League of Communists] from the 
incumbent party, a guarantee that the police will not be 
used to meet the needs of incumbent parties, and so on. 

“Mr. Cosic said,” Darmanovic continued, “that there is 
a high degree of agreement on the demand for demo¬ 
cratic change, although he said—as he usually says—that 
his power is limited. 

“It is clear that Mr. Cosic considers the question of the 
state of Montenegro mostly settled. He even prefers to 
use the term ‘union,’ which in my opinion could be the 
source of serious conflicts unless people realize that the 
March referendum did not close that issue. Mr. Cosic is 
full of democratic rhetoric, but his speech, say, in Niksic, 
was very symptomatic, if not highly dangerous. To refer 
to the entire world community as an enemy which has 
malicious intentions toward us is unwise to say the least. 
Nor, finally, is it true. That approach certainly does not 
lead to removal of the sanctions,” Srdjan Darmanovic 
judges. 

Russian Opposition Leader Against Sanctions 

92BA1304A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jul 92 
pp 50-53 

[Interview with Russian opposition figure Eduard 
Volodin by Milivoje Glisic; date and place not given: 
“Russian People Against Sanctions”] 

[Text] The unified opposition has been on Serbians side 
from the beginnings says the former university professor, 
now a journalist We have succeeded in telling the truth to 
the Russian people, while in parliament the opposition has 
done everything possible to minimize the blow inflicted on 
Yugoslavia by the Yeltsin and Gaydar government 

The subject: Serbs and Russians. Our guest and discus¬ 
sion partner, Eduard Fedorovich Volodin, introduces 
himself as follows: Russian, bom in 1939, has a daughter 
and a grandson, no police record, has not held any 



JPRS-EER.92-109 
18 Angnst 1992 


YUGOSLAVIA 


51 


positions of power, has received no state or government 
awards; graduated from Moscow State University, 
worked at institutes at the University and on the Presi¬ 
dency of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a doctor of 
philosophy and university professor, and since 1990, 
when perestroyka “finally led to a red-hot situation,” a 
political commentator for the newspaper 
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. “Although my beard is 
gray,” he says, “I am, as you see, a young journalist.” 
That is all. 

That is not all, however. At the moment, Volodin is the 
deputy chairman of the Coordinating Committee of the 
Union of Patriotic Forces of Russia, and thus the num¬ 
ber-two man in the Russian unified opposition. 

Eduard Volodin willingly and openly responds to even 
the most delicate questions. 

[Glisic] The Serbs are disappointed; the majority of them 
feel that the Russians, by agreeing to the sanctions 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, have not 
behaved amicably. 

[Volodin] I will answer you like this: The day after the 
current, provisional government of Russia voted on the 
Security Council for sanctions against Yugoslavia, I 
wrote an article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA that bepn 
with the words, “Something inconceivable is happening. 
Anti-Russian demonstrations are taking place in front of 
the Russian embassy in Belgrade. But I, as a Russian, 
agree with them. For the first time in history, the 
Russian Government is betraying its Orthodox brothers 
in the Balkans. 1 hope that the people in Montenegro and 
Serbia realize that this is being done by the traitorous 
government of Yeltsin and Gaydar, and not by the 
Russian people.” 

That was also the position of the Russian unified oppo¬ 
sition. I hope that it is known in Yugoslavia, and 
especially in Serbia, that the unified opposition has been 
on Serbia’s side from the beginning. We have succeeded 
in telling the truth to the Russian people, while in 
parliament the opposition has done everything possible 
to minimize the blow inflicted on Yugoslavia by the 
provisional Yeltsin and Gaydar government. Naturally, 
this does not mean that 1 do not also blame myself for the 
vote on sanctions. The responsibility is borne by 
everyone, but the details about which I am speaking 
should be clear to the Serbs. 

[Glisic] A secondary question: Why do you always refer 
to the Yeltsin government as provisional? 

[Volodin] Some newspapers in Russia are even 
harsher—^they talk about Yeltsin’s occupation govern¬ 
ment. You see, I use a milder term. Let me explain: The 
opposition feels that neither Yeltsin nor his government 
wiU be able to survive their entire mandate for leading 
Russia. An opposition council adopted a practical reso¬ 
lution in June to call for a special session of the Congress 
of Soviets at which Yeltsin would be stripped of his 
extraordinary powers. His government will be forced to 


resign, and a pvemment of national confidence and 
national salvation will be formed, 

[Glisic] Explaining the decision to support sanctions, 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev said that 
interests outweigh emotions and traditions in politics. 

[Volodin] I have a very low view of Minister Kozyrev’s 
intellectual abilities, and that means that I also have a 
very low view of his political assessments. Emotions 
always influence political decisions, and sometimes they 
even determine the course of political events. For 
example, during the Balkan war in 1877-78, Russia was 
not motivated by any economic interests; that was a war 
of Russian feelings. As a scholar, I know how Russian 
villages far-removed from politics reacted during that 
time. If a volunteer left the village—and there were many 
volunteers—the village authorities would resolve to sup¬ 
port his family at their expense, and in the event of 
injury or death they would help the widow or family, 
while the church blessed these actions. That was moti¬ 
vated by emotion. 

And as far as Russia’s political interests are concerned, 
here too Kozyrev is at a schoolboy level. Besides Russia’s 
economic interests in the Balkans, there are also geopo¬ 
litical interests. Russia’s strategic presence in the Bal¬ 
kans means the stability of its southwestern borders, 
while at the same time this allows it to monitor the 
situation along the Black Sea coast more safely. This also 
explains the presence of the Russian fleet in the Black 
Sea. The betrayal of Serbia and Montenegro destroys our 
geopolitical position in the Balkans, in the Adriatic, 
Black, and Mediterranean Seas. I assume that you know 
that Russia lost part of its strategic presence in the 
Mediterranean and in the Balkans when it betrayed the 
Arab world in the Middle East. The current action is 
rendering our influence, our interests, and our actions in 
this part of the world meaningless. In effect, we have 
strategically weakened our position on our southwestern 
borders, and for this reason I ask: What kind of politi¬ 
cian is Kozyrev? After decisions such as these, enormous 
efforts will be necessary in order for us to return to the 
Balkans and Mediterranean Sea. I want to say that these 
are not simply good intentions and nice wishes; Russia is 
too big a country not to have geopolitical interests in this 
region. I am not talking here about amicable and 
Orthodox ties, but rather—to be blunt—only about 
interests. 

[Glisic] What would be the motives for what you call 
betrayal? 

[Volodin] Here, I will use the geopolitical term “Atlan- 
tism” or the more substantive term, from a philosophical 
and cultural-historical viewpoint, “mondialism.” But in 
Russia, this “mondialism” is contrasted with Eurasian- 
ism, and “Atlantism” with Russian national interests. 
On the political scene, Kozyrev is a typical representa¬ 
tive of “Atlantism,” while on the philosophical-historic 
scene—even though he does not realize it, because his 


52 


YUGOSLAVIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


abilities are too limited—he is objectively a “mondial- 
ist.” Naturally, it is possible to adopt both pro-Atlantist 
and promondialist positions, but there is also the historic 
destiny of the nation and state. Russia’s foreign policy 
over the last seven years has been unnatural for historic 
consciousness, meaning that it runs counter to the his¬ 
toric consciousness and historic interests of the Russian 
people. Even if it were continued for a little more time, 
that policy is inevitably condemned to ruin. 

[Glisic] In that case, how do you interpret the Yeltsin 
phenomenon, and how did Russia even end up with 
Yeltsin? 

[Volodin] As a political figure, Yeltsin arrived on a wave 
of refusal to accept an enormous quantity of inadequa¬ 
cies and mistakes from the period when the communists 
ruled society. Taking advantage of these negative phe¬ 
nomena, he very easily created a populist program. In a 
situation like that, Ivanov, Petrov, or Sidorov could have 
emerged as well, but they took Yeltsin, who was capable 
of taking direct action. 

[Glisic] Thus, official Russia, with its official Russian 
policy, depends on the West and submits to the West’s 
dictates, as never before in the modem age—could one 
say this? 

[Volodin] Without a doubt. If you read Baker’s letter to 
Kozyrev, you see that their views are completely iden¬ 
tical. For now, only excerpts from that letter have been 
made public, but if you were to read the entire docu¬ 
ment, you would see that Kozyrev is simply a puppet in 
Baker’s hands, hanging from a string. 

[Glisic] Is there any advantage to that? At one time, the 
West promised major material aid to Russia, but as far 
as I know nothing has come of that aid. 

[Volodin] There exists, you know, the concept of polit¬ 
ical inertia. They, Yeltsin and Kozyrev, are so involved 
in the system that they cannot pull back, they cannot step 
away. In Helsinki, at the CSCE meeting, there were 
certain conflicts between the Russian position and 
Baker’s position, but that was only a weak attempt to 
break out of the inertia. But the fact of the matter is that 
the process of inertia is continuing. That is exactly why 
the opposition said in its statement that after it assumes 
power it will revise all international agreements con¬ 
cluded by the Soviet Union and Russia between 1985 
and 1992, because that political decision will break the 
trend of inertia. 

[Glisic] After all you have said, is it possible to formulate 
some sort of Yeltsinian political poetics? 

[Volodin] It is simply difficult for me to formulate 
anything where Yeltsin is concerned. Aside from enor¬ 
mous ambitions and a complete misunderstanding of 
Russia, 1 think that there is nothing here. In more than a 
year as president, he has managed to use the word 
“Russians” not once, despite the fact that Russians 
today make up more than 80 percent of the population of 


Russia. I wrote about this four months ago, and for four 
months I have been keeping an eye on whether or not he 
would say the word “Russians,” but he has remained 
very consistent—he has not uttered it a single time. 

[Glisic] So what is the political credo of the unified 
opposition? 

[Volodin] Let me say, before responding to your ques¬ 
tion, that the people in power do in fact have a credo. 
During the debate on the 1992 budget, Gaydar said 
something. He blurted it out, he simply said it.... When 
the opposition was attacking and criticizing him, he 
responded that the main task of his government is to 
create a third estate. But this is not the third estate, it is, 
in practical terms, the criminal bourgeoisie which came 
from the Mafia systems during communist days. In two 
years, these Mafia circles have already gained a political 
lobby, and it appears to us that they have already 
established contacts with mafia systems in the West. I 
think that this government’s objective is to create not a 
third estate, but rather a comprador bourgeoisie. If one 
recognizes this, then all the actions by this government 
make sense, including its foreign policy. 

And the opposition? The opposition includes a wide 
variety of political forces, different philosophies and 
ideologies. In the unified opposition in parliament, there 
is cooperation between constitutional democrats, so- 
called cadets, and communists, but that does not confuse 
us. The basic gist of our assessment of events in Russia is 
that the crisis has reached a stage where questions are 
being raised about the existence of fundamental princi¬ 
ples: the integrity of the state, its independence, and the 
survival of the very nation. We have concluded that on 
this basis, and in order to force this government to 
resign, we must set aside all political and ideological 
differences. National state interests are above all else. 

[Glisic] Concretely speaking, what does the opposition’s 
economic program imply—some sort of reprivatization, 
the return of land to the farmers? 

[Volodin] No, we will not take such measures. We feel 
that a longer period of state control over basic economic 
sectors is necessary, accompanied by a regime of highly 
favorable conditions for li^t industry, manufacturing, 
commerce, and agriculture, regardless of the form of 
ownership. During the stabilization period, moreover, 
very strict controls over foreign trade will be introduced. 
Together with state foreign trade, private foreign trade 
will be allowed for those enterprises and branches of the 
economy where private trade has proven efficient. The 
land question is a radical question. No one in the 
opposition intends to disband the kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes, farm property; rather, the farmers themselves 
should decide which form of production they want. 
Right now, this is being shown obviously by southern 
Russia. 

Representatives of the Yeltsin administration wanted to 
break up the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and sell the land, 
but the Cossacks expressed strong protest. They said that 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


YUGOSLAVIA 


53 


the traditional Cossack way of using the land is the 
current communal way, and that the Cossack people will 
not permit any sort of buying and selling on their 
territory. We have a very flexible view of this issue. What 
is being done today is the same thing that was done in 
1928-29, during collectivization. Breaking up some of 
the kolkhozes or sovkhozes means condemning the 
country to hunger. I want to emphasize that we are not 
staunch supporters of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, but 
we have considered the issue soberly and we feel that a 
new rural revolution would in fact be a national tragedy. 

[Glisic] Just a minute ago you said, “if the opposition 
comes to power.” What are the chances of it actually 
coming to power? 

[Volodin] The attitude among the people since 2 Jan¬ 
uary, since the introduction of the liberalization of 
prices, has turned sharply in the direction of the oppo¬ 
sition and against the regime. Yeltsin has misinterpreted 
the ostensibly peaceful attitude of the people over these 
seven months. Psychologically, the people are no longer 
behind him. Inflation is unrestrainable. If his privatiza¬ 
tion program becomes a reality, then we will have tens of 
millions of unemployed people in Russia by fall, and that 
is an explosive mass of people. The problem is to avoid 
an explosion, to keep that basic mass under control, and, 
by using it, and in its name, to come to power in the 
traditional way. 

[Glisic] The Yugoslav public would be interested in an 
explanation of Gorbachev’s spectacular rise and his also 
spectacular fall. 

[Volodin] Gorbachev’s rise is completely explainable. In 
April 1985, as a young politician, he said that reforms 
and improvements are essential in all areas of life. 
Society expected all of this as well. If Gorbachev had 
been a national leader and carried out a policy of 
national interests, then he would still be enjoying 
undreamed-of political support by all of society to this 
day. As early as 1986, however, it became clear that he is 
simply a chatterbox. By that year, he had come to be 
known in Russian intellectual circles as Aleksandr 
Fedorovich—^a reference to Kerenskiy. All of his actions 
were aimed at simply breaking up the entire state. The 
economy was gradually falling apart, and realizing that 
he no longer had any political support in society, he 
adopted the traditional struggle for peace. This is a good 
indicator in Russia: If you have failed to achieve any¬ 
thing inside the country, then struggle for peace on earth. 
This is the same thing that Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
did. At this point, we regard his as a traitor, and a public 
social committee has been formed to investigate Gor¬ 
bachev’s activities. In May, the chairman of that com¬ 
mittee asked the procurator general of Russia to initiate 
proceedings against Gorbachev for antistate activities. 
We prepared the documents. 

[Glisic] You say that his goal was to break up the state. 
What was his motivation—^personal reasons, material 
advantages, clumsiness? 


[Volodin] I think that a combination of all such factors 
was involved. I have not devoted much attention to 
Gorbachev’s psyche, and I am not familiar with his 
behind-the-scenes activities, but in terms of his very 
nature, his character, that man has shown himself to be 
an enemy. He betrayed the party. Regardless of what our 
attitude toward it is, everyone in Russia recognizes that 
this is betrayal. He betrayed the fundamental national 
interests of the Soviet Union. He openly betrayed the 
Soviet Union in September 1991 when he unconstitu¬ 
tionally granted independence to the Baltic states. He 
also betrayed all the friends that Russia had in both the 
East and the West, he betrayed our army, and our 
geopolitical interests. Regardless of how one views the 
tearing down of the Berlin Wall, the process under way in 
Eastern Europe, that was the first line of defense, and he 
betrayed all of that. 

[Glisic] What is the position of Orthodoxy in Russia 
today? Is Orthodoxy threatened? 

[Volodin] I will quote several figures of interest to your 
readers. There were 1,242 monasteries in Russia in 1917, 
but only 11 in 1988, Today there are around 40. In 1917, 
there were more than 30,000 churches, while today there 
are around 11,000. According to estimates by the 
Academy of Sciences, 11,000 churches were tom down 
and 3.5 to 4 million icons were destroyed during Khrush¬ 
chev’s mle alone. That was the situation of Orthodoxy 
until 1988, but the situation is no better today. The 
rights of the Orthodox Church continue to be restricted. 
During the years of perestroyka, 80 percent of the 
remaining icons were removed from Russia. 

On the other hand, however, there has been a spiritual 
boom, and the authority of the Orthodox Church is on 
the rise. It is no coincidence that the well-known provo¬ 
cateur Gleb Yakunin, who wears a clerical robe, has 
begun a campaign of provocation, ostensibly to uncover 
priests as KGB agents. Everyone realizes that this is not 
about uncovering agents, but rather about destroying the 
true meaning of Orthodoxy. Moreover, the current pro¬ 
visional government is creating highly favorable condi¬ 
tions for realization of the pope’s plan to reevangelize 
Russia. A regime of the greatest privileges has been 
offered to Protestant organizations as well. A great 
amount of propaganda is being done by the followers of 
Krishna. And because the Orthodox Church is poor, the 
aggressiveness of Protestantism, Catholicism, and non- 
traditional religions is increasing under these circum¬ 
stances. For this reason, we stated in the opposition 
platform that upon coming to power we will offer sup¬ 
port to the traditional religions of the nations of Russia, 
without interfering in their internal affairs, and I am 
thinking here primarily of Orthodoxy in the territory of 
Russia, and in a number of areas Islam, as well as 
Lamaism, as a special form of Buddhism, among the 
Kalmyks and Buryats. 

[Glisic] Are ideas of Slavic identity, or rather Pan- 
Slavism, experiencing a revival in Russia? 


54 


YUGOSLAVIA 


[Volodin] If we look at the Slavic world, it is currently 
impossible to solve the problem of Pan-Slavism politi¬ 
cally. As an ethnopsychological, cultural-historical, and 
in a certain sense even historical-philosophical ideal, it is 
meeting with a great deal of understanding among circles 
of the Russian intelligentsia, and is preserved in decla¬ 
rations by certain political parties, but the road from 
historical philosophy to politics is a very long one. 

[Glisic] In closing, if the Russian opposition, to which 
you belong, comes to power, what can we Serbs expect? 

[Volodin] I have already told you that the opposition has 
stated openly that upon assumption of power it will 
revise all international agreements concluded between 
1985 and 1992. As you know, our parliamentary oppo¬ 
sition bitterly opposed sanctions and the blockade, and 
at the same time it received a majority of votes in the 
Supreme Soviet when the question of using military 
force against Serbia and Montenegro was under consid¬ 
eration. We have an unambiguous, precise, and clear 
stance on this issue. 

[Glisic] I warn you that many Serbs, for historic, senti¬ 
mental, and, if you like, also religious reasons, expect a 
special status for themselves among the Russians. 

[Volodin] You see, we have arrived at such a cata¬ 
strophic situation that after coming to power, if we 
confer most-favored-nation status on Serbia, then Serbia 
will have nothing to pay us with. The second thing is to 
restore deliveries of raw materials, to bring about at least 
the previous level of commercial ties, and significantly 
strengthen cultural contacts—^and even poor Russia can 
do that! 

[Glisic] One more thing: You have bitter things to say 
about certain figures from the official government, from 
the leadership. After this interview, you will return to 
Russia. Do you anticipate any consequences; what is the 
current level of repression? 

[Volodin] We recently published an open letter from 
Djuretic to Yeltsin on the third page of the newspaper 
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, while on the second page 
was my article about the annual proclamation “Speech 
to the People.” That was a document from June 1991 
when several rather well-known people in Russia, 
including me, addressed the people with an appeal that 
they oppose betrayal and close ranks in the struggle for 
renewi, for a Russian renaissance. The current vice 
president, Rutskoy, immediately demanded that all the 
signers of the proclamation be sentenced to 10 years of 
hard labor! After the political coup in August 1991, 
many from the opposition, including the signers of the 
letter, were prepared for repression. Now, however, the 
opposition has grown stronger, we know which social 
forces stand behind us, and any repression against the 
opposition would be regarded as provocation. 

[Glisic] The government is keeping this in mind? 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 

[Volodin] I personally think that there is a danger of the 
current regime attempting some sort of provocation 
while parliament is on annual vacation. But that is why 
1 became a journalist instead of remaining a professor.... 

Declaration on Peaceful Resolution in Sandzak 

92BA1305D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 
30 Jut 92 p 6 

[Article by R.H.: “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”] 

[Text] Tutin—^A meeting of the opstina assembly was 
held the day before yesterday in Tutin in which a 
Declaration on Peace, Community Life, and Prosperity 
was adopted. The declaration was unanimously adopted 
by the deputies of one of the most underdeveloped 
opstinas in the country, and it was signed by the leaders 
Zvonimir Stasevic, Hasim Malicevic, and Muharem 
Trgovac. The declaration particularly emphasized that 
mutual tolerance, understanding, and respect for ethnic, 
cultural, and other specific features of the nationalities of 
Sandzak are needed in this area. All disputes should be 
settled peacefully in keeping with the law and through 
the institutions of the system. The people of Sandzak 
give full support to Milan Panic and Dobrica Cosic, from 
whom they expect removal of the sanctions and pros¬ 
perity of ^rbia and Yugoslavia in the near future, the 
declaration states. There are no paramilitary formations 
in this region. For the moment, there is no evidence 
whatsoever that any citizen of this opstina has partici¬ 
pated in an oiganized way in the war in B-H [Bosnia- 
Hercegovina]. If there have been individuals, then these 
are people who had previously moved to Bosnia, 

In any case, the local citizens of this opstina are dis¬ 
turbed by the presence of the reserve units of the 
Yugoslav Army in this region, which has particularly 
upset the Muslim people, who have nothing against the 
regular army, but have objections to the behavior of 
individuals in the reserves who could cause incidents 
with untold consequences. What most frightens the 
Muslims and Serbs in this region today is that peace and 
freedom can be disturbed by some third party from 
outside. 

The position of the deputies of this opstina is that Serbia 
has l^en and remains the parent state of all the Serbs and 
Muslims as well as of the other nationalities who live in 
it. 

Implications of General Vasiljevic^s Arrest 

92BA1277C Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 
24 Jul 92 p 9 

[Article by Svetislav Spasojevic: “Kill the Blackbird 
Known as KOS”) 

[Text] Major General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, until 
recently the top man in the Security Administration of 
the Yugoslav Army, has for some 10 days now been in 
military prison in Ustanicka Street in Belgrade. (Even 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 ADgost 1992 


YUGOSLAVIA 


55 


after the arrest of the subject of its interview, which was 
expected anyway, NIN has quite enough material to 
continue the series of articles entitled “Ail the Secrets of 
KOS” [Counterintelligence Service; literally, blackbird].) 
The trouble with the written word is that it remains and 
thus places an obligation on men who are moral. 

Last week, the daily press wrote at length and in great 
detail about the arrest of the man who is the best- 
informed about the strictly kept secrets of the top lead¬ 
ership of the Yugoslav Army. Nevertheless, let us repeat 
some of the more essential facts, which for the present 
are not sufficiently well-known. 

On 15 July, the general was questioned in the military 
court in Belgrade for more than eight hours by Captain 
1st Class Milomir Salic, investigating judge; he then 
broadened his original indictment and held him in 
custody during investigation. The man who until yes¬ 
terday headed the Counterintelligence Service of the 
Yugoslav Army is accused of terrorism, undermining the 
country’s military and defensive capability, abuse of 
official position, bribery, and corruption.... 

The law speaks exclusively through a final verdict. Not, 
that is, through an indictment, a press release, nor, God 
help us, through the press. And that is the reason why 
establishment of the truth lies in the jurisdiction of the 
court, but only in democratic societies. Although for 
decades now, and especially in recent years, we have 
been living in a state where there are no rights, we are 
compelled to believe in the inception of some new times 
and a human community. The “Vasiljevic case,” then, 
should be left to the military court and we should believe 
all the while in its honorable intentions. 

Although in the pages of NIN we have published about 
100 typed pages, Mr. Vasiljevic never wanted to talk 
about the new chief of the Security Administration, 
General Nedeljko Boskovic. He broke that rule only 
once. At that time, he told me that the new top man at 
KOS had accused him of attempting to kill him! He 
thought, he said, that this was only a momentary erup¬ 
tion of the irrational and that the matter would be settled 
very quickly. The case took on a special dimension when 
following that incomprehensible accusation he was 
called in for a talk by Colonel General Zivota Panic, 
acting chief of the General Staff. Vasiljevic is said to 
have taken a shot at Boskovic in Sarajevo, in front of the 
garrison in Lukavica. 

Gen. Zivota Panic, the top man in the Yugoslav Army, 
asked Vasiljevic, who at that time had just ceased to be 
the top man in the Counterintelligence Service of that 
same army, where he was on the particular day which the 
present top man of KOS, Gen. Boskovic, chose as the 
time when the assassination attempt was made on him in 
Sarajevo? Vasiljevic recalled that he spent that day with 
Isakije Stanic, the Belgrade lawyer who is now defending 
him. 

1 do not recall today the exact date of the unsuccessful 
assassination attempt of the Yugoslav general against the 


Yugoslav general, but I am convinced that it was not St. 
Vitus’ Day. That same day, again according to the 
testimony of Gen. Vasiljevic, in the building of the 
Federal Secretariat for National Defense [SSNO], in 
front of the office of the chief of the General Staff, Gen. 
Nedeljko Boskovic threatened Colonel Miladin Papic, 
military prosecutor of the Yugoslav Army as follows: 
“And when I arrest you, Miladin, I will bring the 
television people to cover it.” 

Vasiljevic, who has now been arrested, was pensioned off 
with another 30 or so generals on 8 May of this year. He 
learned of this in a small garrison in Hercegovina, where 
that day he had been attempting to exchange captured 
Croatian soldiers for members of the Yugoslav People’s 
Army [JNA]. The news was communicated to him by the 
officers of that garrison, because they had heard it on 
television! Gen. Aleksandar Vasiljevic is now 54 years 
old. He has been replaced by a man older than him, a 
man who had already been in retirement about five 
years! 

Following the conversation in Gen. Panic’s office, the 
subject of NIN’s interview realized that peaceful days of 
retirement did not lie ahead of him. The night before he 
went to the interrogation in the military court we talked 
for a long time in the newspaper office. He was con¬ 
vinced that he would be taken into custody, but also that 
there was no basis for that.! got the impression that he 
wanted to be arrested so that he could prove his pro¬ 
priety and devotion in the court, above all to the service 
to which he belonged, and then also to the army itself. 
Vasiljevic, in my modest estimation, is a bom soldier. A 
native of Sumadija, he graduated from all the military 
schools and reached the top army leadership without the 
help of “negative selection.” Others have told me in 
recent days that in this dirty Yugoslav war other top- 
level officers would not even have let their dog go where 
the “man from Kragujevac pledged his life.” 

The imprisonment of Gen. Vasiljevic and a “charge 
which could bring him life imprisonment” are inter¬ 
preted by many as a declaration of a showdown with the 
former top military leadership and above all with Gen¬ 
erals Kadijevic, Adzic, Brovet.... The end of the war is 
coming into view, and someone, like it or not, will have 
to render account for its consequences to the Serbian 
people and above all to the mothers whose children have 
disappeared forever. The trial of a man who by his office 
was one of the key Yugoslav generals quite certainly 
brings onto the stage of the courtroom what until yes¬ 
terday was the country’s top military leadership, but it is 
certain that the top government leadership will keep 
them company in the defendant’s box. In that perfor¬ 
mance, even the top leadership of a republic, at least as 
far as those are concerned who are informed about the 
“Vasiljevic case,” will not be given a cameo role. 

Why has NIN, week after week, almost obstinately and 
in spite of everything, been publishing the confession of 
Aleksandar Vasiljevic? There is only one answer: 


56 


YUGOSLAVIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


because there is no more reliable weapon in the defense 
of democracy than the free press. And the court will say 
what the truth is. 

It is a long time since we saw the film “To Kill a 
Mockingbird,” in which the hero defends an innocent 
man. The film’s title in English means “To Kill the 
Blackbird (KOS).” Finally, to what extent is NIN in the 
right if it only suspects that some quite definite depart¬ 
ment wants to kill that bird at someone’s expense? 

Hercegovina Fighter Denies Forming Army 

92BA1305F Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 
30Jul92p4 

[Article by D.B.: “Antelj’s Paramilitary Army”] 

[Text] Boracnica (Konjic)—Boro Antelj (age 35), “from 
Nevesinje and Orthodox to boot,” as he says, has, 
following lengthy warnings, formed his own army and 
for several months now, pretty much outside the Bileca 
Corps, has been holding a lengthy front from Nevesinje 
to just outside Konjic. The young captain, who back in 
elementary school argued with the teacher over history, 
first graduated from transportation school, then the 
military academy, and he has served in 2^mun and 
Kragujevac... and then not long thereafter a military 
disciplinary court in Belgrade “took away” his rank. 

Everything was corrected at the end of last year, when 
Antelj, after quite a bit of coolness on the part of the 
General Staff (Blagoje Adzic), was formally assigned to 
the Trebinje Brigade. Antelj’s fighting men, who are 
holding a front almost 50 km long, have recently been 
accused more and more of being outside the unified 
command, of being a paramilitary army.... 

“I formed the unit myself, but I am not outside the corps. 
TTie leader of the hue and cry against my unit is someone 
whose role in Nevesinje is unclear to everyone. This is 
Colonel Svetozar Parezanin, who has been initiating 
everything on behalf of the League of Communists— 
Movement for Yugoslavia [SK-PJ], and the point is to 
proclaim the Serbs who are now fitting for their lives to 
be war criminals, which is what happened after World 
War II,” Antelj says, and he has this to say about the 
accusations that they are a party-oriented army and that 
is why he recently traveled to Belgrade: 

“They accused me of having recently gone to the rally to 
destroy the present government in Serbia and to create 
an army for Vuk Draskovic and the SPO [Serbian 
Renewal Movement], which is foolishness. It is true that 
my long-held goal has been to create a Serbian army, a 
Serbian state. Orthodoxy, Slavism, but membership in a 
party should be left for after the war, when we win.” 


Hercegovina Corps Commander Describes 
Problems 

92BA1305E Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 
30Jul92p4 

[Interview with Colonel Radovan Grubac, commander 
of the Hercegovina Corps, by Dragan Banjac in Bileca; 
date not given: “A Way Out of the State of Abandon¬ 
ment”] 

[Text] Bileca—Colonel Radovan Grubac, newly 
appointed commander of the Hercegovina Corps, almost 
inherited the “disease” of avoiding newsmen of his 
predecessor in the time of the JNA [Yugoslav People’s 
Army] in these parts—General Pavle Strugar, whom 
very few people managed to see during the period of 
nearly a year that he spent in Hercegovina. 

“After its arrival here, the corps was in a state not of 
betrayal, but of abandonment. Order was needed, and 
we also had a problem because of the diminished 
number of company commanders, and there was also a 
poor match between people and equipment, so that some 
of the equipment was not functional. We also had the 
worst thing that could happen to us—mistrust on the 
part of the people. 

“We came into conflict with three armies—^the regular 
army of the Republic of Croatia, Ustasha units from 
Western Hercegovina, and the organized Muslims who 
in this region were mainly against us. The Croatian 
Army has been manned with filters from Varazdin, 
Zagreb, Dugo Selo, Rijeka, Sibenik, Split, Omis, Makar- 
ska, Imotski, and Dubrovnik, as indicated by the mass of 
captured supplies, and we are dealing with outright 
aggression on the part of Croatia into these areas.” 

The commander of the corps in Bileca believes that his 
fighters broke down the Croatian forces, particularly on 
the Dubrovnik front, and inflicted considerable losses in 
equipment and personnel on them. “In the area of 
Ivanica,” Grubac says, “a good percentage of the 
Croatian forces, in particular the Split Brigade, were 
manned with university and high school students. We 
are rather stable, we have achieved the necessary morale 
(there have been examples of pure heroism), and the 
objective is to drive these forces out of the SAG [Serbian 
Autonomous Oblast] of Hercegovina with the Neretva 
River as border and to the sea at Neum. It also includes 
the area of the upper Neretva and Upper Drina Valley.” 

In eastern Hercegovina, one can often hear (from 
officers) about the problem of the undefined state in 
those areas. The commander says that in some places the 
government is providing proper support, but in some 
places not. There is a particular problem, Grubac says, in 
the fact that the economy is not functioning and that 
Hercegovina has been left to itself and in large part 
plundered even by the Serbs themselves. The effort has 
yet to be made to seek the addresses of those who in the 
name of Serbism have plundered from these areas for 
their own personal benefit aluminum, say, and certain 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


YUGOSLAVIA 


57 


other important items of value, which passed over into 
Yugoslavia through special channels and are being “con¬ 
cealed” there, waiting for the price to fill the car trunks 
of private operators. In the meantime, ordinary people 
are dying for them, and many have fled (with their 
capital). 

“Of the 1,000 officers, 50 of us responded to the call, but 
one-third of the capable defenders fled to Serbia and 
Montenegro,” he says. 

Reproaching the Muslims in the area under Velez for 
betrayal, the commander says that he cannot have a high 
opinion of that people although (just like his command) 
he distances himself from certain actions by the police 
and certain paramilitary organizations toward the 
minority nationality of this region. In spite of a certain 
amount of understanding for those who did not respond 
to the call, Grubac issued a call to those who have fled to 
return and defend Hercegovina. Many people were con¬ 
fused by the case of Major General Vodije Vujovic, who 
when appointed commander here only made an appear¬ 
ance, spent the night in an apartment in the JNA Center, 
and went away. He is still getting paid in “his” corps, 
although he was later assigned (in the Command of the 
1st Army) to the position of assistant commander for 
civil affairs. 

Serbian Opposition After Democratic Party Rift 

92BAI305C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 
30Jul92p 11 

[Article by Cvijetin Milivojevic: “Winners With the 
Taste of Losers”] 

[Text] The split in the Democratic Party [DS], as matters 
now stand, could be yet another step, this time serious 
and dramatic, toward instilling more order in the chaos 
of the Serbian opposition. A chaos which in these three 
years of multipartyism in Serbia has almost regularly 
been to the advantage of the present government.... 

Regardless of whether the departure of those who are 
dissatisfied has been a gain or loss for the remainder of the 
Democratic Party, in the past several days five opposition 
courses have b^ome clearly differentiated in Serbia. 
Along with the Serbian Radic^ Party, which in spite of its 
fair amount of influence on the “popular masses” is not 
even considered an opposition party by most of the oppo¬ 
sition; in addition to the several smaller parties of “inde¬ 
pendent origin” (Serbian National Renewal and the newly 
established Social Democratic Party are the most impor¬ 
tant); aside from DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Ser¬ 
bia], and its civil alternative under the name of the Civil 
Alliance of Serbia—^the remainder of the DS (the former 
wing centering around Micunovic and Djindjic) is as of 
Sunday in a position to behave specifically as a party of the 
democratic center. No longer burdened by the Damocles 
(double-edged) sword which from the outset has hovered 
over the Democratic Party (because of its destiny as 


“perpetually the second” party of the opposition) in the 
“person” of the numerical superiority of the Serbian 
Renewal Movement.... 

Who is winning and who is losing is the most frequent 
question of the public now that the wing of Vojislav 
Kostunica has “sacrificed” so-called party identity to the 
future (probably) election coalition of DEPOS. This 
movement, which has seen closing of the ranks of the 
opposition as the only serious possibility of bringing 
down the party in power, nevertheless is not what it was 
supposed to be—^that is now absolutely clear—according 
to the conception of its initiators a few months ago. In 
spite of the St. Vitus’ Day “victory,” DEPOS, for 
instance, with its overemphasized national idea and 
iconography, has in a way repelled those who until 
yesterday were its allies, advocates of the civil option. 
Establishment of the Civil Alliance of Serbia (along with 
the probable movement of this association closer to the 
parties of the ethnic minorities) and the final split with 
the Democratic Party—^are not greatly favorable to 
DEPOS however much it might be celebrating the divi¬ 
sion among the Democrats under the influence of 
momentary euphoria. 

Why? With all due respect for the intellectual potential 
of DEPOS, the exclusive concentration of the national 
(Serbian) intelligence will nevertheless remain incom¬ 
plete without support of the democratic center. Another 
thing: In view of the arrogance of the ruling elite of 
Serbia, the demands of DEPOS on the principle of all or 
nothing (constitutional assembly or nothing) do not 
promise success in any near future. Only if the goal is to 
expose “Micunovic’s collaboration with the Socialists” 
would DEPOS have anything to be happy about. But the 
objective indicators (for instance, public opinion sur¬ 
veys) do not support that argument. 

It follows, then, that the Socialists, pressed to the wall, 
having done nothing for or against, are the ones who 
have the right to be happy and have been given an 
unhoped-for opportunity for “a little breathing space.” 
After all, although this may sound improbable, the 
former Socialists (now Social Democrats), some of the 
present Socialists (and very soon future Social Demo¬ 
crats), sympathizers of the Civil Alliance, Micunovic’s 
Democrats, and also counting on the support of two men 
not committed to parties at the head of the federal 
state—in view of their own sense of tolerance, have more 
chances for a fruitful agreement. The hard-line leader¬ 
ship of the Socialists will certainly play the card of 
division (the card of the “suitable” and “unsuitable” 
opposition), because a similar attempt to append Seselj 
to the Socialists yielded an enviable result. It is not 
impossible that some new “bone” will be thrown in the 
midst of the opposition, which at this point is divided 
even formally, so that then it would engage in settling 
internal accounts. 

DEPOS is getting what it wanted (unison in radical, 
uncompromising opposition to all moves of the govern¬ 
ment), and it can accordingly consider itself the winner. 


58 


YUGOSLAVIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


The Democratic Party would no longer serve as the 
perpetual ‘‘bit in the mouth” checking all attempts of the 
opposition to unite since back in 1990, The Serbian 
Renewal Movement, as the leading party of the new 
coalition, officially gains from this that urgently neces¬ 
sary intellectual “wind at its back,” personified by a 
segment of the academy until recently uncommitted, 
among them people from the world of science and 
culture. 

Even the first elections will show whether this will be a 
sufficiently heavy weight on the election scale for each 
opposition fraction separately and for all of them 
together. They all have the right to hope. 

Program of Social Democratic Party Discussed 

92BAI277A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 
24Jul92pIl 

[Interview with Cedomir Mirkovic, chairman of the 
Initiating Committee for Formation of the Social Dem¬ 
ocratic Party, by S. Pokrajac Stamatovic; place and date 
not given: “Soft Landing on the Democratic Runway”] 

[Text] [Stamatovic] The idea of forming the Social 
Democratic Party [SDS] has been on the public scene for 
several months now, but just recently the initiative of 
people who support such an idea was made public 
through the Declaration on the Founding of the Social 
Democratic Party. In a few days, the party will present 
its programmatic principles to the public, and that is why 
at the beginning of the interview for BORBA we asked 
Cedomir Mirkovic, chairman of the Initiating Com¬ 
mittee for formation of the party, writer, and editor of 
TV Belgrade, how bright the future is for a party of that 
kind under present political circumstances, when polit¬ 
ical forces are already deployed? 

[Mirkovic] When we went public, it turned out that our 
initiative aroused encouraging interest, to use the 
mildest expression, because I might even say enormous 
interest, and so at this moment the most important thing 
for us is how first to respond in an organized way to that 
great interest. In coming days, we will be registering the 
political party and setting up the first branches in Nis, 
Kragujevac, Novi Sad, Kikinda, and Pristina, and in the 
first week of September we will be holding our founding 
congress in Kragujevac. 

We Most Pot Up With the Sospicions 

[Stamatovic] Many in their commentary concerning 
your party stress the fact that the initial core is made up 
of former members of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]. 
To what extent could that possibly be a minus, because 
often a favorable view is not taken of those who leave 
one party in order to form another one? 

[Mirkovic] We have to admit that in past months the 
idea of social democracy and even the very term have 
been associated to a considerable extent with this group 
of deputies in the Serbian Assembly and with the fact 


that they are the most visible in that Initiating Com¬ 
mittee. That has double significance. On the one hand, it 
attracts those people who have identified with what they 
advocate and their refusal to give in to certain relations 
in their original party. On the other hand, one also hears 
the fear expressed that now someone has changed his 
clothes and that our party will be some kind of surrogate 
of some other party. I am aware that we must put up with 
various suspicions. We are starting out at an unfavorable 
moment because of the economically unfavorable situa¬ 
tion and all the way to the fact that parties have already 
formed their profiles, while we are like some wedding 
guest who has been late and is attempting to catch up 
with those who have already gotten a good start on him. 

[Stamatovic] Have you been late? 

[Mirkovic] As far as I am concerned, unless I have to, 1 
will not engage in verbal polemics against suspicions and 
skeptical observations. With our programmatic moves, 
because of the profile of our membership, through our 
role on the public scene, we must prove and demonstrate 
our identity and integrity. The political scene is begin¬ 
ning to become more dynamic; with luck and if the 
government does not invent any tricks, this could make 
it possible for us to make a soft landing on the demo¬ 
cratic runway far behind schedule, indeed at least two 
years. 

[Stamatovic] The working version of your Declaration 
bears a programmatic similarity to certain other parties, 
particularly the Democratic Party. 

[Mirkovic] If a programmatic similarity with the Dem¬ 
ocratic Party has been spotted, this need not be sur¬ 
prising, because we are above all a democratic party with 
claims to emphasize the economic and social program 
and especially social security and solidarity. I would 
recall that our program consists of the most important 
catalogue of social-democratic values of the present-day 
Western democracies which have made a large contribu¬ 
tion to economic and social development and which in 
addition are very dynamic and capable of adapting to 
specific conditions. We have adapted our program to our 
own circumstances. In the end, programs are the basis on 
which parties must be recognized, but practice provides 
the best credentials. True recognition lies in specific 
activity. I do not think that we will be the same as any 
party either in our program or in our activity, and will 
take up its space, nor that anyone will displace us 
because of a related orientation. 

Take Cosic and Panic at Their Word 

[Stamatovic] There is talk about a coalition between you 
and the Democratic and certain other parties. 

[Mirkovic] We have agreed to build a political party 
^ which is open to coalition and ready to enter into 
alliances on certain issues, but at the outset we will 
operate independently. We will operate that way until we 
feel our own strength and political range and prospects. 
It seems to us that it would be a bad thing if we were even 



JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


YUGOSLAVIA 


59 


now to see ourselves as a part of some alliance. In any 
case, we will very gladly enter into a coalition with the 
parties of the center. 

[Stamatovic] What is your attitude toward DEPOS 
[Democratic Movement of Serbia]? 

[Mirkovic] We have not formulated specific views con¬ 
cerning DEPOS. But I can set forth my personal view. 
DEPOS has a democratic orientation, and its orientation 
is democratic above all else. Regardless of how skeptical 
one might be of some of their specific moves. 

[Stamatovic] Of what does that skepticism consist? 

[Mirkovic] In that if I were an active member of DEPOS, 
I would do a better job of formulating the attitude 
toward the individual parties, and I would also array the 
objectives over time and provide them some kind of a 
calendar schedule. When you all at once come forth with 
a maximalist demand in a heap, it immediately becomes 
counterproductive. However, I have a liking for DEPOS, 
because otherwise I would not enter into the details of 
their strategy. 

[Stamatovic] What DEPOS has been insisting on has not 
been accepted? 

[Mirkovic] Some of what they insisted on has probably 
been converted as some kind of accumulated energy. The 
question now is which direction that dynamism will go. 
TTiere are two tendencies, one which offers some kind of 
consensus to neutralize the great inner strains that are 
blocking Serbia. I see on the other side the tendency to 
respond to the action of DEPOS and to the action of the 
university students by thumbing their nose and dis¬ 
playing certain new signs of repression. I see that repres¬ 
sion both in the laws offered on public assembly and in 
certain current actions concerning the news media. It 
seems to me that even in the government itself at this 
moment there is a strong inner strain between that 
tendency that wants increased social agreement and that 
tendency which sees a cementing of its interests in 
displaying an irreconcilable, exclusive, and arrogant atti¬ 
tude toward all demands for more democracy. 

[Stamatovic] What is to be done under such circum¬ 
stances? 

[Mirkovic] The most important thing is for all well- 
meaning people and all constructive political forces at 
this moment to take Mr. Cosic and Mr. Panic at their 
word when they promised elections at all levels. When I 
say this, I do not mean that these two men would go back 
on what they promised, but I am afraid of those who will 
seek all possible ways of wriggling out of those promises 
and evading them. 

[Stamatovic] Let us go back to your future party. I am 
interested in your attitude toward the Serbs outside 
Serbia. 

[Mirkovic] No political program at this moment can 
claim serious support in the Serbian people unless it 


faces the position of the Serbs who have been left outside 
Serbia and does so in the greatest detail and in a most 
responsible way, without beating about the bush and 
without cheap patriotic rhetoric. It seems to me that 
every one of those programs must be premised upon the 
necessity that the Serbian people be a part of one whole 
in the cultural and spiritual sense and have ties to its 
parent state of Serbia. It is likewise necessary to shape in 
all Serbs, both those in Serbia and those outside it, the 
awareness that only a democratic Serbia, strong econom¬ 
ically and defensively, with friends in the world, can in 
the short term and the long term guarantee any future 
existence for the Serbs outside Serbia. 

Cynicism and Mockery of the Serbs 

[Stamatovic] How are we to arrive at such a Serbia? It 
obviously does not have at this moment all those 
attributes which you have enumerated. 

[Mirkovic] At this moment, such a Serbia could emerge 
if the promises are kept which Mr. Panic and Mr. Cosic 
have presented to the public, and that means holding 
elections at all levels by the end of the year. Panic and 
Cosic have offered in the best possible way a solution 
both for the great internal tensions and even that partial 
legality of a state which is inappropriately being called 
Yugoslavia. Panic and Cosic could not have offered a 
better strategy, because they have distanced themselves 
from verbalism, and these are major pledges not to give 
in, not even to what ought to be consented to. 

[Stamatovic] Your party will favor holding a referendum 
to reassess the decision on the joint state of Serbs and 
Montenegrins? 

[Mirkovic] We have come out in favor of a referendum 
in which the people would express its will on all aspects 
of the joint state, including the name and all the way to 
the symbols. At the same time, we have not the slightest 
intention of questioning the justifiability of the peoples 
of Serbia and Montenegro living in the same state. 
However, the name of Yugoslavia for that state might 
rather be seen as cynicism and as a mockery of the Serbs. 
That name obviously was retained because certain poli¬ 
ticians have bound up their destiny with the promise to 
preserve Yugoslavia, and now when it is definitively 
done with, they give that name to the two former 
Yugoslav republics which are the only ones that had 
statehood even before Yugoslavia. You cannot give the 
name Yugoslavia to Damp Little Meadow regardless of 
what you hope to achieve by that trick as is evident from 
the fact that retaining that name, which has not brought 
Serbia good fortune, cannot even guarantee it the right to 
inheritance of the former state. 

[Stamatovic] Serbia—republic or monarchy? Again you 
call for a referendum? 

[Mirkovic] We have left open the possibility of taking a 
vote on that dilemma, because we feel that everything 
that spoils and destroys the national identity and 
increases tensions should be resolved by social compact. 


60 


YUGOSLAVIA 


JPRS-EER-92-109 
18 August 1992 


The fact that the Karadjordjevic dynasty was over¬ 
thrown and that overthrow was sanctioned by an undem¬ 
ocratic regime argues in favor of deciding this in a 
referendum. 

[Stamatovic] The concept of social democracy is often 
given differing interpretations? 

[Mirkovic] It is certain that there are those who project 
their personal views, and perhaps they have not been 
sufficiently defined, onto the term and concept of social 
democracy. Some of them will drop us flat when they see 
what we are for. That will certainly occur with those who 
have perhaps believed that we are making some kind of 
anational party which pays no attention to the drama 
and future of the Serbian people. We will likewise 
disappoint those who think that nationality questions 
can be decided by patriotic slogans and cheap war cries. 
However, I hope that we will attract those who believe 
that the national cause, the democratic cause, and the 
cause of social welfare must go side by side and that 
without respecting international standards and without 
positive international legitimacy—nothing significant 
can be done today. 

[Box, p 11] 

The Position and the Opposition 

We have a clumsy and lazy incumbent party which has 
been deadened by the number of volts which has allowed 
it at this moment to do anything it wants any way it 


wants, while on the other side, we have a powerless and 
increasingly nervous opposition which has no other 
choice than to shout about procedure, at least in the 
parliament, and to take advantage of the circumstance 
that sessions of the parliament are carried live over 
television so that in this way they can somehow have 
some influence on the public. That is not a good thing 
and that should not be our future. 

[Box, p 11] 

A Mockery of Logic 

What the government has proposed in connection with 
Politika is for me a sign of immense nervousness in the 
top political leadership. If someone wanted certain 
changes to happen at any price, regardless of procedure, 
he might almost be satisfied with this, because this will 
certainly speed up certain changes. 

However, as responsible people we must be disturbed 
because they are attempting to place Politika in the same 
status as Television, it would become government prop¬ 
erty, which they will refer to as public property, by some 
ironic mockery of logic. Whereas on the one hand Prime 
Minister Panic is promising privatization, even beyond 
the logic of what is realistic, the Serbian Government is 
responding to his requests with nationalization to which 
it refers as privatization. I hope that it will not succeed 
with Politika. Just think of the discrepancy between 
advocating nationalization of Politika and the desire to 
create the best possible picture of Serbia in the world. 


vnxs 

ftTTH PRQCErsS 103 

52S5 FORT 9m PL RD 
SPRIHGFIELD 


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